Ukraine and Russia – 20 years without empire: historical lessons

(Continuation; for beginning see the previous issues)

We published in the previous issues a wide-scale polylogue among Yurii Afanasiev, Yurii Shcher­bak, Oxana Pachlovska, Myroslav Popovych, and Larysa Ivshyna. It will be recalled that the debate was held at Den/The Day’s editorial office as part of the roundtable “Post-Soviet Space: 20 Years On. Where Are We Going?” The first part of the conversation was about the key moments of the 20-year post-Soviet history of Ukraine and Russia: why did the two countries and peoples choose this way which has obviously resulted in an acute systemic crisis, what hindered Ukraine and Russia from fully under­stand­ing and embracing the values of European democracy and begin – if only slowly and gradually – to put them into practice, what is the difference and similarity between the mentalities of the Ukrainian and Russian elites?

Today we continue this debate on The Day’s pages. But this time we are putting more emphasis on the current events and their likely consequences rather than ana­lyzing the past. The future of the two countries is covered with more or less thick fog, it is alarming, but still it does not rule out a hope. What are the main risks, where are the most insidious thorns and traps on the road of our countries to a society of really free people? What should the opposition, intellectual rather than poli­tical, do to win the people’s absolute confidence? What period of time has history assigned to the current Russian regime of “sovereign democracy” and who is likely to replace it? When shall we find, at last, a high-quality alternative to those who have announced themselves “elite” and are ru­ling us, and what should be done to this end? The Day’s guests are offering their valuable ans­wers to all these questions.

Yurii SHCHERBAK: “Samuel Huntington said the West ends where Orthodoxy begins. He does not consider Orthodox Greece a Western country. But we must know what causes this – religion or the nation that embraces it.

“The world is now being re-divided, which will take 20 to 30 years. A new leader, Poland, has already emerged in Europe. We are pinning great hopes on this: an East European bloc will perhaps be formed around Poland, which even Belarus will join some day. We should not simplify these processes. What could be a model for Russia is India, a multiethnic and, at the same time, de­mo­cratic state, one of the leaders in the world of today. If it is the question of what is closer to the Russian way, it is perhaps India. But nobody is saying this!

“Incidentally, very few know that Tajikistan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan are forming a geopolitical triangle. Uzbekistan is coming closer to the US. This means serious processes are unfolding in Central Asia. Russia is losing its influence there. But the border across which drugs are trafficked in to Russia remains open. It has grown by about 70 per­cent during the NATO war in Afghanistan, and Russia is now consuming more drugs than the US.

“In the context of these changes, I do not rule out that, when Putin comes to po­wer, he will have to wage a victorious war against Ukraine to strengthen his re­gi­me. I cannot exclude this development be­cau­se this politician is conti­nuously blackmailing his people, imposing the besieged fortress complex on them.”

“DEALING WITH UKRAINE, RUSSIA OPTS FOR ‘ELITE INFECTION’“

Larysa IVSHYNA: “I am going to make an assumption and I would request you, Mr. Afanasiev, to comment on it. They chose a military aggression against Georgia, above all, because the Georgians were united, particularly, in their wish to join NATO. A mi­litary aggression was supposed to show that such a beha­vior was punishable. As for Ukraine, they have been eroding its statehood for many years. And while earlier the question was to have a political fifth column, now the goal is that all the columns be fifth. Ukrai­nian oppositionists, no matter how hard I sympathize with them for their si­tuation, have not, of course, read George Sheve­lov’s article ‘Moscow, Maroseika,’ nor have they studied the phenomenon known as ‘Kochubei mentality’ and its impact at the turning points of our history. So, dealing with Ukraine, Russia opts for ‘elite infection,’ which many gladly give in to, and, as a result, the whole space is being ‘infected.’ In spite of a very dramatic domestic situation, the Russian lea­der­ship is still leaving some narrow intellectual niches, where the bar is very high. Meanwhile, here, our socially irresponsible media tycoons are holding sway. In this space, the younger generation can see no cultural role models. This presents an obvious danger for the potential with which Ukraine went out of the USSR. Paradoxical as it is, people in the Soviet Union’s ‘can’ could hear the Ukrainian radio and poets, there was a high-quality theater. Let us recall Sheve­lov again, who said that Peter the First had won when he cut Ukraine off the West in terms of culture. These trends and methods are also visible today. Therefore, there must be an opposition, of course, but what we need still more is an alternative. In this connection, I do not think Russia will resort to military intervention in Ukraine even under the worst circumstances. Tuzla showed that in a critical moment even the Moscow-oriented Ukrainians can rally together around the idea of NATO membership. I think many in the Kremlin understand that Ukraine should not be rallied around anything. It should be and in fact is being ruined. How can we resist this?

“When I said it is important for Rus­sian historians to know a true Ukrainian history, I meant – from the Ukrainian viewpoint. Only in this case is a dialogue possible. Nobody in Russia thinks that we have a thousand-year-long history and the right to speak with Russia from somewhat different positions. We keep looking for people in Russia, who could show interest in what we are trying to speak. But even we held the polls ‘What kind of Russia do we love’ and ‘What kind of Ukraine do we love,’ the Russian answers were usually of the following type: ‘We have close friends there,’ ‘you cook tasty meals,’ ‘it’s a pleasure to vi­sit you,’ or ‘you are, in principle, good folks.’ But we have mentioned Chaadaev, Herzen, and people who knew Ukrainian history. In fact, there has been no back wave so far. Maybe, Yurii Shevchuk’s visits show a new, awakening, interest? Maybe, these seeds were sown by late-1980s democrats and brought forth new, far more mature, democratic forces? I don’t know. I would like to hear from you if a new look at Ukraine is possible in Russian society.”

Yurii AFANASIEV: “You said that what motivated the Russian leadership to unleash the Georgian war was, first of all, the fact that Georgia had not just declared but taken a different way in comparison to Russia. It aspired for democracy, NATO, and Europe. The war’s message was: don’t pry into where you don’t belong. If you go on, you’ll get hell. That is right. But, at the same time, it seems to me that the war was motivated, on the part of the Russian leadership, by far deeper considerations than Georgia as such. I think that, by launching this invasion, Russia said to the West: don’t forget that we are Russia and we will be doing what pleases us. If we are to wage a full-scale war, we will do so. This is approximately what Russia meant by this war. But, to be fair, Russia also disgraced itself, for it showed it was incapable of fighting even against Georgia. It became clear for the military that there was no army capable of doing anything. But it is the details, the bypro­duct of the war. And, what is more in my view, was the intention not only to stop Georgia’s progress but also show the whole world and the West that Russia was prepared for a full-scale war in the conditions of a nuclear world.

“As for Ukraine, I will refer you to Du­gin who outlined in clear-cut terms the stra­tegy towards it. I do not want to say it is a strategy of Russia’s leadership, but we should take a closer look at it because the strategies mapped out by Dugin’s camp meet with no apparent rebuff from any side. Besides, this stra­tegy spotlights real Ukrainian problems. Dugin says that, to tame Ukraine, one should play on the realities of the caesura [the space that divides the worlds in the civilizational and cultu­ral dimension and is itself divided. – Ed.] that passes across Ukraine, deepen the differences between eastern and western Ukraine, and thus increase this contradiction, which will finally make both of them be clo­ser to us – they will prefer to be Russified rather than stay in opposition to one ano­ther. But he himself says it is rather unlikely and can provoke a war. So one should not pin too many hopes on this strategy, for it is dange­rous to all. A safer, in Dugin’s view, stra­tegy is to play on the aspirations of western Ukraine which wants to be nationally self-sufficient and sovereign. This part of Ukraine should be told: you are looking westward to find great independence, but bear in mind that now, as part of the West, you will lose it. This approach may produce the desired results. Ukraine will see on the whole that it must go East rather than West.”

IN CONTRAST TO EUROPE, IT IS NOT TYPICAL OF RUSSIA TO ACCEPT SOMETHING DIFFERENT

Oxana PACHLOVSKA: “I would like to back Yurii Shcherbak in his vision of Europe. There is a very harmful ne­ga­tive stereotype of a Europe that has bogged down in the crisis, is unable to solve the problem of migration, etc. In all the centuries of its existence, Europe has been evolving the concept of Different. This is what it began with in the Ancient Greek era. Even when Europe was colonial, the anti-colonial idea was inherent in the intellectual milieu from Montaigne to Sartre. In other words, the intellectual class has always been reformatting Europe, as far as understanding the other world is concerned, for Europe is an inclusive civilization – not because it reworks and takes away the identity but because it increases and finds a consensus between local identities. This is why Europe, absolutely different at its opposite poles, has the same identity shaped by the value-related re­fe­rence points of democracy. The danger of Russia, to use Mr. Afanasiev’s term, is that it does not have a consolidated identity – not only because it is patchwise. There is a very interesting book, Imperial Know­ledge, by the Polish researcher Ewa Thompson. She writes in it about 19th-century Russian literature: whenever Russia was turning to Europe, it was the embodiment of Slavism, whenever it was turning to the Slavs it was the embodiment of Russianness, and whenever it was turning to the Caucasus and Asia it was European. Even Putin said in an Arab country that Russia is also a Muslim country. And as long as it is such, it constantly changes its image and remains unpredictable, for it finds the ways of influencing various realities, depending on its ever-changing identity. An Orthodox state assaults Georgia: can you fancy that? The Cold War and the rape of Belarus – are you not brothers? How can Russia perceive our history if it has no concept of Different?

“Whenever we say that Ukraine is a caesura, it is true. But there is a much more complicated relationship between western and eastern Ukrai­ne. It is not a partition along the Dnipro artery. We can see a lot of non-European things in western Ukraine and a European Ukraine in Kharkiv and Donetsk among the Rus­sian-speaking population. These cities are more and more assuming the European way of thinking because they know they should catch up with certain stages. Conversely, western Ukraine sometimes dis­plays a lax attitude (‘we’re Euro­pe, you know…’), which creates an opposite impression. And the fact that on December 19 last year, when the government resorted to a number of provocations to thwart the signing of a treaty with Euro­pe, there were no people on the streets to defend the idea of Europe, shows that degradation has gone down the Ukrainian body’s capillaries and our duty is to appraise to what extent this illness is deep and cu­­rable.”

L.I.: “There are two modern-time films that explain many things in post-Soviet history. It is The Cold Summer of ’53, whose warnings are still to reach us, and Brigada. They refer us to studying anti-Stalinist literature.

“I often recall Yevhen Hrytsiak, leader of the Norilsk revolt. He shared with us his own methods of resisting the system. When Hry­tsiak was in solitary confinement, he learn­ed English and translated Indian yoga, which helped him keep well and lucid-minded. He also told us that during the Norilsk uprising he was supported by people of all ethnicities, including the ‘Great Russians.’ They all stood united until the victory. But when they won, the Ukrainian national question split them up in the prison camp.

“And the film Brigada showed the way the Soviet nomenklatura was decaying and mutating, and what it turned into. I was even, emotionally, on the mobsters’ side sometimes: uneducated guys get demobilized from the Soviet army and see the whole set of streetwise behavior and rampant corruption in the law-enforcement bodies. This system of Mob protection put them all through the mill, turning decent people into victims and murderers at the same time. This also conti­nues today – not only because the processes are still going on. The Russia that put people inside and the Russia that was inside suddenly met, and nothing happened. Was there no Nuremberg Trial? Will there be a Hague trial? Or is this going to last for centuries?”

Maria TOMAK: “Mr. Shcherbak mentioned Vaclav Havel and his last article. But I would like to cite his last commentary published in Novaya gazeta after his death. In this commentary, Havel also touched upon post-Soviet reality and the society that struggles with a dange­rous form of post-communism. Besides, all must remember the situation with the Quadriga, when Ha­­vel’s word was decisive in this story and Putin was denied this award. With due account of all the aforesaid, do you think Europe understands Russia?”

(To be continued in the next issue)