A new national doctrine
The 10 th World Russian People’s Council ended its work in Moscow last week. It was attended by 2,500 delegates from every region of Russia and overseas. The theme of the council was: “Faith, Man, and the Earth: Russia’s Mission in the 21 st Century.” The participants sought answers to various questions, including human rights: “To what extent can our vision of universally accepted human rights allow the Orthodox people to live in accordance with the dictates of their faith?”
Metropolitan Kirill, chairman of the Department for External Church Relations of the Moscow Patriarchate, delivered a speech exploring the main theme of the council. Without exaggeration his presentation eclipsed every other speech and attracted both the church and secular community of Russia. And well it should, for the metropolitan made an attempt, albeit not a very effective one, to challenge the 1948 UN General Assembly’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights (henceforth: Universal Declaration) with a concept developed in the offices of the Moscow Patriarchate. He argued mellifluously, seeking to prove that “the concept of human rights is being used as a front for falsehood and abuses of religious and national values,” and that the Universal Declaration “does not allow the Orthodox people to live in accordance with their faith.”
The metropolitan’s philippics against “liberal human rights” are easily deciphered: international monitoring of religious freedoms systematically record blatant violations of believers’ rights in Russia. Perhaps that was why Metropolitan Kirill decided to prove to the rest of the world that the concept of human rights that had come to Russia from the West is alien to the ethical norms of “Russian civilization,” because human rights, in their modern European interpretation, allegedly suppress the individual’s right to a religious life.
Unfortunately, during his speech Metropolitan Kirill did not consider it necessary to “walk through” the clauses of the Universal Declaration and explain, without unnecessary and vague phraseology, where he disagreed and why. It is safe to assume that, among other things, the head of the DECR does not like Article 18 of the Universal Declaration, which reads: “Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.”
Many questions arise in conjunction with the Russian Orthodox Church’s “new doctrine.” First, what is one to make of the fact that the Universal Declaration was approved and signed by the Soviet leadership, and that Russia’s official denunciation of the instrument would imply withdrawal from the United Nations? Is the Moscow Patriarchate expecting the Putin administration to take such a crucial step?
However, the main question addresses a different matter: what is preventing the Russian Orthodox people from living in full conformity with their faith? Is it the impact of the Universal Declaration? Also, how are we, humble readers, to associate this impact with the centuries-long organization of Russian church life?
There is another important passage in the metropolitan’s speech: “If we succeed in activating the traditional religious potential of Russia, its ethnic and cultural diversity, and in working out a universally acceptable concept of human rights and personal dignity (acceptable to whom?), this will open up new prospects for us and will help us change and improve the face of human civilization.” (How very humbly put!) Let us stress that he means only the “traditional” religions of Russia (as defined by the ROC), namely the Orthodox faith, Islam, Judaism, and Buddhism. But there are dozens of other religions and confessions in Russia, including traditional Protestants. What about the rights of those “nonstandard” believers within the “improved variant of human civilization”?
In his speech Metropolitan Kirill addressed lawgivers, urging them to revise legal clauses that allegedly “counter the majority’s opinion” (read: Orthodox majority), and to draft laws allowing religious organizations access to education, the army, and health care. As for legal protection, he declared that his mission currently lies in combating manipulations of human consciousness and the “involvement of people in crime, the slave trade, prostitution, addiction to drugs and gambling” (we have always thought that other agencies deal with these issues).
One of the council’s postulates, adopted in conjunction with Metropolitan Kirill’s speech, reads: “There are values that stand not lower (read: higher) than human rights. These values include faith, morality, piety, and the Fatherland.” Such comparisons may be interpreted in a variety of ways, let alone their acceptability, but for people who have survived the Soviet totalitarian regime this means only one thing: restoring that omnipotent state machine designed to suppress absolutely all human rights and freedoms. There is no mistaking the nostalgic sentiments of some ROC bishops, who long for the old regime and the Byzantine symphony of church and state. If only they could convince the secular authorities that Russian Orthodoxy remains unwaveringly loyal and indispensable.
Another important aspect of Metropolitan Kirill’s speech is what he neglected to say. We know that the Russian Orthodox Church has been functioning not only within the boundaries of the Russian Federation; its dioceses or exarchates are found in a number of independent countries, including Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, and Estonia. “Reunification,” that favorite word of the Russian establishment, with the Russian Orthodox Church abroad is also inevitable. We in Ukraine are very interested to know whether the new ROC doctrine (the council’s brainchild) is a “civilized and universally Orthodox” one. Will it allow them to forgive their enemies?
Metropolitan Kirill’s speech sparks numerous mental associations, like the history of serfdom in Russia that would be annulled several centuries later than in many European countries, then restored in the 20th century; the history of the persecution of Old Believers, Greek Catholics, Baptists; the Russification of the Baltic republics and Georgia in tsarist and Soviet Russia, and many other things. Now we have yet another thrilling scenario entitled “How the Universal Declaration of Human Rights Was Abrogated in Russia.”
In conclusion, I would like to quote from the Russian human rights champion Vadim Prokhorov: “No rights can be excessive. But the dominance of one confession may result in the church acquiring excessive rights. Also, we have many structures, in addition to the ROC, wishing to curb citizens’ rights. But is there anything more important than human rights? Nothing.”
