Tight embrace

Moscow makes no secret of the fact that the victory of the Party of Regions leader, Viktor Yanu kovych, is its ideological and geopolitical victory. In principle, the main thing for the Russian leadership was Viktor Yushchenko s fiasco, considering that he is openly regarded in the Kremlin as a no-handshake politician.

The first round of elections was followed by fanfare, including rallies and extensive coverage by the federal channels and printed media. As for the runoff contenders, the Russian political elite stressed its neutral stand until almost the last moment. It is possible to assume that the 2010 election campaign passed with the least involvement of the Russian factor in Ukrainian history. Some observers even believe that Moscow, at least Vladimir Putin, openly favored Yulia Tymoshenko, as evidenced by its stand in the matter of penalties for Ukraine s failure to meet the offtake obligations. Be that as it may, Yanukovych did not receive any tangible degree of support from Moscow. It is, however, part of human nature to take pride in success, even if it is a gift from Lady Fate rather than the result of hard work. It was important for the Kremlin to stress the failure of the Orange project. In this sense Yanukovych serves as a very important symbol.

Dmitry Medvedev doesn t mind attending the ceremony of inauguration of the newly elected President of Ukraine, and this will be his first visit to Kyiv as head of the Russian state. It is necessary to show the inner audience that Ukraine has been won back. Among other things, this visit will be additional proof that Putin made a wrong bet in 2004 and miscalculated in 2010.

Even more importance is attached to Yanukovych s visit to Moscow. There is every indication that he will be accorded welcome on the highest level. Sources at the Ukrainian Foreign Affairs Ministry say that signals from Moscow suggest that, despite Medvedev s tight schedule for the next couple of months, the Kremlin is prepared to receive Yanukovych any day. This, however, does not mean that the new Ukrainian president can expect troublesome future in relations with Russia. Moscow has suffered too many losses in conjunction with Ukraine and is eager to recover all of them, at quite some profit, ignoring the fact that the world (Ukraine included) has changed a great deal and irreversibly.

In particular, the Kremlin expects to receive a loud and clear signal from Yanukovych to begin talks aimed at prolonging the term of deployment of the Black Sea Fleet in the Crimea and securing guarantees of the rights of Ukraine s Russian-speaking residents, which would mean discarding the NATO membership idea. There are enough people in Moscow who realize that Yanukovych is not a pro-Russian politician he is simply not anti-Russian, as is the case with Viktor Yushchenko. However, this does not prompt them to conduct dialog with him as the leader of yet another sovereign country.

They figure that if Yanukovych is not prepared to secure Moscow s interests in Ukraine, he should be coerced in doing so. Here the emphasis is not on gas levers or support of Tymoshenko s efforts to remain prime minister, but on purely emotional pressure. The Kremlin plans to treat Yanukovych the way Russians are treated by Americans, with respect, stressing his official status, being very friendly in exchange for practical concessions. In other words, it all boils down to a top-level reception with all attendant pomp followed by the undertaking of practical obligations. Also, the Russian lobbyists within the Party of Regions are at play in full strength.

At the moment, there is little Yanukovych can do to counteract this. His team lacks people capable of finding subtle diplomatic responses to the severe challenges thrown in their way. It is necessary to avoid hurting Russia s feelings and, at the same time, getting too far on the path of reconciliation, so as not to lose an opportunity to conduct fruitful dialog with the West and most importantly, so that western Ukraine recognizes the new president s legitimacy.

Neither the pro-Russian Leonid Kozhara, nor Petro Poroshenko, who regards everything from the standpoint of his business, is fit to be such an adviser. Ever since his appointment as foreign affairs minister, Poroshenko has been saying everything Moscow wanted to hear. True, he has practically honored no commitments he assumed in regard to the Russians (among other things, he has failed to prevent attacks on the Black Sea Fleet and Russia-owned resorts in the Crimea). Anyway, a person who has a business in Russia, especially after being appointed head of the foreign affairs ministry, will see his highest priority in not being blacklisted as a visitor to the Russian Federation. This person will not be able to prepare Yanukovych s visit to Moscow the right way. Meanwhile the newly elected president s office and Ukraine s international positions will strongly depend on how he goes about this visit and whether or not he can avoid Kremlin-imposed analogies with the historical process of granting a permission to rule.