Stefan MEISTER: “I see a failure of Russian policy in Germany”

Stefan Meister is a political analyst, program manager for Eastern Europe and Central Asia at the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP), a non-governmental organization that for almost 60 years has been promoting a discussion of foreign policy through research, discussions, and publications.

Dr. Meister visits Ukraine regularly, coming here to give lectures and to participate in activities at various levels.

We met in the DGAP Berlin office to discuss the European prospects of Ukraine and Russia’s influence on EU policy.

Stefan, how has the Ukrainian issue become close to you?

“My academic background is Russia – Russian domestic and foreign policy, and I think that is what many people are starting with in post-Soviet countries. But I think since Ukraine is the second biggest country of the region by population, and it’s a direct neighbor of the European Union, it is one of the countries with the most vibrant civil society – in many senses it’s a very European country. There’s a lot of change, movement, activities, and that fact is very important for other post-Soviet countries. And if you look at the Orange Revolution, and then the Revolution of Dignity, I think these are events that have an effect for the whole region. We understand why Russia reacts in such a way – because it can have consequences for Russian politics. That’s why I think it’s important to study Ukraine also as an indicator for what is possible and what is not possible in the post-Soviet region.”

In Ukraine, we talk a lot about our prospects in Europe. How do you see it from Berlin?

“Personally, I think there should be a perspective, and I think there must be an offer for Ukraine. But in reality, there is no such offer from the EU or from Germany.”

Why?

“There is a clear consensus among our decision-makers and society that there is no enlargement possible at the moment for the EU. And I think the whole Eastern Partnership policy is a policy to hold the countries out, not to bring them in. You can argue that Maidan revolution has changed the situation, because that’s the clear message for ‘we are a European country, we don’t want to have the Russian option anymore.’ But as you can see, there is a strong support from Germany and the European Union, but at the same time I think that’s not sufficient either in terms of money or in terms of offers or in terms of supporting the Ukrainian civil society. So, I think that’s just a half-way policy, it’s not a serious decision for Ukraine as a potential EU country, but it’s more in terms of ‘there is a society interested in Europe, but there are so much crises at the moment, that we have to find balance between Russia, Ukraine, and our own interests.’ And I think that makes it very difficult because that will throw back these people, who really want to have European Ukraine.”

Which factors hinder our rapprochement the most?

“I think there are three areas the factors come from. One is in the EU itself. The EU has overstretched in its enlargement, it has a deficit for integration in itself. And I think that leads to the result that many decision-makers just say ‘we don’t need another problem inside the European Union.’ Ukraine is a very different country from Turkey, that’s for sure, but if you bring Turkey and Ukraine in, it will change the European Union – and the EU, its societies and people, are not prepared for this.

“The second problem is Russia. There is still a focus – not only in Germany, it’s also in France, Italy, Spain, and many other countries, but especially in Germany – that Russia is a security factor in Europe. We have to find a kind of a compromise with Russia. And if there would be NATO troops in Poland, or if there would be more support for Ukraine, for the integration with Ukraine, it will create more problems with Russia, for what we might not be prepared.

“And the third problem is within Ukraine itself and its elites, which you can see at the moment – with Yatseniuk, and the General Prosecutor, and all the fight with the corruption. I think Ukraine at the moment is not really been promoted by these elites; they don’t promote their ability and will to reform the country. So, there is a growing skepticism that this country really has the ability to change, because you still have the oligarchs, which are playing the old game, and you have the Prime Minister which was happy to cut his first billion and even put it on Facebook! I think that’s very bad for any perspective of Ukraine.”

Yes, our officials are a disaster. However, you mentioned Russia. Is the corrupt autocratic regime of Putin is something to be afraid of in Europe?

“I think the problem is that we don’t want to take the consequences of the conflict with Russia. Many of our decision-makers understand that Russia is systematically undermining our norms and principles, but there is still this behavior – you have to look at every member state. If you look at the German society, there is a strong pacifistic tradition from the times of the Cold War; if you look at the polls, 80 percent of Germans say that Russia is not a democratic country, Putin is a bad guy, and Russia is a problem, a security threat. And 50 percent say that we need a tougher approach with Russia, but another 50 percent – and you can say the same about the German elites – always say ‘let’s make compromises, let’s start a dialog’ about the country that is not interested in all that. There’s sometimes the lack of understanding of the logic of the system, but there’s neither the will to understand it. So, I think that’s a bit of a problem that we don’t want to see the reality of Russian politics because we are afraid of the consequences.”

And how strong is, in fact, Russia’s influence within the EU and Germany?

“Well, I think it is there. There are people like Gerhard Schroeder, who is a former Chancellor, on the payroll of a Russian company. And we have many others that work with Russia. There’s an increasing cooperation and funding of right-wing and left-wing groups in Germany and other member states. There is a contact to PEGIDA, there is a contact to the Linkspartei. There is a direct funding of these groups and networks; you know how the Russian networking functions – you have the formal rules, but the informal rules are the most important. And there is a setting; there are groups, politicians, journalists, and maybe think-tank people here, who get paid, who are a part of this network, who get invited to kind of events, meetings with the President or someone else. There is a constant work on that – on the other hand, I think that it has not functioned in regard of the Ukrainian conflict. I think this to be a failure of Russian policy in Germany that they did not expect that Merkel would have been so tough, that Merkel would have imposed sanctions. I think this was really a shocking development for Moscow, but what they are trying to do at the moment is to undermine Merkel. And this case with this Russian-German girl Lisa, is a classical example of how they are trying to manipulate the general discourse, of how they are trying to create their own fifth column in Germany using the Russian Germans, or the Russian minority, which amounts to 6 million people. They also have their economic networks, the lobby organizations that work together, they have the cultural institutions, the business contacts and so on. I would not overestimate this, but I think it’s much broader and much deeper an issue than we have expected.”

In our country we often discuss the “fatigue” Europe has from Ukraine. Again, is this an exaggeration or not?

“This whole conflict has also positive sides, because this is the first time the German society, and other European societies, really have understood Ukraine as a sovereign country. They now see it not as a part of Russia or the Russian empire, but as an independent, sovereign country with its own history, with its own society. The first discussions here in Germany and in other countries were ‘what is Ukraine – where is it, what is it about?’ I think people now know what Ukraine is. That’s a positive effect. At the same time, the image of Ukraine is really bad. It’s one of the most corrupt countries in Europe and it’s owned by oligarchs, which have their interests in every direction. It’s a weak state, with weak institutions, which is a problem for Europe. It’s a security risk, and a corruption risk. And what we observe with the Poroshenko-Yatseniuk team just confirms this stereotype. I think there are some successes, there are some reforms – the civil society in particular is really amazing, because without it there would be no Ukraine. It fills the gap, which the state has left, that’s amazing. But we more and more understand that this is a long-term investment, that it needs time – but our politicians have an interest for fast decisions. And perhaps they may come up with an idea to fix the problem with these Ukrainian elites as fast as possible using Russia – but I think that would be a misperception, because Russia is interested in destabilization, in weak states, in formal and corrupt structures. And our interest is a stable Ukraine that develops in the direction the biggest part of the society wants to. Because then it would be a security provider, it would be a benefit for Europe. But we are looking too much short-term; we are reacting too much to crises. We always do crisis-management, we lack the long-term approach. And I think it’s a big deficit, as we are focusing on all the problems we have now, but not on the perspective. But again, the image is very bad, and Ukrainian politicians do quite a lot to support this image.”

And finally, a question on values. What exactly is the European Union we dream about so much? Is it a guarantee of security, or a privilege, or just a lot of work?

“I think that the European Union, first of all, is a lot of bureaucracy. It’s a lot of institutions, bureaucrats, principles and other things you have to fulfill. And at the same time it is an area of solidarity, and of compromises. I believe that all this is being questioned at the moment. What we have now is the biggest crisis of the European Union we have seen since it exists, in my opinion, because we have an increasing re-nationalization in the member states, we have the growth of populist groups, which gain their support with the anti-EU propaganda and slogans. And I think the EU has not done its homework, it is not integrated enough in many areas, it has a weak foreign policy, it has a weak security policy, it has a weak economic policy also, in terms of fixing the economic problems of the weaker Southern member states, and of some of the new member states in the South East. But in the end it is big success story in terms of peace in Europe, in terms of finding compromises and solidarity among the member states. And I think that would also fit Ukraine into, as the Ukrainian society has done quite a lot to really show that they stand by these principles and norms. They show solidarity with Europe – and they expect also from the European Union some kind of solidarity in this critical situation. And I also think this is about credibility of the European Union. This is my personal opinion – if we don’t support Ukraine in a way which is necessary, if we don’t help it to become a success story, this would be the end of the EU as the credible foreign policy player, which is attractive to other states. Ukraine is really a litmus test for the European Union in terms of supporting its own principles, values, and normative – and being able to export them and stabilize their own neighborhood.”