Yugoslav Events Confirm: Air Defense Is a Military Priority for the Country

This was the subject of an interview granted to The Day by the Commanding Officer, Air Defense of Ukraine, Colonel-General Oleksandr STETSENKO.

HOW AD WAS INTEGRATED
AND WHAT CAME OF IT

"Mr. Stetsenko, I would like to start with foreign policy factors. Exactly four years have lapsed since Ukraine joined the CIS integrated AD, and we have heard since then occasionally that this situation runs counter to our state's nonaligned status. What does the Commander of Ukraine's AD think about this problem?"

"We cannot say now that Ukraine is part of the CIS integrated AD system. At least because the document on Ukraine's participation in this system dated February 10, 1995, bears not only the President's signature but also a reservation that this agreement is subject to the legislation of Ukraine. As of today, we treat it as in fact a framework agreement, while relations between Ukraine, the Russian Federation, Belarus, and other states rest on a bilateral basis. During this time, we have never funded even one collective program aimed at updating the integrated AD, be it combat training or expenditures to keep up the CIS AD Coordination Committee.

"At first, when an integrated CIS AD system was being discussed, we really hoped it would allow Ukraine to intensify military and technical cooperation. Moreover, Russia was interested, particularly, in the joint development of new weapons systems. We, in turn, took the following approach: Ukrainian factories should take part not only in the development of new armaments but also in their repairs. We made up a list of enterprises to be involved in long-term work within the CIS limits taking precisely this approach. But our proposals were turned down. So within the limits of the integrated AD system, we also rejected technical cooperation and opted for the strategy of bilateral contacts."

"Then what is the reason for Ukraine to continue in the CIS AD integrated system if it now exists only on paper?"

"First of all, it allows us to keep track of the air defense systems situation in Russia and other CIS states. This is the main thing. The equipment and weapons of our national AD, in spite of a large number of component parts produced by our own military-industrial enterprises, were assembled in Russia. The latter also has the design bureau responsible for modifications and modernization. This is important for us. Also, speaking of usefulness, we conduct joint Ukrainian-Russian training of air defense duty forces. There have been six such training sessions. They were aimed at eliminating acute or conflict-prone situations and achieving a clear coordination between the ADs of both countries. For sometimes an aircraft loses its bearings in the air or communication with the ground or is hijacked, and the AD of another country can render assistance under various force-majeure circumstances. But I must also say we conduct such exercises not only with Russia. We have similar agreements with Belarus, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria. So if their warplane or ours approaches within 25 kilometers of the border, this should be brought to the neighbor's notice on time so that it does not scramble its aircraft for an interception mission or activate any other AD systems."

"But today cooperation with Russia is connected with another circumstance supposedly of not only a military but also military-political nature. I mean the use of our two missile early-warning radar facilities, located in Mukacheve and Sevastopol, in the interests of Russia's nuclear forces and antimissile umbrella. Is it a sign of Ukraine's involvement in serving collective interests under the Tashkent Pact?"

"There are lots of various rumors about these facilities. To start with, the agreement with Russia on the use of missile early-warning radar and the control over outer space was signed by the first President of Ukraine as far back as July 6, 1992. Under the agreement, our state undertook to fully finance the early-warning facilities stationed in Ukraine. At the time, the Soviet Union had already disintegrated, but nuclear weapons still remained on the territory of four republics. Ukraine had both nuclear missiles and control posts. Early-warning stations are of crucial importance for the effective functioning of nuclear forces, so we had to quickly determine the legal framework for the work of these facilities in those far-from-simple conditions.

"But later on, when the decision was finally made to proclaim Ukraine a nuclear-free state and the nuclear warheads were taken to Russia, the early-warning radar systems worked and still work primarily in the interests of Russia. This was why we held intensive talks with Russia in 1993-1994. It was agreed that, from January 1, 1994 to January 1, 1996, when we still had warheads, Russia and Ukraine would share equally the radar's cost. The radar cost an annual $1.5 million to maintain. The new agreement on the early-warning radar, which we signed with Russia on February 28, 1997, and which was recently ratified on the third attempt by the State Duma and is still to be ratified by our Verkhovna Rada, envisages that all expenses for the supply of spare parts to and repairs of the radar are to be fully borne by Russia. Ukraine maintains only the personnel. However, now we proposing that Ukraine should be compensated even for these expenditures."

"That means Russia must pay Ukraine an annual $1.5 million for the two radar facilities. Yet, Russia has regularly paid an annual $5 million to Latvia for a similar radar in Skrunda. Why is there such a difference?"

"Russia leased Skrunda as a self-contained military installation, land inclusive. There were Russian soldiers and guards there. If we had not had nuclear warheads, we might have followed this way, i.e., lease out the radar."

"And was there no sense in bargaining later?"

"We could not put forward any conditions, for the fate of our early-warning stations is sealed by another international treaty, the 1972 US-Soviet ABM Treaty. After the collapse of the USSR, Ukraine became its legal successor under the agreement, which states that missile early-warning facilities may 'be stationed on the periphery of a nation's territory with outward orientation,' If we had leased out the radar, we would have indirectly admitted that Ukraine remains part of Russia's national territory. We would also have automatically been expelled from the ABM Treaty which limits the abilities of signatories to develop weapons capable of shooting down incoming ICBMs. Participation in this treaty allows access to all sorts of information that no one would share with us under any other circumstances: bases for nuclear arsenals, data on military satellites, and the danger of terrorist acts using nuclear weapons. This is essential for us. Participation in the treaty also allows Ukraine to influence the position of the superpowers when it comes to the development, upgrading, and modernization of ABM systems. This also opens up prospects to some extent for placing orders with our defense enterprises."

"If our Parliament does not ratify the agreement with Russia on the early-warning radar, what might be the consequences?"

"It would change nothing militarily or politically, for the role and place of the early-warning facilities in Ukraine were determined by the 1992 agreement. The new agreement of 1997 does not impose any limitations on our side, but it has an important detail: it lays down the amount and procedure of Russia's compensation for the radar-related expenses borne by Ukraine. If this agreement did not exist, that would suit Russia just fine, for Ukraine de jure would have to continue to maintain the radar at its own expense. Thus ratification of this document is in our national interests."

HOW OUR S-300 AND AMERICAN PATRIOT FRATERNIZED

"A quite strained dialogue is now going on between Moscow and Washington about the future of the Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty to which Ukraine is also a party. The US wishes to revise the limitations imposed by this treaty. What is our military servicemen's attitude to the American attempts to strengthen the antimissile umbrella over their country even, if necessary, at the expense of revising the ABM Treaty?"

"We would like to see this international document remain unchanged."

"The commander of the Russian Air Force, now also in charge of AD, has said recently they are developing over-the-horizon radar systems capable of detecting the launch of enemy missiles at strategic distances. To an extent this could be viewed as Russia's desire to rid itself in the future of its dependence on Ukraine or, say, Azerbaijan, a difficult negotiation partner which also hosts an early-warning radar. Would Ukraine then have to dismantle the Mukacheve and Sevastopol facilities?"

"This danger does and will exist. These are first-generation radar installations. The Russian designers have already extended their service life by five years. Later Russia will service them as long as necessary. But in fact, our radar evokes growing interest of the US and other states, for they cover the whole Middle East and North Africa. If Russia stops paying for our early-warning radar, we do not rule out the possibility of the United States funding its operation."

"What is the current state of cooperation with the US and NATO in air defense? For it is thought that representatives of such high-tech services as the AD and Air Force find it more difficult than those of ground forces to reach understanding with NATO executives."

"We have moved a proposal that two regiments - ours equipped with the S-300 anti-aircraft missile system and an American armed with the Patriot - fraternize and become twin military units, and then carry out joint battlefield exercises so that the American crews fire our missile system and we their Patriot. Of course, provided the US finances the exercise."

"But today the Patriot and the S-300 are the main rivals on the arms market. And there were earlier proposals to hold kind of a duel between the two systems, the results of which would have an impact on many promising contracts either for the US or Russia. It seems to be Russia that first suggested this competition to the US. Then the US wished to purchase one Russian antiaircraft unit and compare it with their Patriot. Whose side are we on in this dispute?"

"We are not speaking of a duel between these different weapon systems. We are speaking about a confidence building measure which would allow AD representatives of the two countries, Ukraine and the US, to understand each other better. As to the effectiveness of an antiaircraft missile system, this depends on the skill of its crew. I know the Patriot and the S-300 system which our AD troops are also equipped with. And what I prefer is the S-300. As to probable cooperation with the North Atlantic Alliance, Ukraine maintains, on a bilateral basis, quite active air defense contacts with both CIS and NATO countries. For example, some Hungarian air defense experts undergo training in Ukraine. And recently the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense conducted a conversion course for Turkish officers who studied the Osa and Kub short-range anti-aircraft missile systems. On the other hand, we have recently visited some AD bases in Greece."

"Does this mean our officers can now visit anywhere and see everything?

"The point is not what we see. The point is how and against whom what we saw will be deployed..."

HOW DESERT FOX TOUCHED UKRAINE

"Has the cruise missile bombardment of Iraq, quite effectively performed by America and Britain, taught Ukraine anything?"

"We study in detail the experience of that operation. It has all the signs of a modern war. The US and British military, to win absolute air superiority during Desert Fox, made almost 650 sorties and launched over a thousand cruise missiles. Their strikes were first of all aimed at destroying the air defense network of Iraq, i.e., radar and launch sites. Since the Iraqi AD were equipped with obsolete AA missile systems and artillery effective only in daytime, these facilities were being hit at dusk and at night. And there was nothing at all to counter the cruise missiles. In addition, Iraq's AD system was not mobile.

"As to conclusions, we can now state that air strike facilities are capable of fulfilling strategic tasks and contributing to the achievement of the main objectives of a war, i.e., victory. In this case the air defense system also assumes a strategic weight and must be regarded as a major factor in the preservation of a state's sovereignty.

"As of today, we have decided to give the development of Ukrainian AD top-priority status. It is planned to increase the numerical strength of this branch as part of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. We are now introducing on an experimental basis a territorial principle of manning AD units with conscripts, so that these specialists are then always within reach of their former commanders. This is cheaper for the state, more convenient, and will increase combat readiness..."

"Hypothetically, would a cruise missile attack on Ukraine be as disastrous as it was on Iraq?"

"Our units conduct annual missile launch exercises on the national test site. We constantly experiment with the deployment of our AD facilities to achieve the most effective results. By the way, we also fire at targets similar to cruise missile which are poorly visible on radar screens. It is more difficult to detect and track them than the American Tomahawks."

"But we fire over the sea. This is simpler, isn't it?"

"Says who? The sea is a mirror for a radio signal. Radar screens look like milk. I wish you could find a target marker. And our units come back from tests in high spirits, so to speak. We also fire over the ground. We also train crews on simulators at a special center. Conditions in the latter are such that if somebody gets a 'satisfactory' grade, he will fire at the test site with at least 'good' grade. But, with due account of the Iraq War experience, the Minister of Defense ordered this year an AD live-ammunition exercise be held, simulating the repulsing of an all-out cruise missile attack. It was also decided to reinforce AD supplies, repair defective equipment and arms, irrespective of any financial constraints. We have recently held talks with Russia on the resumption of work to modernize S-300 units, and we are now paying more attention to the development of mobile AD systems."

"How is the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine going to settle its bills with Russia? Lack of funds, you know..."

"Russia has incurred a $4.5-million debt for using our missile early warning radar. We are not after cash, we would be content with spare parts for our AD systems as payment of this amount. Of course, at the producer's price, and not three or four times as much, as they sometimes try to do."

"Will this critical dependence of Ukrainian AD on Russia in the modernization and production of sophisticated antiaircraft missile systems continue?"

"We can make do for a long time with the weapons we already have. As to new designs, we have recently developed our own artillery-and-missile system whose performance surpassed those of other short-range weapons now employed by AD."

"Some of our officials have already said Ukraine will in a couple of years also have the prototypes of long-range air defense systems, similar to the mentioned S-300, with a range of about 300 kilometers."

"It won't be so fast. But, owing to a powerful national defense industry and other circumstances, we have indeed embarked on the road of developing a system like this. It should incorporate the best features of the S-300 and Buk systems. We are now analysing what we have to make such a system. We have identified the leading designers in this field. We have a design bureau capable of making a missile; moreover, S-300 missiles have always been assembled in Ukraine. We already know who will be in charge of the radar, automatic control system, and the central computing complex. The main thing now is to identify a general designer. This must be a heart able to unite all our capacities into a whole.

"However, developing a modern antiaircraft missile system independently costs too much. It involves very large expenditures. This is why we will have to decide in the future where Ukraine should orient itself in this sphere, either toward Russia or the West, and attract investors."

"From the West or East?"

"From where the money is found. But even with the current arsenal in its present-day condition, I reiterate, our AD troops are capable of fulfilling their principal task: to provide a reliable cover for air borders and protect the sky over Ukraine."