Father Borys Gudziak on twentieth century tragedies as reasons for the religious boom and international cooperation
What follows is an interview with Father Borys Gudziak, Ph.D. and rector of the Lviv branch of the Ukrainian Catholic University of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church. A graduate of Syracuse and Pontifical Urbaniana Universities (Ph.D. in Slavic and Byzantine cultural and church history, Harvard, 1991; ordained UGCC priest in 1998), Father Borys analyzes Ukraine’s current church life.
Esteemed rector, how do the Christian churches influence Ukraine’s latter-day history?
Gudziak: The Christian heritage is the dominant theme of the Ukrainian religious tradition. None of the aspects of Ukrainian cultural, political, even economic life in the second millennium can be properly comprehended without considering the impact of the Christian churches, their doctrines, canons, liturgical practices, social and individual spirituality; or without studying Christian art, literature, and folk traditions. These traditions had been preserved before the nineteenth century and they continued to influence Ukrainian religious life during the period of secularization. Nor should one overlook the fact that the presence of Jews and Moslems has had their noticeable effect on Ukraine ever since annals started being written.
Speaking of modern times, the tragedies of the twentieth century have exerted a radical influence on religious life. Estimates show that some 17 million Ukrainians died violent deaths in that century. To think of all those innocent people, leaving in our hearts bleeding wounds that do not heal. The social, psychological, and spiritual consequences of violence in the twentieth century remain to be analyzed, but they continue to influence the dynamics of current social phenomena and trends.
Religion was subject to especially severe persecution, as religious beliefs, even passive affiliation with the Church was in glaring contrast with the theory and practice of Marxist materialism, for such beliefs and affiliation preserved the autonomy of the individual, fostering solidarity and contacts with fellow believers all over the world.
How did the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church manage to occupy such an important place in public life in the West and the rest of Ukraine since the early 1990s, over such a brief historical period and at such impressive rate?
Gudziak: Under the totalitarian regime, the UGCC was formally banned in 1946, yet it survived in Western Ukraine, actively supported by the populace, although forced to stay underground for a number of years, resisting all efforts of the Moscow authorities to destroy it. Under those conditions of terror and persecution, the UGCC succeeded in preserving its structure, producing two generations of church leaders and enjoying the support of most of the society. In a way, it turned out an unprecedented phenomenon in religious history. In 1946, the UGCC became not only the world’s most officially taboo religious organization, but the Soviet Union’s only large public association which, relying on large strata, resisted Soviet rule, remaining numerically the strongest opposition to the regime. Not surprisingly, it emerged from underground, in the late 1980s, as a religious body strong enough to play a major role in the Ukrainian political and cultural arena.
What do you think is the most characteristic religious phenomenon at the current transformation period?
Gudziak: Ukraine experienced a true religious boom after the perestroika campaign. Statistics showing the number of religious organizations and structures, confessions, and communities are evidence of an unprecedented religious growth in this country, especially in 1988-92. A total of 1,700 Greek Catholic communities were registered in eleven months in 1990-91 (currently the number is some 3,500). In 1988, less than nine different confessions were officially registered in Soviet Ukraine. At present, we have over a hundred. In 1988, Ukraine had under 6,000 religious communities, now it is over 27,000, or 4.5 times that number. There is a constant increase of Orthodox communities (whether contrary to or because of the current Orthodox rift).
This religious boom is still going on. It could be interpreted as a manifestation of declarative religious affiliation because it is fashionable or as a whim, a superficial spirituality without deep personal roots. Polls, however, show that most people who live in Ukraine are believers and also that people trust the Church far more than they do any political institution.
Further proof of Ukrainian society being markedly religiously affiliated is the number of clergy and theological students: 26,000 clergymen, presbyters, rabbis, and 18,000 students. Add here some 6,000 members of cloistered communities. All the seminaries are packed with students. Every year there are two applicants per vacancy at Lviv’s Ukrainian Catholic University. Such statistics prove considerably lower in Poland and North America, let alone the Netherlands, Germany, or France. All this is evidence of a flourishing religious life, although it would be difficult, of course, to perform a quantitative analysis of religious sentiments in the Ukrainian people. The current unstable way of life may also be one of the reasons for such intensive religious sentiments. When in trouble we tend to ask Him for help.
Contemporary religious life is markedly variable and unstable, with people changing confessions and community memberships. Starting in 1989, the Orthodox Church has undergone several transformations and divisions, so that Ukraine has several Orthodox churches with strained relationships. Rifts, conflicts, and transitions apparently have not reached their peak, especially considering the anti-ecumenical stand taken by certain churches. All these phenomena indicate that [religious life] is still in the making and the general context one of pluralism and eclecticism.
How do you assess the overall stability of religious life in Ukraine and the possibility of all its subjects peacefully coexisting under these conditions? At times this seems an impossibility.
Gudziak: Contemporary religious life is marked by plurality and mobility, not only in Ukraine, but all over the world. Owing to the media focusing on religious squabbles, people here and abroad believe that our church life is dominated by interdenominational discord.
However, if one takes a closer look at the facts and compares them to other contexts, one will arrive at different conclusions. From what I know, no deaths resulting from religious conflicts have been registered in Ukraine since perestroika; no church buildings have been burned down, unlike what happened in the United States in the 1990s; there have been no explosions or other terrorist acts, as was the case in Northern Ireland, for example. Now and then adherents of certain confessions would be locked in churches for the night, but there would be no bloodshed. There haven’t been the remotest threats of armed conflicts on religious grounds in Ukraine, contrary to what has happened in other countries — and this despite all those decades of violence and impassioned denominational declarations. This is a true miracle in our religious life. Constant movement and conflicts are, above all, indicators of a remarkable upsurge and intensive character of religious life and spiritual devotion.
The number of parishes and adherents has grown, and the clergy is playing an increasingly important role in society. But what do the polls have to say about our future, the younger generation and its attitude toward the Church?
Gudziak: We have few polls reflecting young Ukrainians’ religious affiliations. Different sources point to one-half and two-thirds of young Ukrainians stating their religious beliefs, with only 6% regular churchgoers; 32% going to church now and then; 46% paying rare visits, and 16% never going there. Interestingly, one-third of all unbelievers hope that their children will be religious, while 79% of the believers cherish this hope.
All told, the life priorities of believers and agnostics differ little. A happy family life is their highest priority (79% of the faithful and 63% for nonbelievers), followed by career (36% and 41%). Well-being is considered practically equally important (23% and 29%), just as almost all are not enthusiastic about getting influential and famous (4% and 1%). Only 13% in both groups of respondents would like to work for the benefit of their country.
As Rector of the Ukrainian Catholic University, you must be working to produce future religious leaders. Are there any problems?
Gudziak: Rearing religious leaders is, of course, a prerequisite of normal church development. Thus, investing in the training of religious cadres is as important for the reformation and rebirth of Ukraine as in all the other social spheres. Meanwhile, the quality of our training is determined by limited funding. Suffice it to recall the well-known fact that the amount allocated for a single student in the West appears enough for ten students in Ukraine. Mostly, the theological seminaries and academies lack qualified teaching staff and adequately stocked libraries. I think that Western churches, universities, and libraries could have shown more interest in supporting Ukrainian religious educational establishments.
At present, solidarity and support projects between the Orthodox and Greek Catholic churches, on the one hand, and their counterparts in the diaspora on the other, are quite limited. Unlike the Catholic and numerous Protestant churches, Moslem and Judaic institutions of learning are receiving substantial material aid from abroad.
Consider one example. The ecumenical Orthodox community obviously avoids contact with the Ukrainian Orthodoxy, regarding it as a hotbed of discord. The ecumenical isolation of the Ukrainian churches (both the allegedly noncanonical and those under the jurisdiction of the Moscow Patriarchate) is quite alarming; religious life in Ukraine badly needs national as well as international cooperation. Today, not a single Orthodox church is receiving aid to meet its educational needs from abroad.
What would you say religion will mean for tomorrow’s Ukraine?
Gudziak: I expect religion to become an important social, political, cultural, intellectual, and economic factor. In a society suffering from moral and intellectual corruption, a number of citizens can rely only on the Church. Even churches burdened with a legacy of collaboration with the past repressive regime are capable of adequately responding to the current ethical crisis. Even now they are contributing in the development of a civil society, forming social aid organizations, something the state structures are unable, and maybe not under the obligation, to accomplish.
It would be premature to discuss the ultimate role of religious communities in the future. On the one hand, returning to the secular premodern model of the past is out of the question. It is also hard to visualize religious life in Ukraine as evolving using today’s Western patterns, among other reasons because Ukraine was sealed off from the twentieth century Western churches. However, it is perfectly safe to assume that religious life will develop in Ukraine following a number of vectors; modern pluralism includes the reconstruction of the territorial hegemony of some confessions or other. The death of religions appears highly unlikely, although the religious communities are faced with the cardinal questions: Will their evolution be of vital importance to the people? Will these communities be able to keep abreast of the times and adequately meet the challenges of the third millennium? Or perhaps they will isolate themselves and move in a fruitless, even dangerous direction.
Often not only religious communities, but also the state, society, even individual citizens expect the churches to have all their problems solved (almost automatically) by force of the religious tradition. Yet this could happen only if the churches and [religious] communities had selfless, tolerant, sage, considerate, brave, and intellectually creative leaders.
In late 1988, a noted Ukrainian positivistic and anticommunist historian suggested that religion was a historical phenomenon, and that it would not play an important role in the future Ukraine. However, twelve years of Ukrainian independence have demonstrated that God is extremely important for many Ukrainian citizens, and that the Church remains a significant factor in the life of Ukrainian society.
