In the dusk of mystery

In the large pantheon of Soviet heroes one of the most conspicuous places is occupied by the legendary Soviet intelligence agent Nikolai Ivanovych Kuznetsov. This man, who fearlessly assassinated Nazi military leaders in broad daylight, became the hero of numerous serious books, articles and essays, as well as several feature films. Today virtually no blank pages are left in his biography as a secret agent. Yet the true circumstances of the death of the man who acted in the German rear under the identity of a Wehrmacht officer Paul Siebert are still shrouded in mystery and conti­nue to cause heated arguments.

THE END OF THE “GERMAN HAUPTMANN”

On Feb. 12, 1944, in the village of Kurovytsi in the Lviv region a car with three Soviet agents, disguised as Germans, was halted by a German gendarmerie patrol. The agents’ names were Nikolai Kuznetsov, Ivan Kaminsky, and Ivan Belov. The patrol commander, Major Kanter, demanded that Hauptmann Siebert produce a written permit to leave the city of Lviv, but the latter had none. To avoid inevitable arrest, Kuznetsov and his companions had to use firearms and, killing a couple of gendarmes, were able to get away from the dangerous roadblock. Yet their bullet-riddled gray Peugeot did not take them very far. The three Soviet agents abandoned the useless car and soon vani­shed in the dense nearby forest.

That was to become the last day in the career of the German Oberleutnant (later Captain) Paul Wilhelm Siebert. No longer would he stride down the streets of Rivne and Lviv, stretch out his strong arm in the Nazi salute, flirt with pretty women in the refined German society, and, of course, assassinate German leaders and collect valuable data for the Soviet military command. Siebert-Kuznetsov and his two companions had only a couple of weeks to live. They spent this time meandering through the endless woods of the Lviv and Volyn regions, desperately hoping to encounter the regular Soviet troops or guerillas. Alas, this was not to happen.

Feb. 12, 1944 is a notable date for one more reason. Historians have a fairly clear picture of everything in Kuznetsov’s life before this “gendarmerie” episode. But after this day, the life of Paul Siebert is concealed in the dusk, if not total darkness, of mystery.

Once in the woods, the three agents came across an armed unit of Jewish militia which they joined. A memoir tells us that Kuznetsov was anxious to get to Krakow as soon as possible, and continue to shoot down “the fascist vultures” there. But very soon he had to realize the utter infeasibility of his scheme. His papers had already got into the enemy’s files, which virtually blocked his further career as an agent. A new “clean” ID could be quickly made out for him at the mobile office of the guerilla group “Victors” to which he belonged, but his partisan comrades were far away, on the other side of the front. To meet them, Siebert had to cross the front line as soon as possible.

The Jewish militiamen did not detain Kuznetsov and his companions. With two Jewish guides, the “Hauptmann” and two “German soldiers” soon set out through the woods.

THE EXPLOSION

A version of what happened next appeared in a book by Mykola Strutynsky, ex-member of “Victors” and one of Kuznetsov’s drivers. He carried out his own investigation into the details of the famous Soviet agent’s death. On March 9, 1944, Kuznetsov and his companions put up for the night at the house of the farmer Stepan Holubovych in the village of Boratyn, Lviv region. From there, they could clearly hear the guns at the front line. They were having a rest when a small group of Ukrainian insurgents broke in on them. Kuznetsov addressed them in good German, which together with his and his companions’ German uniforms made the insurgents believe that they were speaking with a Wehrmacht officer. They let Paul Siebert know that there was no danger for him or his men: it was a rule with Ukrainian nationalists to let all “stray” Germans go. However, they relieved them of their guns.

It looked as though Kuznetsov and his fellows did not have to fear the arrest any longer. But the “Hauptmann’s” relief was premature. Later the commander of the insurgents, Chernyhora, appeared at Holubovych’s place. As soon as he set eyes on Kuznetsov, he yelled, “It’s him! It’s Siebert!” He ordered his men to keep an eye on these “Germans.”

Kuznetsov knew instantly that this meant nothing but failure. According to Strutynsky, the Soviet agent was preoccupied with only one thought: how he could charge a dear price for his life. He managed to get up and grab a grenade which he had put close by. In deadly silence his voice boomed out, “Die, you damned scoundrels! We won’t die kneeling!” In a moment a deafening explosion followed. Then the wounded insurgents saw Kuznetsov writhing in agony on the floor. After a minute the agent’s stern face was still.

Many decades later, in 2005, another version of this event was suggested by an ex-guerilla from Chernyhora’s group, Petro Yakymiv, who was a member of the company with the romantic name “Hutsulka” (Hutsul girl). This veteran of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army concurs with Strutynsky in that in early March of 1944, he and a few other insurgents detained in the village of Boratyn three men in German uniforms under the command of a Nazi Oberleutnant. Neither Yakymiv nor his companions had a shade of doubt as to the identity of the Germans. The “Hutsuls” were going to let the men go after they had disarmed them. But as the detained men were giving up their weapons, a grenade exploded (in Yakymiv’s opinion, the explosion was due to Oberleutnant’s negligence). The German officer died from the wounds, while several “Hutsuls” were badly injured. Only later did Yakymiv learn who that “German officer” really was.

DUBIOUS IDENTIFICATION AND MYSTERIOUS GERMANS

Despite a certain similarity in the interpretation of the circumstances of Kuznetsov’s death in both versions, they still have considerable discrepancies. Strutynsky’s version speaks of essential identification and disclosure of the Soviet agent by Ukrainian nationalists and a grenade as a means of suicide. Yakymiv’s version does not even mention identification, while the agent’s death is technically an incident. So the question arises: Did the Ukrainian Insurgent Army men identify Kuznetsov as a Soviet agent? This question appears to be crucial, because if the Ukrainian nationalists had not unmasked Siebert, Kuznetsov’s death would have been absolutely pointless.

In my view, the insurgent commander’s chances to identify the agent Kuznetsov were quite modest, to put it mildly. I would like to emphasize that to identify Paul Siebert was no easy thing for Chernyhora or any other Ukrainian nationalist, contrary to Strutynsky’s depiction. It could have been possible, though, under at least one of the following prerequisites: 1) Chernyhora once was an UPA undercover agent in the guerilla group “Victors” and knew Kuznetsov well; 2) he had a photograph of Kuznetsov on him; or 3) Chernyhora knew (from some other sources) Siebert’s identity: his rank in the German army, age, appearance, etc.

The first version is virtually unrealistic, as Kuznetsov was tho­roughly undercover in the guerilla group “Victors,” following the commander Medvedev’s strict order. The second one can also be dismissed, because Kuznetsov’s biographers are sure that neither Germans nor Ukrainian nationalists had his photograph at their disposal. The third version can be treated as likely, yet with certain reservations.

In all probability, the UPA secret service did not make a point of collecting any data on the Soviet spy Kuznetsov. If Chenyhora had anything on his file, he would have received it only from the Germans. Again, this would have only happened if the UPA commander had begun to cooperate with the German intelligence. We have no reliable data as to Ukrainian nationalists’ possible cooperation with the Germans in their “hunt” for Paul Siebert.

Let us assume, with great reservations, that such cooperation did take place and the man who allegedly identified Siebert was not only the insurgent commander, but also a Nazi agent. What would have happened if the two were to meet? Not much, in all likelihood. If the Ukrainian insurgent had relied on Siebert’s military rank (Hauptmann, i.e. captain), it wouldn’t have gotten him anywhere. It is a well-known fact that even before this encounter, Kuznetsov, who was very well aware that the Germans were searching high and low for Hauptmann Paul Siebert, merely removed one star from each shoulder strap, thus demoting himself to his former rank of Oberleutnant. Given that Siebert-Kuznetsov’s appearance was nothing out of the ordinary, a verbal description would have been of little use as it would have matched many young Wehrmacht officers.

On the face of it, one could infer that the Soviet agent died quite accidentally, due to negligent handling of weapons. But the problem is, in fact, much more complicated. In this context, let us ask a new and more serious question: Did the three men in German uniforms, detained by the Ukrainian insurgents in the village of Boratyn on March 9, 1944, have anything to do with Kuznetsov and his two companions?

There were several significant circumstances that made me doubt this fact, which has been taken for granted by many historians. Firstly, several different sources (including Strutynsky’s and Yakymiv’s accounts) say that the three detained men spoke excellent German. But it is common knowledge that out of the three Soviet agents, only Kuznetsov was fluent in German. Kaminsky had a poor command of it, while Belov couldn’t speak it at all.

Secondly, according to the more specific evidence (provided by another “Hutsulka” guerilla Petro Kumanets after the war), in Boratyn the Ukrainian nationalists detained two, rather than three, Germans. The reader will know that Kuznetsov’s group consisted of three persons, and it is very unlikely that one of them, Kaminsky or Belov, was away from Holubovych’s house at the time of the arrest.

Finally, a perfectly reliable Nazi intelligence document (we will give more detail on it later) says that a Ukrainian insurgent group detained Siebert and his comrades on March 2 (not March 9), and not in Boratyn, but in the woods near the village of Bielhorodka in the Volyn region.

All this suggests that we are dealing with two different events that occurred in different places and at a different time. But if Kuznetsov, Kaminsky, and Belov were detained by Ukrainian nationalists a week before the incident in Boratyn, who was arrested by Chernyhora’s group on March 9, 1944?

Let us not be confused by the fact that both cases feature a man wearing a German Oberleutnant’s uniform. History has seen even more striking coincidences. In my opinion, Chernyhora and his companions did arrest several German men in Boratyn, and as they unarmed them, a grenade accidentally exploded. But even if Nazi uniforms served to disguise some other people who could speak excellent German, there should be no doubt that the three Soviet spies in question were detained in the Volynian woods on March 2.

DEATH IN A BATTLE VS EXECUTION BY UKRAINIAN NATIONALISTS

Historians now have several documents at their disposal that throw light on what happened to Kuznetsov, Kaminsky, and Belov. The most important of these is a telegraph report by Obersturmbannfuehrer Witiska, director of Nazi intelligence in the District of Galicia, addressed to Gestapo chief General Heinrich M?ller and written on the basis of the information provided by the agents in the UPA.

The report read that on March 2, 1944, one of the UPA groups detained “three Soviet-Russian agents” in the woods near the village of Bielhorodka, Volyn. Witiska maintained that the Ukrainian nationalists were able to identify all the three men, in particular, the “Soviet-Russian spy” Paul Siebert. They also confiscated Siebert’s detailed report on his activities as an agent for the Soviet General F. (the chief of the Soviet counter-intelligence General Fedotov). With reference to another source (a report by Nazi General Pruetzmann whose raid patrol was commissioned to find out about “Hauptmann” Siebert), Witiska wrote that the detained Soviet agents were shot by the Ukrainian nationalists.

Certain historians (for example, Teodor Gladkov, author of several substantial books on Kuznetsov) hold that Witiska really used erroneous data on Kuznetsov, Kaminsky, and Belov. According to Gladkov, Kuznetsov and his two companions were not executed by Ukrainian nationalists; instead, they were killed in a skirmish, outnumbered by the enemy. Gladkov goes on to say that if the three really had fallen in the hands of the UPA men, the latter wouldn’t have touched a hair on their heads. Indeed, they might have handed them over to the Germans to gain considerable military and political benefits from the deal.

Yet I have some objections concerning the standpoint of my respectable Russian colleague. There was likely no fight between the UPA men and the three NKVD agents. Lukin, chief of counter-intelligence in the guerilla group “Victors,” had reliable evidence to the effect that the UPA men who arrested Kuznetsov, Kaminsky, and Belov, were wearing Soviet uniforms, which most probably allowed them to avoid any resistance on the part of the agents. In all likelihood, Siebert made a fatal error, mistaking the enemies for Soviet soldiers and unveiling his true identity. Together with the report which was found on him, this earned him and his subordinates a death sentence.

It is certainly hard to disagree with Gladkov about the prospective advantages the UPA might have gained with such important prisoners in their hands. They might have become the Ukrainians’ trump card in their complicated game with the Germans. But the UPA might have had other considerations in deciding the prisoners’ fates. Siebert-Kuznetsov had been a nuisance for a long time, because he had left evidence pointing to Ukrainian nationalist forces at the sites of his assassinations. Normally that would be done through all kinds of counterfeit IDs, which had to make the Nazi intelligence bark up the wrong tree. (By the way, in his report Kuznetsov described his career as an agent provocateur in great detail.)

Treating his frauds in earnest, the Nazis executed UPA men and their sympathizers by the thousand. So it was only natural that Kuznetsov and the other two spies deserved nothing but death in the eyes of Ukrainian nationalists and provoked in them a desire to carry out the execution themselves, without trusting the Nazis with this mission. The complicated circumstances in the front zone were an additional factor, which did not rule out a possibility of the prisoners being freed by the Soviet troops.