Keeping ancient freedoms intact

History especially reveals itself when people are facing an unexpected challenge. What really amounted to this kind of an unexpected and crucial task for the 18th-century Ukrainian elite was participation of its delegates in the Legislative Commission which was drafting a new legislation for the entire Russian Empire in 1767, the era of Catherine II’s “reforms.” Drawing up proposals and doing other work in the commission, the Ukrainian delegates displayed their vision of the Hetmanate as an autonomous country within the limits of the Russian Empire.

“INSTRUCTIONS” FROM THE LITTLE RUSSIAN NOBILITY

The Governor-General of Little Russia, Count Pyotr Rumiantsev, called elections to the Legislative Commission in March 1767. For this purpose, the nobility, burghers, and Cossacks delegated deputies who issued nakazy (instructions), in fact proposals, to the central government. These “instructions” are an extremely valuable piece of information that reflects the sociopolitical thought of the 1760s. The elections showed that the “Little Russian gentry” considered themselves masters of the Hetmanate. Apart from voting on behalf of their own estate, the nobles who resided in cities took part in the municipal elections and positioned themselves as senior officers at Cossack meetings.

There were 34 proposals that came to the Legislative Commission from the Hetmanate. The central idea of all the “instructions” was that “Little Russian rights and freedoms” had been granted by Polish and Russian monarchs and the “Little Russian people” had been enjoying these “freedoms” for centuries—consequently, they were the best form of the Hetmanate’s social system. Incidentally, this was the opinion of not only the nobility, i.e., the elite, but also of burghers, the Cossacks, the clergy, and even Russian dissenters. This shows only too well the effect which the sociopolitical ideas of a self-ruling and autonomous Hetmanate, propagated by Cossack intellectuals, had on the minds of the lower strata of society and non-native ethnic groups of the population. The “instructions” abounded in new catch phrases, typical of the political culture of enlightenment, such as “we have resolved, by a joint counsel, to list the most obvious needs and shortcomings of our society.”

In these proposals, the nobility was guided by the right of precedence, i.e., historical legitimism, in the demands to preserve the particularities of their country’s autonomy. Those who drew up the “instructions” belonged to the generation of Cossack intellectuals that entered creative life in the 1750s and the 1760s. Accordingly, they reasoned in the same way and used similar texts to substantiate the “freedoms” of the Hetmanate society. For example, the Instructions of the Hlukhiv Nobility noted that “since the time when Little Russia reunited, for its own good, with Her Supreme Imperial Majesty’s All-Russian state, all the sovereigns, who happily reigned and deceased by God’s will, have been promising by their imperial word and confirming by their stately decrees that they will sacredly and unbreakably maintain and preserve the integrity of Little Russia and honor all the previously granted rights, privileges, freedoms, and customs. Therefore, we, the undersigned, also on behalf of the citizens residing in other districts, are making this most humble and servile request that Her Wisest and Motherly Imperial Majesty keep intact all the privileges for our fatherland in the newly-drafted law and, if necessary, make additions and exclusions thereof.”

The Instructions of the Pryluky Nobility trace the Hetmanate elite’s rights back to the times of W adys aw Jagie o: “The aforesaid rights and privileges, listed in the Statute, were granted to this country by Polish kings and grand dukes of Lithuania: by W adys aw Jagie o in 1433, by Sigismund I in 1507, by Sigismund Augustus in 1569, as well as by Her Imperial Majesty’s sublime and glorious ancestors, such as His Tsarist Majesty, Blessed and Ever Memorable Sovereign, Tsar and Grand Prince Aleksei Mikhailovich who awarded two credentials to Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky March 27, 7162, or 1654 Anno Domini.”

The Hlukhiv Nobility Instructions set out “Little Russian rights” in line with the speech of Hryhorii Poletyka at the Hlukhiv Council in 1763: “As our ancestors used to fight the enemy and do other services, so we and our heirs have taken a solemn oath to eternally serve the all-Russian Her Imperial Majesty’s throne, and we are now loyally serving at our own expense.” It followed from the Lubny nobility’s instructions that the Cossack intellectuals suggested that “freedoms and good old customs be preserved and not violated, nothing new be established, and if anything needs to be added to the good of Rzecz Pospolita, we can only do so by a common consent.”

Such wording occurs in all the instructions of not only the nobility but also, importantly enough, in those of the Cossacks and burghers. The penetration of the Ukrainian elite’s sociopolitical values into the general public shows that the terminology of the Cossack intellectuals’ manuscripts and paperwork was so widely used in the Hetmanate’s various population strata that the Cossacks and burghers would only express their demands in the language of the nobility, i.e., the language of “freedoms.” What was new in the expression of traditional Central European political values, i.e., “freedoms,” was partial use of the language of an imperial political culture. This resulted from the impact of the Russian Empire’s Ukrainian intellectuals on their “fatherland” as well as “modernization” of the entire Central and Eastern Europe whose elites began to embrace the early-Enlightenment sociopolitical categories of thinking.

The Cossack intellectuals regarded history as a system of useful precedents for that-day period and the future. In the Hlukhiv nobility’s instructions, the Cossack intellectuals presciently wrote: “The late wise monarch Peter the Great, the Emperor and Autocrat of All Russia, issued ukases in 1722 and 1725, which forbade officials, senior officers, and nobles to rent out their houses.” It follows from the Hlukhiv instructions that the basic value of the Ukrainian elite was “benefit,” i.e., interest of the “common people” rather than that of the state and its treasury, which is clear from the request to reduce duties on the import and export of salt.

A similar idea of public interest also follows from the instruction of the Pryluky nobility. The Chernihiv instructions show that the nobility cared about the “state benefit” but they believed that it was necessary “to elevate them (Little Russian people – Ed.) to such a high degree of happiness that they could feel the never-ending grace of Her Imperial Majesty.”

The Chernihiv nobility instructions, influenced by the son and father of Bezborodko, regarded the existing legal relations as something that could be changed by the criteria of “state benefit” and “natural law.” Still, the Hetmanate was pictured as “the most crucial member of the Russian people,” and it was suggested that it preserve the legal standards of the Polish-Lithuanian era and benefit from the promises of Russian monarchs. The instruction pointed out: “We are most humbly requesting that, for the good of the state, the local Cossacks and the nobility be given an appropriate opportunity to serve the monarch in the existing regiments from the lowest ranks upwards and thus be honorable defenders of the empire and bona fide citizens.” The Pryluky nobility instruction asked for the confirmation of the Statute and legal norms, i.e., privileges of the era of Polish-Lithuanian kings, Russian tsars, and emperors. The instruction also called for confirming the right to land, i.e., the main wealth of Central European elites.

The Pereiaslav nobility instruction proposed that, in accordance with “the most exalted imperial credentials and articles coordinated with Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky for times eternal,” “all rights and freedoms of Little Russia be confirmed without any violation.” The Pereiaslav intellectuals tried to “combine” the rights (but not duties) of the new-time gentry with the still broader benefits of the traditional nobility. They asked for equating the nobility with the gentry, “as equals with equals,” with “benefits enjoyed by the nobility” remaining intact. They also proposed establishing legal standards to regulate real-life social relations: “Little Russian rights and freedoms as stipulated in the Statute book.”

The Cossack intellectuals highly valued education, which was in line with the imperial policy, but the central government confined itself, even theoretically, to establishing secondary educational institutions. The Chernihiv nobility instruction requested setting up a bank that could subsidize “schools as a thing good and useful for the entire empire.”

The Pereiaslav nobility suggested establishing a university in their city because it used to be the center of an ancient Rus’ principality and the host of the Pereiaslav Rada. The Cossack intellectuals also believed that “it would be good if the local nobility had a military academy” and “an educational house for noble maidens.”

The instruction of Chernihiv burghers expressed more banal interests: they asked for “freedom to brew and sell vodka.” Like the Cossack intellectuals, the Chernihiv burghers complained about the consequences of wars. Residents of other cities also requested similar things. “The request of the citizens and all other residents of Lubny” noted that the Rumiantsev census was “something that has never occurred in Little Russia.” The residents called for protecting their interests from Russian merchants “with due regard of centuries-old Little Russian customs and freedoms.”

It is important that other strata of society were also concerned about the wealth, status, and power of the Ukrainian elite. It was said, for example, that “by Little Russian rights, the Little Russian white clergy and their property are considered part of the nobility.” And the Chernihiv regiment instruction recalled that, according to Clause 13 of the Bohdan Khmelnytsky articles, “it is lawful for a Cossack to enjoy Cossack freedoms and the privileges of nobles.” The Chernihiv Cossacks referred to Peter I’s ukases of 1708–1709, whereby “We have never levied a more than a nominal tax on the Little Russian people, who enjoy their rights and freedoms under our great-power authority, because We always honor the rights and freedoms of all our subjects and We have always strictly kept and are going to keep our promises, especially those we gave to the Little Russian people.”

The Pryluky Regiment Cossacks point out that “the main drawback of Little Russia is that there is no hetman.” The Myrhorod Regiment Cossacks insisted on “confirming the freedoms and the noble honor to all the Cossacks” and establishing a court in accordance with “the Little Russian law of the Statute Book.” This showed a certain evolution in the Cossacks’ awareness, when the unwritten “freedom” was supplemented with “noble honor” and the written “Little Russian law.” This meant that the Hetman State’s lay intellectuals extended the nobility’s values to a broader stratum of the Cossacks.

The Ukrainian delegates regarded “the Little Russian nobility” as equal to the Russian and Lithuanian ones, but in reality “the rights, privileges, and freedoms of the Little Russian nobility” were much more difficult to exercise and enjoy.

The autonomy-seeking proposals to the Legislative Commission could have comprised even more radical demands if the central government had not interfered in their drafting. For example, Rumiantsev interfered in drawing up the overtly autonomist instruction of the Chernihiv nobility, which called for guaranteeing all the traditional rights, canceling taxes for the upkeep of the Russian troops, and granting the nobility the right to duty-free trade. Rumiantsev wrote to the empress on this occasion in a letter dated April 13, 1767: “I never hesitated to tell them all the truth, which they do not exactly like.”

Oleksandr Bezborodko, who was in favor of centralization-aimed innovations, and his father, General Justice Andrii Bezborodko, succeeded in drafting a Rumiantsev-style instruction of the Chernihiv Regiment to the Legislative Commission. Although this instruction was in line with the imperial project of an enlightenment-based rule, it still comprised a cautious demand for autonomy. The instruction said: “The newly-drafted laws should leave us for centuries to come all the notable benefits, freedoms, rights, and privileges that we have scrupulously made use of up to now.”

Rumiantsev’s letter to Catherine II further says that in Starodub the elections of a delegate to the Legislative Commission clearly reflected the nobility’s autonomist views: “They all began to clamor that we keep intact all their existing rights, freedoms, customs, and estates, cancel all taxes, withdraw the army, and exempt the nobility from paying duties. Some of them, especially the former employees at hetmans’ administrations, called for insisting that the hetman’s office be restored.” But the final version of the Starodub nobility’s instruction had no clauses about such a traditional sociopolitical aspect as a streamlined legislative system; nor did it include a request that local offices be held by the local nobility or that the cash tax be canceled.

Interestingly, church instructions also reflected the Ukrainian nobility’s autonomist tendencies. The 127-page Kyiv instruction comprised a 74-item program of church autonomy. The Kyiv Eparchy instruction proposed recognizing the title of Metropolitan of Kyiv, Halych, and all Little Russia; restoring the practice of electing the protohierarch from amongst Ukrainian contenders; transferring jurisdiction over the Kyiv diocese from the Holy Synod to the Collegium of Foreign Affairs; and establishing church jurisdiction over Ukrainian eparchies. Yet, none of the instruction’s articles about restoring the Kyiv diocese’s autonomy was included into the synodical instruction and, accordingly, was not considered.