THE RIGHT TO DEMOCRATIC SELF-DEFENSE

As war in Chechnya winds down to a low level conflict, it is time to revisit the question of what the war was about and where it will lead. The West reacted to the conflict as a revival of Russian imperialism, a sign that Russia’s relations with the world may grow cold again. Many Russians, including democratic reformers who do not fully support Russian policy, feel misunderstood.

When Russians speak of their national interests people see visions of a Soviet-style empire striking back. Nonsense. Except for a small number of fanatics and a few Slavophiles, Russians see no way back to the imperial past.

Nor do they want it, even if they could have it. Today, no irredentist or nationalist movement has significant support in Russia; nothing like the 15-30% of the vote for radical nationalists found in France and Austria. I think the Russians don’t get much credit, even recognition, for the unprecedented equanimity with which they shrugged off centuries of imperial tradition. One reason Russia accepted so peacefully the break-up of the Soviet Union was that many recognized that empire and democracy were incompatible. What Russians seek is economic renewal that will pave the way for Russia to play a more important role in the life of Europe and the world.

This is not to say that there is no resentment about the way Russia is treated. For a decade we have experienced humiliation after humiliation: loss of superpower status; vast and disorienting social problems; NATO’s eastern expansion. No one pays any attention to Russia: not over Yugoslavia; not over decisions concerning former Soviet republics, where significant Russian populations reside. The West often claimed to be helping. Russia made a show of gratitude. But honestly speaking, nothing has been done that could not be explained by pure self interest.

Not that the West did not have a right to act in its self-interest. But so does Russia. For many people, including our educated, liberal, and pro-western sectors, the second Chechnya War offered a chance to show that we have not lost everything. Almost all Russians now believe that we must defend our interests. This is the psychological basis of Putin’s popularity.

That Russia’s genuine national interest — not imperial ambitions — are at the root of the second war in Chechnya is not sufficiently recognized. Indeed, at the beginning I was myself a strong supporter of Putin, especially when the campaign was directed at terrorists. Chechnya was a hotbed of anarchy and terrorism, with various clans brutally competing with each other and, in the process, threatening the region’s stability. Conflict was already spreading to neighboring Dagestan; lawlessness was a real danger.

The Chechnya War was thus a war for our Constitution, which differs from, say, the American Constitution only by the depth and length of its tradition. Imagine if Alabama suddenly overthrew all democratic institutions. I am sure America would not hesitate to reestablish constitutional government, even if force was required.

So far, the West will not grant Russia the same rights of democratic self-defense. Because Russian constitutional norms are considered unstable, imposing them by force appears willful and undemocratic. Yet Russia has the same obligations to defend its constitution as does any country. By defending our constitution we defend democracy.

Wars, of course, have a logic that often defeats the positive motives with which they begin. As the offensive progressed, Chechen bandits largely hid in the mountains, while Russian might was turned on cities where civilians were dying. I could not support such barbaric bombings. So, as the war outgrew its anti-terrorist beginnings and the number of refuges reached 200,000, without the government providing a viable program of aid, I began to waiver.

Chechnya also exacted a political price. Though the war brought Putin popularity, it weakened his position. Our generals know that Putin’s political success depends on Chechnya; they are blackmailing him by asking for a 150% increase in defense spending, military training in schools, and a call up of 20,000 army reservists. Putin must finish the war soon if he wants to restore his independence.

So far Putin has offered no long-range plan. I am convinced that the hardest phase of the fighting will end shortly after the elections. Yet guerrilla warfare will simmer on, like a fire underground. What will we do then?

Since no viable local partner is in sight, Russia must work alone to reestablish elementary order in Chechnya. A Governor-General must be appointed, with responsibility for restoring a basis for human life: a chance to start rebuilding the economy, help for those who cannot work, and reconstruction of shattered infrastructure. But the people of Chechnya must be brought in as soon as possible to participate in their government: I think some sort of parliamentary system would be the best, so that various clans would have to work with each other to form coalitions, rather than excluding each other, as they did under the presidential regime of the last few years.

But the outcome of the Chechnya War that matters most for Russia and the world is the conflict’s impact on our democratic evolution. Here there is room for optimism. Elections are preserved. So, too, is freedom of speech, freedom of the media, and the multi- party system. The supposed hand- over of the journalist Babitsky to the Chechen rebels, and the subsequent fears for his life, inspired widespread public revulsion. This was a positive sign, for it meant that democracy has taken root. The life of one man mattered, even in the frenzy of war.

If this year’s violence in Chechnya had occurred in 1991, there would have been a real threat to our democratic aspirations. But though ours is a young constitutional tradition, Russians have been breathing democratic air for ten years now. We don’t want to breathe any other. We don’t want to go back under the ice. The Chechnya War was not only about preserving the Russian state, but also about preserving our democratic constitution. Russians and Chechens have paid a heavy price in lives lost. We must make sure it was not in vain.