Compromise and the national interests

On March 3, Paris will host this year’s first meeting of foreign ministers in the so-called Normandy format. At an earlier gathering in Kyiv our Western partners expressed a hope that a compromise in the implementation of the Minsk agreements could be reached in the French capital.

However, the statements of Germany’s foreign minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier and the US Secretary of State John Kerry, made in Washington, D.C., cannot be accepted without reservations, in particular what concerns a prejudiced attitude towards Ukraine and its implementation of the Minsk agreements, totally despised by Russia and the fighters it backs in Donbas.

First, at the press conference Steinmeier said that, although both parties to the conflict recognize the Minsk agreements as the main document, “the preparedness of all the conflicting parties to implement real policies is very limited.” Meanwhile, Kerry added that both parties must fulfill their obligations, and Russia must guarantee that the separatists will implement their portion of the agreements.

Secondly, after the session of the UN Security Council, where Steinmeier presented the program of German chairmanship over the OSCE in 2016, he said that his country “will try to make progress, especially in terms of security situation, and discuss a new electoral law for eastern Ukraine, for Donbas, which is a main condition for holding the election, due in the first half of this year.”

The Day asked several experts and a spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to elucidate what kind of compromise Ukraine could make in Paris.

Oleksii MAKEIEV, director, policy and communications department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine: “We will bring up the entire range of issues, the most important of which are security and creating security prerequisites for eventual elections, making progress in what concerns the modality of the elections, stipulated by Ukrainian legislation, according to the OSCE standards, and securing the consent of Russia and Russian guerillas, who still will not agree to any concessions in the framework of the negotiations. That is why this is going to be a very complex conversation, and we hope to make progress in the security, political, and hostage issues.

“We have certain approaches and positions which we cannot give up. In particular, we cannot give up the provision about the obligatory ceasefire after one year, and no compromise is possible about granting the OSCE full access to the entire occupied territory. We cannot make any compromise about the withdrawal of foreign troops from Ukraine. So, this is going to be quite a tough conversation. We have concrete arguments proving that Ukraine has fulfilled its obligations, and Russia, being a signatory to the Minsk agreements also must fulfill its part starting with Paragraph 1 and finishing with Paragraph 12.

Oleksii MAKEIEV: We will bring up the entire range of issues, the most important of which are security and creating security prerequisites for eventual elections, making progress in what concerns the modality of the elections, stipulated by Ukrainian legislation, according to the OSCE standards, and securing the consent of Russia and Russian guerillas, who still will not agree to any concessions in the framework of the negotiations. That is why this is going to be a very complex conversation, and we hope to make progress in the security, political, and hostage issues.

“Now about Steinmeier’s statement concerning the election in the occupied districts of Donbas in the first half of this year. Indeed, the chief of German diplomacy voiced certain assessments and expectations. We will see how the negotiations will go, and to which extent we will be able to fulfill such security prerequisites which are necessary to hold those elections. In order to enable them as soon as possible, ceasefire must be introduced tomorrow, and all the conditions must be implemented, which will enable the OSCE to conclude that the situation there is indeed safe for holding an election. And the sooner it happens, the better. But it is up to Russia to fulfill its obligations and use its clout on the guerillas it controls, so that the situation could finally settle.”

Dr. Hryhorii PEREPELYTSIA, Doctor of Political Science, conflictologist, professor at the Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv, also believes that Ukraine could agree to hold the elections on certain conditions. “If both Kerry and Steinmeier emphasize the urgency of the election, we must say we will not recognize this election, and will not participate in it until Russian troops have been withdrawn from Donbas, armed gangs dissolved, and all the terms preceding the elections met,” emphasized Perepelytsia.

The expert went on to say that, according to the canons of any peacemaking strategy, there cannot be any elections until hostilities have ceased. For instance, it took two peacekeeping operations, demilitarization, and demobilization to hold an election in Bosnia.

According to Perepelytsia, a similar situation was in Kosovo, and this is the way to act if peace is the ultimate goal. “But if the goal is to lift the sanctions against Russia, it is pointless for Ukraine – supposing it wants to defend its interests, and not yield territory to the enemy – to negotiate in the Normandy format. Otherwise it will mean surrender with a hope that hostilities will cease – which will never happen,” believes the expert.

Should Ukraine agree to this modality, i.e., holding the election in Donbas, it must be seen as surrender of national interests and Ukraine’s territorial integrity, and the country’s leadership must be held criminally responsible for that.

“We have a chance to avoid such a trap, but it will take firmness in defending our standpoint. And if mediators solve their problems at the expense of Ukraine, its sovereignty and territorial integrity, we certainly must leave the Normandy format,” emphasized Perepelytsia.

Tatiana KASTUEVA-JEAN, head of the Russia-NIS Center at IFRI (Paris, France), cited the report of the Moscow Center for Political Technologies saying that the most probable and acceptable scenario of settling the conflict in Donbas for all the parties involved would be to freeze it. According to her, given the deadlock nature of the situation, “freezing” would be an optimal variant. “This would allow to avoid a big loss of life, which happened before, and enable Russia to preserve this ‘neither war nor peace’ situation, which suits it the best. For Ukraine it would offer an opportunity to avoid the current problem of blocking the constitutional reform,” remarked Kastueva-Jean.

She went on to say that from France’s perspective it is important to prevent the conflict from flaring anew and rule out armed clashes. Paris’s “minimum program,” given the crisis in Syria, is to prevent the aggravation of the situation in Ukraine, or at least keep it smoldering.

Kastueva-Jean does not rule out a possible adaptation of the Minsk agreements. “For Merkel and Hollande, a Minsk 3 would mean defeat and the need to admit a second failure in a row,” believes the expert.

In her opinion, a compromise in Paris can mean a minimum program, which boils down to preventing hostilities from being resumed by either side. And secondly, the West will keep an eye on domestic processes in Ukraine to see if it can demand anything at all from it.

Felix SCHIMANSKY-GEIER, adjunct, project coordinator of the joint FSU Jena – Kyiv Mohyla program “German and European Studies,” political scientists, M.A. International Relations, Friedrich-Schiller Universitaet Jena (Germany): “After the meeting with the US Secretary of State, Germany will try to exert maximum pressure on both parties to the conflict in order to achieve tangible results. In particular, Mr. Steinmeier said that the implementation must continue, and the confidence in entire process would depend on that. I think that Mr. Steinmeier and Mr. Kerry do not intend to bring the Minsk agreements to a deadlock, but will achieve results instead. Consequently, they increase stakes for a bigger result.

“I do not know what kind of compromise Mr. Steinmeier is after, but I think that for Germany the main problem is the local election and the passing of relevant legislation by the Rada.

“Germany sees Minsk 2 as the only diplomatic format of reaching an agreement among all the conflicting parties. In diplomats’ eyes, holding a local election is the first step, and they want to ensure full access to Ukraine’s border with Russia later.

“In my view, Ukraine must insist on gaining full access to the border. Truth be told, I doubt that Russia and the separatists it backs will agree to that.

“On the other hand, I do not think that Germany wants to secure peace at Ukraine’s expense. I can see that Mr. Steinmeier also pressurizes Russians and Russia-backed guerrillas. I see Steinmeier and Kerry’s determination and desire to ensure the implementation of the agreements. But I cannot see that Germany is interested in pressurizing Ukraine to put it in a disadvantageous position.”