WEIMAR UKRAINE?

I.

To what extent could present-day Ukraine be compared to Weimar Germany? There are a number of similarities to be found in Germany of the 1920s and Ukraine of the late 1990s:
- ineffective government institutions;
- incompatible value and behavioral stereotypes in principal regional and social groups;
- lack of a Parliament majority (hence, repeated Cabinet changes);
- vague geopolitical orientation of the state, along with growing foreign debts;
- economic crisis (with a consequent rise in unemployment and decline in living standards);
- lack of democratic and legal traditions;
- vulnerability of public conscience (in Germany, resulting from defeat in World War I and the humiliating Versailles Treaty; in Ukraine, resulting from the USSR's collapse and loss of basic social guarantees).

This list could be much longer. It is important to note, however, that the government of the Weimar Republic was exposed to many extremely negative factors entirely beyond its control. It was blamed, quite unjustifiably, for Germany's defeat in the war (German military officers actively supported the myth of being stabbed in the back by Social-Democratic leaders); for the heavy burden of the Versailles Treaty with its territorial annexations and staggering reparation payments. Last but not least, German industries, struggling to revive after war devastation, were devastated by the world economic crisis of 1929 (nor was it a coincidence that the Nazis and communists increased their seats in Parliament from 12 to 107 and from 54 to 77, respectively, in the 1930 Reichstag elections).

If one compares the benchmarks at the start of the Weimar Republic in 1919 and independent Ukraine in 1991, one would be amazed at how much the situation favored Ukraine. In Germany, the republic emerged at a time of undeclared civil war. A communist republic was proclaimed in Bavaria and collapsed after much violence and many deaths (November 1918 — May 1919); the Spartacists revolted in Berlin, led by Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg, suppressed by government forces in the course of a bloody week (January 10-17, 1919). On the other hand, the rightists did not prove very loyal citizens of the new republic, either (e.g., the Kapp Putsch of March 1920 and Hitler's Beer Hall Putsch in Munich in November 1923). By contrast, the Ukrainian state was established without any excesses at all. Independence was proclaimed by the Parliament's constitutional majority and confirmed by an all-Ukraine referendum winning 90.32% of the vote.

Under the Versailles Treaty, Germany had to surrender large territories to Denmark, Belgium, France, and Poland. Ukraine, thanks to the communist regime, met independence being more territorially solid as ever in its history.

After losing the war, Germany was blamed for its outbreak, and had to make huge reparation payments. The first was $5,000,000,000 in gold, maturing in 1919-21. To secure payments, French and Belgian forces occupied the Ruhr valley, Germany's main industrial region, in January 1923. Ukraine started in the foreign economic domain with a clean bill of health, without debts and being considered a rather promising potential business partner. However, due to a remarkably ineffective and incompetent economic policy, its foreign debt had reached $9.8 billion by 1998. Servicing it this year will take Hr 2.6 billion.

In other words, drawing these parallels puts Ukraine in an unfavorable light. Government and public institutions (e.g., the legislative, executive, and judicially branches; local authorities; labor unions; the Church, etc.) are regressing at an accelerating rate. Premier Valery Pustovoitenko's recent statement about the Cabinet being prepared to approve its own action program at one of its sessions, should Parliament decline to do so, passed almost unnoticed by the general public.

It should be remembered that the last three cabinets of the Weimar Republic (headed, respectively, by Chancellors Heinrich Bruning, Franz von Papen, and Kurt von Schleicher) also ruled with the aid of presidential edicts, but without support from the representative power. It is also true, however, that the Weimar Constitution (a) allowed this and (b) the aging President, former Field Marshal von Hindenburg, considered this situation totally abnormal (it was precisely the attempt to form a cabinet supported by a Parliamentary majority that caused all the subsequent leapfrogging; Hitler promised to get Reichstag support and was appointed Chancellor). In Ukraine, President Kuchma made no public gesture to scold his Premier who had obviously got out of line.

II.

A movement toward totalitarianism may take a somewhat different (although essentially a similar) course. It suffices to recall Russia in 1905-20. Predicting catastrophe, Russia's first Prime Minister Sergei Witte wrote: "...no government can prepare overnight a country with a diverse population and administrative networks built on various principles, for learning and understanding the rules of law and order. To establish law and order, persistent work and unwavering consistency are required." The inconsistent and irrational policy of the ruling clique at that time could not but result in what would be now described as the velvet revolution of February 1917. And yet the Provisional Government (reminiscent of the early Weimar cabinets) could not steer Russia between Kornilov's Scylla (remember the Kapp Putsch?) and Bolshevik Charybdis (Spartacists' revolt?). The Bolshevik coup of 1917 ended in overthrowing the Provisional Government, marking the beginning of a Time of Troubles.

World War I was the catalyst of, rather than the reason for, the Russian revolution. Of course, the army's unwillingness to shed blood for the Dardanelles was among the factors causing the outburst. After Russia withdrew from the war, its territory, one-sixth of the planet's dry land, became the arena of an undisguised civil war of all against all. Volodymyr Vynnychenko, first head of the Ukrainian government, noted that the authorities in Kyiv were unable to cope with or contain "all those small and big warlords, uncontrollable and irresponsible." And he meant "commanding officers in the field," who recognized the central government. The same was true of the Ukrainian National Republic and the Hetman State. Add here dozens other independent warlords, of whom anarchist Nestor Makhno cut the most spectacular figure. Under the circumstances, the Bolsheviks enforced their regime, coming out as carriers of firm power and some semblance of order (which later turned out the Russian prototype of the Nazi neue Ordnung). Vynnychenko wrote that "if we had not been faced with our own rebellious peasantry and proletariat, the Soviet Russian government would have never been able to do what it did to us."

Today's Ukraine is about to relive that warlord period. Its cities and districts are almost officially divided among hundreds of rackets and semi-racketeer groups, mostly organized as regional-financial clans. In the Crimea, Donetsk, or Odesa spheres of influence are being allocated by way of small scale gang wars, with law enforcement agencies responding by sending meat wagons (at least such is the overall impression). Other regions are relatively quiet (Kyiv, Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk...), but this makes one think not of public peace, but of a certain gang having done away with its rivals and now in control, but for how long?..

It remains to be added that the drastic situation in Tsarist Russia, caused by two wars (the fiasco of the Russo-Japanese War of 1905 and the drawn-out First World War), and in Imperial Germany, due to its defeat in the First World War, has been achieved in today's Ukraine without firing a single shot, by the dedicated efforts of two Presidents.

III.

One has to realize that Ukrainian society is on the verge of collapse, with only two factors warding it off so far: (a) non-acceptance by most citizens of any extremist slogans and (b) the weakness of the existing extremist parties and groupings, along with the absence of a potential dictator (for how long?)

Indeed, the extremist parties in Ukraine are numerically insignificant and lack political influence. But they do exist. On the one hand, we have the radical nationalist Ukrainian National Assembly, social nationalists, and so on. On the other hand, we have the ultra-left: Progressive Socialists, All-Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks), etc. Their numerical insignificance is no guarantee that their influence will not grow. (When Hitler first appeared at the Munich Beer Hall where the then German Workers' Party was holding a meeting, there were less than 30 persons in the audience. After uniting with the Harrer group, its membership grew to about 100. The party purse contained 7 and a half marks.) Strong and influential centrist parties could be a reliable guarantee of stability, but this is wishful thinking in Ukraine now.

Another point not be shrugged off is that in conditions of mounting radicalism parties claiming prestige, like the Communist Party of Ukraine, National Movement of Ukraine (Rukh), etc., will inevitably polarize and become more radical. Actually, this process is already happening. Even the "pillar of the regime," the ruling People's Democratic Party ("ruling," considering the posts held by some of its members), made no official response when Anatoliy Halchynsky, one of its leaders, made his scandalous statement on January 16 calling on the President to disband Parliament and "establish presidential government in this country for a term of 2-3 years." It also remained silent when Premier Pustovoitenko declared that the Cabinet could approve its own action program.

True, serious presidential contenders are not trying to don the imperial toga, but it is also true that Leonid Kuchma, while Premier in 1993, insisted on proclaiming a state of emergency — or economic emergency — in Ukraine. In 1995, as President, he literally squeezed extraordinary presidential powers out of Parliament, within the framework of the unconstitutional Constitutional Agreement. An other contender, Pavlo Lazarenko, only recently posing as a faithful right hand of the Chief Executive, while rumored (not without reason) to be the wealthiest man in Ukraine, plunged into populism headlong after resignation, touring regions, making speeches, each carefully attuned to a given audience (it suffices to recall his story, while soliloquizing in Western Ukraine, about his forebears working for the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists). Reminiscent of Zhirinovsky or young Hitler, isn't it?

As social and economic tensions mount, so does radicalism in society. It is then that candidate dictators appear and begin to multiply in geometric progression. Here the key role is played by most of the people living just above the subsistence line. And it is not so much the "red revenge" hobgoblin as the fact that by humiliating the man in the street (like holding back honestly earned wages for 18 months, as often happens in Ukraine) even people as law-abiding as German Burghers or Russian/Ukrainian townspeople can be brought to the peak of radical extremism.

There are alarming statistics showing the dynamics of authoritarian sentiments in Ukraine. The Kyiv International Institute for Sociology and Kiev-Mohyla Academy National University staged a poll in November 1997. Over 43% of the respondents agreed that a "strong domineering leader can give Ukraine more than any laws." In 1995, "strong-hand" exponents made up 35%. In 1996, it was 41%.

IV.

1998-99 Parliamentary and Presidential elections will perhaps offer Ukrainian society the last chance to overcome a very dangerous trend (if at all possible). There is every indication that most citizens of Ukraine will vote against what is rather than for anything positive. And against President Leonid Kuchma. But positive changes will depend on votes for, not against.

Alternative models of social development are generally known. There is nothing extraordinarily new about them. They were adopted and are functioning in most civilized countries. They are social-democratic and social-liberal. The crux of the matter is, whether Ukrainian society can break free of the vicious Weimar circle.

If, once again, the votes spread even between the radical and radically inclined antagonists — CPU, Rukh, the Socialist and Peasants' Parties of Ukraine, National Front, etc. (let alone Lazarenko's Hromada (Community) which is ultra-opposition oriented in both its form and essence) — this will be another step toward and maybe even into the abyss, all the way down to that shining future in which all democratic-minded citizens (if there are any left by then) will be happy to get entry visas to Lukashenko's Belarus.

HISTORICAL REFERENCE

On February 6, 1919, the newly elected National Assembly of Germany met in Weimar to write a new Constitution which was adopted on July 31, after six months of debates. At the time, the document was an ideal example of liberalism and democratic approaches, proclaiming all the conventional civil rights and liberties, including freedoms of the individual, conscience, expression, and many other wonderful things. Twelve years later, on March 23, 1933, the Reichstag passed Hitler's Cabinet's bill On the Liquidation of the Calamitous Situation with the People and the State, made up of five sections which in fact invalidated the Constitution. That was the end of the Weimar Republic, turning it into a synonym of a weak transitory state, having paved the way for the Nazi "new order."