The quality of our discussions

Hryhorii Nemyria, Ukraine’s Deputy Prime Minister for European and International Integration, has worked for various nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). He was an international affairs adviser to BYuT leader Yulia Tymoshenko and headed the 5th Verkhovna Rada’s foreign relations subcommittee on European and Euro-Atlantic integration. He is an experienced university lecturer, researcher, and consultant in the foreign policy field.

Have his views on foreign policy issues facing Ukraine changed now that he is in the Cabinet of Ministers and can see the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Presidential Administration through his office windows? What accents will the Ukrainian government be placing on European and Euro- Atlantic integration? Will the Cabinet of Ministers be using the instruments of the European Neighborhood Policy, and how? These and other questions are raised in The Day ’s exclusive interview with Hryhorii NEMYRIA.

It is absolutely the other way around. This issue has become even more acute and confirmed than what was seen on the outside. It did not begin with NGOs but with my teaching and research on European integration. Research work has value only when you are allowed to view the problem and opportunities in an even deeper way than politicians do occasionally. The effectiveness of a policy often depends on how much politicians are prepared to listen and have an appetite for a lasting dialog with researchers — people who are very well versed in this question.

In my case, the process was gradual. At the International Renaissance Foundation, I helped launch the process of Ukraine’s integration into Europe. At the National Academy of Public Administration I headed Ukraine’s first Department of European Integration. In 2005 I was an advisor to Prime Minister Tymoshenko, in charge of foreign policy and European integration. As chairman of the 5th Verkhovna Rada’s foreign relations subcommittee on European and Euro-Atlantic integration, I could view the issue from the legislative angle. I think that my experience in the nongovernmental sphere and my work as a Member of Parliament and executive official, allow me to see these problems from at least three points of view. There is another very important dimension: the external one, the way the problems we are talking about are regarded abroad — not only from the standpoint of Brussels and the European Commission but also countries, such as Russia, the US, France, Germany, China, and others. As for the view from the windows of my office, yes, I have a clear view of the foreign ministry building.

Are you already seeing the reaction from European capitals to the steps being taken by the Ukrainian government? What is the reaction?

The reaction is quite encouraging, especially considering that our government has been in office for less than two months. It was confirmed on Dec. 18, and that day we began talks with the EU on forming an extended free trade area — actually that was when Ukraine joined the WTO. I am glad to know that my talks in London with Peter Mandelson, British Commissioner for the European Union for Trade, were instrumental. We negotiated a final solution to the problem of regulating export duties between Ukraine and the EU. Of course, Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko’s visit to Brussels on Jan. 28-29 was a very important factor. In terms of the program and its results, this visit was the most intensive one of all the prime ministers’ previous visits. On March 11 the prime minister will take part in a scheduled session of the Ukraine-EU Cooperation Council. In fact, the quick response from Brussels to the prime minister’s proposal to start talks on the free trade area in February rather than toward the end of the spring, as planned earlier by the European Commission, is proof of its markedly positive attitude to the new Ukrainian government.

Speaking of European integration, doesn’t the government’s intention to develop a new strategy and program for Ukraine’s integration into the EU — which is part of the government’s action plan — look strange? Isn’t it controversial, considering that talks are underway about an extensive cooperation agreement between Ukraine and the EU?

Actually, it is a segment of strategic planning that was previously ignored. As for the government’s action plan, it is not designed for a single year; it is a long-term program. Given the best scenario, the government will be able to work for the next five years, until the next elections. Obviously, it would be a mistake not to consider this program and strategy simply because the legal framework of the Agreement on Cooperation and Partnership (ACP) expires this year. The new one is just being worked on. There is an understanding of the changes that are taking place, including within the European Union. There will be a different situation after the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty is completed. Positive attitudinal changes are taking place in certain EU member countries vis-a-vis Ukraine. All this must be taken into account. That is why our government’s action plan has two important clauses concerning European integration. First, there is an approach to European integration as a strategic priority, primarily in the domestic policy sphere. This is a very important conceptual change to the approach to European integration. When we say “European integration,” we mean not so much and not only the foreign policy dimension but mainly the domestic one. This is a conceptual change in our strategy.

Second, as a result, this change entails an institutional change. To implement this approach, we must have mechanisms and institutions that are capable of implementing it. If you read all the chapters of the government’s action plan — not just the one entitled “Ukraine and the World” — you will see that issues, such as energy supplies, health care, and many others, have references to the Convention and European Directives. In fact, it is obvious now that in most of our ministries this philosophy is present in the planning phase. As for mechanisms, this point is very important for us. The fourth chapter stresses that it is necessary to enhance the mechanism of coordinating the European integration policy by creating a centralized mechanism. According to European comparative research, which I had asked to be initiated in 2005, when I was an adviser, about the presence or absence of a coordinating body in all countries, both in the new members of the EU and candidate countries, such a body does exist but not in Ukraine.

What kind of problem does Ukraine have? There is a lot of rhetoric about “ambitious” European plans, which is not backed by existing mechanisms that could allow us to carry out these plans. The key word in a working mechanism is coordination. This is linked to the second component in which the levels of functional decentralization (in other words, dispersion) and horizontal coordination are compared. The level of these two indicators is high only in Estonia, a small country that is unique in many ways. In two other new EU member and candidate countries, except for Ukraine, there is a high horizontal level of coordination. In other words, everything is topsy-turvy in Ukraine. There is great dispersion and no horizontal coordination. Since the European integration policy is by its very nature horizontal, Ukraine’s low level of horizontal coordination constitutes a direct threat to the effectiveness of this policy.

Opponents say that we don’t need any of this because our country is not even a candidate member; that this is only what candidate members to the EU need. This is an absolutely false argument. Why? Because we need this even more than candidate members. Such countries have a limited space for maneuvering and must accept all the 80,000 pages of the Acquis, and they can negotiate certain transition periods only under these circumstances. Such restrictive frameworks do not apply to Ukraine. Therefore, by definition our country has to be more proactive and define what sectors come first and how deeply, and what kind of consistency there should be in order to introduce various types of instruments. Thus, the very need to be more proactive, since our country still does not have candidate status, does not lessen but increase the need to create such a coordinating mechanism.

It is true that we have three ministries, foreign affairs, justice, and economy, which fulfill coordinating functions within the limits of their competence. It is true that there is a Ukrainian part of the Ukraine-EU Committee, along with seven subcommittees. It is also true that they have never been called to order, and if they were convened, it was only on the eve of the latest summit. We are now renewing their work. But this is not enough because we are now talking about a much higher and more intensive level of relations with the EU. Right now we are discussing a new extended agreement and free trade area — not a standard area but an extended one. The difference is that a standard area means only export and import taxes and their cancellation, so that shipments of goods can cross borders duty-free. This extended area is in addition to the liberalization in the sphere of services. The most difficult problem is to harmonize the regulatory environment, which is linked to fundamental changes on the legislative level.

Add here the principle of asymmetry. Its essence is as follows: the European Union, understanding that sometimes there is the political will to do everything quickly, says that this can completely destroy the matter, that you must determine transition periods, and that we are prepared to accept the principle of asymmetry in the sense that changes will occur within a shorter period over here, and that these changes will be on a broader scale. However, this calls for canceling tariff and non-tariff limitations, and doing so in a consistent and scheduled way. And this implies new challenges. Now consider the next term that specifically concerns economic integration. We are now joining several areas of joint endeavor, including aviation.

Ukraine also wants to join the Energy Community, which is made up of EU members and countries with European prospects. Our prime minister has given an absolute clear signal about accelerating Ukraine’s energy integration. The European Commission has to receive a mandate for the negotiations concerning accession to the Energy Community. In fact, this is in fact the same thing as a free trade area from the point of view of adapting legislation that regulates the energy sphere on the principles of transparency and the principles of the European Energy Charter and the Transit Protocol, to which Ukraine is a signatory.

What will this coordinating body be like? This question is now being studied. There is the mechanism of a national agency, and consideration of this question will be submitted to the government committee. We are now drafting a Presidential Edict that will discharge a very important function. It will remove the layers of various kinds of bodies and mechanisms that were created, starting in 1998. Some of these bodies have never convened. There are discrepancies concerning the adoption of acts regulating the European integration sphere. We must also have clarity with respect to the mechanism of the European integration body. I will give you a few examples that illustrate the importance of having horizontal coordination. Ukraine can already use European political neighborhood instruments that were previously available only to candidate members: Twinning, TAIEX, and SIGMA. Here are some data that show how Ukraine used the TAIEX instrument in 2006: only 237 Ukrainian government officials made use of this instrument compared to more than 5,000 each in Bulgaria and Romania. Consider the TACIS program: Ukraine is using 55 percent of these funds, compared to 107 percent in Russia. And this is a country that says it wants to be a member of the EU.

You must be aware that Ukrainian diplomats have reservations about the European Neighborhood Policy. They believe that Ukraine may fall into a trap if it participates actively, claiming that this will mean the loss of our membership prospect. What is your view of Ukraine’s use of the European Neighborhood Policy? You know, I have never been a fan of “theological” discussions. I am a supporter of clear-cut logic, where, if there is an appropriate vision, it must be implemented by means of a clearly stated strategy, action plan, and mechanisms. Now we are seeing that everything is fine with the vision. A strategy is also apparent and the program is being upgraded. There is an action plan that conforms to the program. But there is a problem with coordinating mechanisms. We see this and we will be resolving it. There are opportunities that exist in the instruments but which are being ignored. In this case, we have the classic situation where sometimes things that are better can be the enemy of things that are good. Consider what we look like these days. In the past, Ukraine was standing in two lineups, applying for both SEC and EU membership. Now there is more clarity, but a different kind of situation has emerged. We are told that there are instruments. New ones are appearing, but why are we not seeing progress in their effective use? Let me give you an example: in the film Pretty Woman, starring Richard Gere and Julia Roberts, Gere invites Roberts to a restaurant. There is the usual assortment of forks, spoons, and knives, but she doesn’t know how to use them. In Ukraine, the situation is very much the same: we have a full array of instruments, but subconsciously we want to eat with our hands, or we say, without having learned to use these instruments, maybe you could serve us the dish. Of course, there is no need in the negotiating process to diminish the importance of the normative-legal framework concerning the formula of political association and economic integration.

Clearly, even from the standpoint of the presidency of the European Union, a not so bad situation has emerged for Ukraine. The EU will be headed by France, the Czech Republic, and Sweden — countries that have traditionally had a positive attitude to Ukraine (especially Sweden and, lately, France). This is why our prime minister will soon visit Paris and Stockholm. This is also an element in Ukraine’s European integration policy that has largely been underestimated.

Do you think that the creation of an agency will eventually lead to a conflict between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Cabinet of Ministers?

I see no grounds for this. You must understand that a degree of friction is to be expected when a new institution is founded. But whenever new institutions are created, then this must be done when a new government comes to power, when there is minimal inertia and when there is the greatest degree of openness. This is simply the logic of adopting administrative decisions. Of course, certain questions can exist, but that’s why there is a process of consultations and the State Committee on European Integration and International Cooperation of which I am the head. During meetings of this committee we will be discussing a range of issues that may affect various ministries. Let me say again that the very logic of establishing this new body resides in the fact that European integration is Ukraine’s over-arching priority, especially in Ukraine’s domestic policy sphere. Our foreign ministry will be discharging its functions in what we believe will be a more effective manner in the foreign policy sphere.

You were quoted as saying at a conference that Ukraine should be set small but realistic goals. Isn’t there a risk that the large goal will be lost in the midst of small goals?

Not if we go step by step. I believe that the point here is not about small goals but about taking steps in a strategic direction, not to wander off onto side roads but to go forward. We should not veer off at a crossroads but proceed straight along the highway. And we know what this highway is called.

Does the path along this highway to Europe — the European Union — go through NATO or, as Serhii Holovaty has been saying, through the Council of Europe and the implementation of obligations that were accepted in connection with accession to this organization?

Ukraine is already in Europe. All the members of the Council of Europe are European countries. Belarus is still not a member. That is a separate issue. Indeed, Ukraine has commitments to the Council of Europe that obviously it must fulfill. But in this case I don’t see an automatic linkage. Russia is a member of the Council of Europe, but it does not want to join the EU. Ukraine is a member of the Council of Europe and wants to join the EU. Therefore, Ukraine’s way to EU membership does not lie through the Council of Europe. Ukraine is already a member of the Council of Europe. From the standpoint of standards and their observance, the point in question is, of course, not only joining these conventions, but also properly implementing them. I would also like to wish my colleague Holovaty every success, especially in matters that pertain to the struggle against political corruption in Ukraine.

As regards the Council of Europe, here the situation is so clear that it doesn’t require additional discussion. We are talking about the maturity of the first Copenhagen criterion. The fact that the three latest elections were held in a democratic manner in Ukraine, when the opposition won, is self-evident. This does not mean that we can overlook problems like lists, election mechanisms, and many other things, including internal party discipline. But presenting all this as a strategic barrier makes no sense because we have surmounted this barrier. We have to keep moving ahead with confidence.

If you don’t mind, let’s talk about NATO and Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic integration in general. Marek Siwiec, the Vice- President of the European Parliament, stated in The Day ’ s regular column that he has his doubts about the sincerity of our politicians’ Euro-Atlantic integration aspirations. For some reason, the Russian media are saying that Tymoshenko doesn’t want to step up efforts aimed at Ukraine’s NATO membership. Their arguments are the secretiveness of the Ukrainian prime minister’s visit to NATO headquarters, the fact that there was no traditional press conference, and that Mrs. Tymoshenko had nothing to say about the results of her meeting with the Secretary General.

I don’t want to comment on something I did not see. These facts are obvious: first, the coalition agreement and the government’s program, which was unanimously adopted during a meeting of the Cabinet of Ministers on Jan. 16. This program clearly notes the question of Ukraine joining the Membership Action Plan and that it has been submitted to the Verkhovna Rada, subject to its approval. There is a letter signed by the president, the prime minister, and the parliamentary speaker. Obviously, there can be differing opinions as to the manner in which this document can be made public knowledge. Personally, I believe this was the most politically clumsy manner imaginable. In this case, neither the prime minister nor the government has anything to with it. This only serves to emphasize the problems we are having with communication and — once again — coordination. These problems must be solved immediately. Next, for some reasons we have a tradition whereby any prime minister visiting Brussels must meet with officials of European institutions and pay a visit to NATO headquarters. I regard this tradition as an exception rather than the rule for other countries. If one visits the European Union, then one also visits these European institutions. If one visits NATO, this includes visiting NATO headquarters. Our prime minister met with the Secretary General. She personally informed our president about the results of this meeting and submitted a written report. Of course, all the required signals were sent and received.

How are we supposed to interpret the clause in the government’s action plan regarding measures aimed at joining the Membership Action Plan, with an eye to Ukraine’s eventual membership, and that this plan must be meticulously implemented?

Now that the government’s action plan was adopted on Jan. 16, the Ukraine-NATO Action Plan will be adopted in February and submitted to the president of Ukraine for approval as a separate edict. Let me emphasize: this was in the late spring or early summer. If memory serves me right, this plan was approved in June. Imagine an action plan embracing the whole year being approved in June! Right now, in view of the fact that the government was formed on Dec. 18, every effort has been made for this plan to be approved in February. Second, there will be substantially larger allocations in the budget for information work on Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic integration.

Can you name this figure?

The Ministry of Finance is dealing with this subject, but from what I know it will be three or four times larger. In other words, there will be more budget funds, but money is not the only point, although it is an important one. There is also the issue of understanding and implementing the concept of Euro-Atlantic integration in the Membership Action Plan. This has to do with actual changes, including and, most importantly, in the domestic policy sphere. Those who are talking about NATO propaganda are wrong. Propaganda and counterpropaganda are notions that date to the Soviet period. At issue here is the quality of discussion in society. No members of the government will ever take part in propaganda, but they will take part in public, open discussions. By the way, I invited the “shadow cabinet’s” member, ex-Foreign Minister Kostiantyn Hryshchenko, to visit Donetsk, my home town, for a discussion and to hear the views of a shadow minister of a party that voted for the bill “On the Foundations of National Security,” which states that membership in NATO is Ukraine’s strategic goal. I would be interested to know whether this strategic goal has changed.

Don’t you think that Anatolii Hrytsenko was right when he said that the government’s “Ukrainian breakthrough” is actually the MAP program?

No, I don’t. I think that Mr. Hrytsenko, the former defense minister and chairman of the Parliamentary Committee on National Security and Defense, made this statement because this subject was very close to his heart. We shouldn’t play games with names. Measures must be adopted in order to carry out reforms in Ukraine, of our armed forces, education and judicial systems, and so on. We know examples of countries, such as Slovenia, where a referendum on NATO membership was held. Slovakia’s public opinion on NATO membership was also absolutely negative at first, but then it changed — not because its cabinet members or prime ministers were promoting NATO membership, but because of the reforms that were being carried out in that country, reforms that were improving the population’s living standards. These reforms made people’s lives more secure and better off materially. This is the best, if you use the word propaganda also in regard to the European Union and anything else that concerns Ukraine’s foreign policy and national security strategy. The same applies to the quality of Ukraine’s relations with all neighboring countries, including, of course, the Russian Federation.

If we are integrating into the European Union, then the background of this integration and its principles cannot be different from relations with other countries. In the energy sphere it means transparency, diversification, and competitiveness. And when we talk seriously about European integration, we cannot have any “shadows” in place of transparency or monopolization in place of diversification and competition. While conducting a dialog with the European Union, Russia is applying certain mechanisms that are lacking in Ukraine, particularly the early- warning mechanism, which is something Ukraine doesn’t have even within the framework of the Memorandum on Energy Cooperation. The latest crisis is a clear warning that Ukraine must have this early-warning mechanism. This is undoubtedly a task that our government must shoulder. We must institute this mechanism by making changes to pertinent documents, particularly to the memorandum, because this is in the interests of supply, transit, and consumer countries.

How should we interpret President Putin’s latest statement that, in the event that Ukraine joins the MAP and later NATO, he cannot imagine a situation where Russia will have to aim missile systems against Ukraine?

I cannot imagine such a situation either. That is my answer.

Can you visualize a situation in which Ukraine first becomes a member of NATO and then the EU, or vice versa?

This is part and parcel of all those invented discussions. I think EU membership is a far more substantial and serious challenge for Ukraine in terms of results. And in the given case, once again: if some sort of consistency existed or exists in the case of other countries, this doesn’t mean that it is supposed to happen this way. There are certain parallels. At one time, if you remember, the Partnership for Peace Program was regarded as an alternative to NATO membership, just like the European Neighborhood Policy, which is still regarded by many as an alternative to EU membership. However, membership in the Partnership for Peace Program did not prevent countries from becoming members of NATO later.

In many respects this is a discussion that is devoid of content. Sometimes such discussions are used to conceal a country’s inability or ineptness in carrying out reforms. People are saying that no one is waiting for us there, or if we go there, we will quarrel with other countries. This is not the case. It is common knowledge that the countries that became NATO members increased rather than decreased their commodity turnover and have larger investments from the Russian Federation than before. Once again, this has nothing to do with membership or nonmembership. It is simply that conditions have appeared for investments that did not exist earlier. Business can operate on the world and regional markets in various sectors absolutely independently, without any additional support from a government or through protectionist measures. That’s all. In fact, our integration — primarily European integration — is Ukraine’s openness and preparedness for the new conditions in what is known as the global world order. As for our government, there is no place in our agenda for a crisis.