“Support does not lie in applause”

Three years ago the stormy presidential election of 2004, also known as the Orange Revolution, stirred up enormous interest in the world. On Nov. 22 this year I was waiting for one of its main heroes, Viktor Yushchenko, then the presidential candidate and today the president of Ukraine. Mr. Yushchenko did not seem to be celebrating this date in any special way, although he must have found pleasure in recalling the time when the million-strong Maidan was chanting his name. But three years in office have spotlighted so many long-neglected and fresh problems that he had to call an early parliamentary election.

On that day the president planned a meeting with the faction of the party whose honorary chairman he is. Will this camp be strong enough to form a democratic coalition, as was announced during the election campaign? Or will internal contradictions force it to seek out allies in other camps? How many more rounds are ahead?

This interview took place on the eve of remembering the victims of the 1932-33 Holodomor. Yet our talk was not confined to those tragic events. It was about the unlearned lessons of history, which are the root cause of many of our current problems. There are things for which the president may be criticized and reproached, yet he gained one unconditional personal victory — a victory over oblivion.

The Day remembers Viktor Yushchenko as a citizen, not as a politician, coming to pay his last respects to James Mace, the first person to reveal to the world the truth about the Holodomor in Ukraine. Later President Yushchenko enshrined this truth in a law. On his initiative, the parliament of the previous convocation recognized the Holodomor as an act of genocide against the Ukrainian people.

Mr. Yushchenko, when you were unveiling the monument to Holodomor victims in Popilnia, Zhytomyr oblast, you said that only “a truthful history will consolidate the nation.” But it is obvious that in the current conditions Ukraine’s path to unification will be difficult. What do you think are the most formidable obstacles today?

The first and foremost thing is whether society should live with lies or with truth. Is truth a good or a bad thing? What is the unifying thing — false values or genuine ones? It is not enough to say that it is bad to lie. No alliances are based on lies, and if any still are, they are short-lived and bloody. But this is not the subject of today’s discussion; it is a subject that exists beyond it. To live with lies, including historical lies, means to head toward polarization and to take the unsolved problems of the past into the future. Second, what is truth? Truth means trust. You tell the truth to those whom you respect. You never lie to those whom you respect. This is very important for forming an honest dialogue in society and with a society. But the truth is so hard to face up to! The truth really hurts, so many people would like certain historical events and circumstances hushed up, which would be sheer distortion. We should remember that the Bill of Rights and Pylyp Orlyk’s constitution are based on man and his right to live. Nobody is authorized to rob him of this right. So if a disaster happened in our country, we must reconsider it honestly. How can we create a happy future? This subject is rooted deeply in the past. If we do not pass judgment on the past and do not adopt the right attitude to it on the basis of values, we will be insincere about all the things in our current life. We must look back and honor the memory of our compatriots, our own grandfathers and grandmothers. We must kneel down and honor the memory of these innocent martyrs. This is what distinguishes a human from a beast.

Mr. President, as you well remember, the great US-born Ukrainian James Mace once said that to a great extent Ukraine is a post-genocidal society. Some people refuse to accept this, thinking that this is a label or an insult. In reality, this should be considered the point of departure for Ukraine to heal its wounds. We are proposing that the world recognize the Holodomor as genocide, and more and more countries and parliaments are supporting us. But acute domestic political problems remain. There is still a party in Ukraine that dates back to the one that caused the genocidal Holodomor, and except for some highly-moral individuals like Borys Oliinyk, it has not repented anything and is now even part of the current ruling coalition. What is your vision of resolving this problem?

There is a very important parallel. In the speech that I gave yesterday I tried to say that what had been ‘sown’ in 1932-33, unfortunately still exists to a large degree. There is still a widespread fear of speaking the truth and taking responsibility. The irresponsibility and mayhem caused by those punitive units still echo in our political and social life. We must remember this.

After all, this brings us to the crucial question: who is to blame for this? The debate continues. This question is extremely important and painful for the Ukrainian people, who arguably suffered the heaviest losses. I want to issue this warning: it would be a grave mistake if we tried to place all the blame on a certain nation or state: this would be unfair and would lead us from the true path of seeking the root cause. I see that attempts are sometimes made to raise this issue, and they find fertile ground. But by all accounts, whomever you ask today, an eyewitness of those terrible events or an academic researcher, they will say that the real culprit of this tragedy is undoubtedly the Stalinist communist regime. It is sad that the militants who picked up the flag of that political force (although they are not personally responsible for the 1932-33 events) perhaps lack morality, courage, or some other human qualities to condemn this. If they believe their ideology, that is their own business. But if their leaders, whom they are ready to ‘deify’ even today, committed crimes, they should admit and condemn this. I don’t think it would be a humiliation for the concrete political force because its current leaders are not personally guilty of that. Their only guilt is that they will not repent. And inasmuch as their ideology ‘blessed’ certain terrible misdeeds, they are hindering catharsis and representing a danger to our contemporary life. Of course, this should not be taken literally. The crime remains unpunished. The tragedy is that no conclusions have been drawn from the fact that it was an obvious evil. We were once told: forget about this story and erase those two years from your memory! In other words, we were offered a false history, a false memory, and false values, which, I am certain, are causing great harm to modern-day Ukrainians. And it is very sad that this party never begot people who, out of considerations of morality and honesty, should have admitted at least part of this guilt.

Mr. President, is Ukraine going to urge the UN again to recognize the Holodomor as genocide? Some overly pragmatic people may ask: why does Ukraine, and you as president, need this?

Before giving a definite answer, may I ask a similar question about the Holocaust? Did the world really benefit from learning what the Holocaust was? And why is the tragic moment in the history of our nation so important? What should the world know, no matter what race we are and what continent we live on? If a tragedy occurs somewhere, we, Ukrainians, mentally fly there and offer our official condolences. In other words, we live in a big open world, where the idea of good and evil is the same for everybody. The Holodomor is a tragedy not just for my family and Ukraine. So do not ask for whom the bell tolls. On the one hand, the world has responded. Of course, we may be disgruntled and wondering why it did it so sluggishly and after so much reflection. But on the other hand, I am glad that among those who recognized the Holodomor is UNESCO, a non-political organization that usually passes moral and ethical judgments. My impression is that something is changing in the minds of the leaders of the UNESCO member states. This kind of decision was unthinkable 10 years ago.

No doubt there was extensive preparatory work done by historians and diplomats. It is common knowledge that you made a sizable contribution to this because there are very few statesmen who are dealing with this problem. Have you ever heard it said that you spend too much time on this?

Yes, I have. But I will tell you frankly: I want to de-politicize this issue as much as possible. We are talking about a young country and young state. And the gap in state building — from the times of Yaroslav the Wise and Volodymyr the Great onwards — was not just a period when there no attempts to restore our statehood: more often than not wars, devastation, and famines would push this great goal away from us. In other words, our country marched forward, paying a heavy tribute for achieving the long- coveted goal. Do you know any other historical instances when a country proclaimed its independence for only 24 hours? It was so tempting to cry out, ‘Glory to Ukraine!’ and adopt the trident, our national emblem. But this lasted for 24 hours, and by the next morning it was executed on the “red field.” Yes, there was a time when our state existed for 24 hours! Later, it was a question of months. Then new wars and betrayals came. This is in fact what brought us down.

I regret as a citizen that we are still unable to say how many Ukrainians were killed in the Civil War and in the period of political repressions, which took a colossal toll of the lives of nationally conscious Ukrainians. And how many people were deported in 1924! And for what? What laws did they break? We know almost nothing about the 1932-33 tragedy, when the goal was to complete mass collectivization by the spring of 1932. That “special operation” engulfed all of Ukraine. Look what I found yesterday in Comrade Stalin’s works. This passage speaks volumes: “It is totally obvious that the national question should not be put on a par with that of the peasantry, for the national question comprises issues of not only the peasantry but also those of national culture, national statehood, etc. But it is also beyond doubt that the problem of the peasantry comprises the basis, the core of the national question. This explains why the peasantry forms the principle army of the national movement and that there can be no powerful national movement without a peasant army. I mean that the national question is in fact a peasant question’ (J. Stalin, “On the National Question in Yugoslavia. Speech to the Comintern’s Yugoslav Commission, March 30, 1925,” Bolshevik, No. 7, April 15, 1925).

Can one say after this that the Holodomor was caused by crop failure? That is a disgrace! There was no crop failure!

You mention phenomena. The “struggle of phenomena” was a frequent occurrence in Ukrainian history. There were people who wanted to establish a Ukrainian state for at least a short time, and there were those who were doing their best to prevent the former from achieving this. There was the miracle on the Vistula, when the Red Army reached the river but then retreated, and as a result Poland survived. But there was no miracle on the Dnipro. Ukraine could not avoid a deep internal rift, and many UNR-era politicians are to blame for this. The heavy toll of famines and all subsequent events is also on their conscience.

I completely agree. Look at the internal vectors that were tearing at Ukraine, the nation, and Kyiv. Hetman Skoropadsky was planning to revive his vision of a strong and centralized monarchist state based on a 60,000-strong national army that he thought would demonstrate to the country its ability to defend the state. But then recall Vynnychenko’s visits to Bila Tserkva, where he called upon the troops to demilitarize, not to mobilize. Meanwhile, regular troops were defending Ukraine in the direction of Bohodukhiv. Then a regiment came from Baturyn, only to be reinforced by students. The regular army was fighting a Bolshevik uprising at the Kyiv Arsenal. So the question is: who prevented us from establishing and developing our statehood? The first answer that comes to mind is: not Muravev! It was the politicians of the day, with their uncoordinated and diametrically opposed goals, often without any general priorities.

Today is Freedom Day (this interview was conducted on Nov. 22). I remember you standing on the Maidan on this day in 2004, and the podium was so overcrowded. The impression was that the boards would snap because everybody wanted to stand close to you and be in the limelight. There is a saying that success has many parents. Today things are difficult for many reasons that cannot be analyzed in this interview. Nevertheless, what does this day mean to you personally? Do you have a feeling of inner jubilation or bitterness? How are you going to mark the day?

There is not a single note of despair or sadness. Illusions — ordinary human and personal ones — are departing. What are Ukraine’s problems today? What kind of sons and daughters does it need? What values is it trying to uphold? I am certain we are living in a unique time. We should not idealize it. A revolution alone cannot make any changes. A revolution can provide an opportunity. There have been many changes but very often not the way I would like. We received freedom of speech, but did we get free journalists? In my view, a free journalist is a professional and a patriot able to lead a society because he has more possibilities, and these possibilities can be uniquely used for the sake of the people. Our society has a lot of problems that party congresses cannot solve. One should reach the individual, convince him, and make him your partner. I can see that the efforts of intellectuals and honest journalists are gradually bringing this goal closer.

I am sure that what is now being done to understand the history of Ukrainian statehood has never been done before. I see a kind of renaissance in this. This is a difficult period, not a sweet one at all. But we are beginning to speak about it seriously and publicly.

Now about rule of law: what kind of judges do we want to see today?

In any case, not the ones we see today.

I agree. But let’s be frank: it was not Nov. 22 that brought in the dishonest judiciary system, weak prosecutors, and corrupt and twice-bribed policemen.

But that date could have put them in different conditions of existence.

We are doing this. If we are talking about President Yushchenko, then you must remember that I have never had a parliamentary majority. Look at the presidents of neighboring countries, who appeal to society, ‘Give us support!’ What does this support consist of? Not in applause but in the proper structure of bodies that help people follow the president’s line. Unfortunately, we are living under different circumstances. But I am not giving up and not saying, ‘No, we will never make it.’ We will have a fair court system. We will have the Supreme Council of Justice, an honest institution guided by honest people. We will have a Prosecutor-General’s Office that will respond to existing challenges. This is what I think. The struggle against corruption? Yes, we shall overcome it.

Mr. President, people will say this is fantasy, because it will take a lot of years to do this or many presidential terms, to be more exact.

But I am not saying we’ll do it in a year, given the existing social metastases. If we don’t have a democratic parliament and honest Ukrainian politicians, it will be futile to hope that we will have a fair justice system.

We already have a parliament, some honest members and some dishonest ones. Some are Ukrainian and some not quite. But in any case, it is just beginning to work. You are worried about this, aren’t you? France and Poland held their elections almost at the same time as we did, but the new Polish prime minister is already working. What do you plan to do to prevent our political elections from turning into an Armageddon that paralyzes public administration?

That’s a good question. Ukraine is not Poland or France. Look, what do I, as president, expect from parliament? I am not waiting around passively. I want it to be a thinking body and a symbol. First and foremost [we need] political stability. Demagogy, rhetoric, and election rigging depart with the elections. Then each of the 450 members who have entered parliament should understand that their first mission is to stabilize the situation that was upset by the previous parliament. And instead of being a stabilizing institution, it has turned into one that fuels destructive processes — from finances and the budget to the economy. I am not dead set against the institution that I respect and of which I was once a member. I will phrase it like this: Ukraine’s wellbeing will depend to a great extent on a stable parliament.

And how can this be reached?

This is the ultimate goal. How can we reach it? If we respect the election results, we will be able to make harmonious decisions as to the configuration, status, and adequate social position of parliament. If you ask me what kind of coalition we need, I will say simply: a democratic coalition. It best reflects the election results, and I don’t think it is too difficult to form one. But we are aware of the risk that a 228-strong democratic coalition may run. I can remind you that when such an important question as recognizing the Holodomor as an act of genocide was put to the vote, five members of the democratic and patriotic factions refused to vote. What helped us were two votes from another party.

But if a broad-based coalition had been in power, this would not have been placed on the agenda at all.

It could have happened. But in the next parliament, the coalition is not a question of arithmetic. The political forces represented there are not a party of one person.

...but of a group of vested interests.

And it is next to impossible to govern this three-vote majority unless the latter comes to terms on fundamental matters. The deal to be signed by the coalition should respond to all explosive challenges.

But the habit of signing things and not fulfilling them destroys all good intentions, like what happened to the National Unity Agreement in the previous parliament.

This is a difficult process. But I am still convinced that 228 can be quite an acceptable number if we give honest answers to questions from factions and groups. But is this enough? I don’t think so. So in order to allow an Orange coalition to work effectively, I think we should change the format of the dialogue between the government and the opposition. Elections usually bring a great deal of aggressiveness to parliament, and we begin to build relationships on the basis of this aggression, throwing away our national interests.

What should be given to the opposition right now, so that it doesn’t obstruct work?

The ideal option is a constructive majority and a constructive minority. Only active dialogue can bring this about. One and a half months have passed. Who has met whom? Nobody. Moreover, nobody remembers what their voters said: ladies and gentlemen, we sent you to parliament not to engage in a ‘civil war.’ There is no tension on the grassroots level, while politicians have made hostility almost a standard of behavior. What should be done to organize the smooth work of the Verkhovna Rada and to form its leadership? Who will be part of it? Who is to represent the Verkhovna Rada if it is a compromise? Negotiations could have led to other results. Perhaps somebody wants to be represented in the cabinet or in the regional authorities. I am adding this from myself. The question could have been put this way if it had been a matter of mutual understanding. Let’s face it: this unfinished dialogue is sure to subject the democratic majority to a very severe test because the accumulated aggression will touch not only on procedural matters but also ideology, which is very important and painful for the nation.

Society is exhausted by the fruitless political process. On top of it, we have gone through tough trials, such as the environmental disaster in the Strait of Kerch and the coal mine explosion in Donetsk. People need to feel that there are reliable state mechanisms that will protect them and that there are individuals that will force the ship owners to pay damages or will determine whether budgetary funds should be used to offset the losses of the corporatized mine. Are politicians thinking about this? From the standpoint of ordinary people, they are in a very unenviable situation.

Definitely.

How can the deals be speeded up?

You have to sit down at the table and ignore your ambitions. For one month I did not take part in the debate about who will be the parliamentary speaker — for one reason. If we say 30 days before the deadline who will be the speaker, I guarantee that this person will not be the speaker because, no matter what faction nominates a candidate, he will be an object of a bitter campaign in 10 or 15 days, which will even involve his grandchildren and great-grandchildren. But the main thing is that we should not talk about who will be the Verkhovna Rada speaker at the beginning of the session because it is a useless debate. I showed my impartiality and wanted to say that we should first coordinate our principles.

Is the end in sight?

The beginning will not be a simple one. I am displeased with the negotiation process that took place. It suffered from tendentiousness and a narrow approach, which makes parliament the scene of overly bitter clashes between certain forces in eastern and western Ukraine, which was not the aim of the elections. Nor do I think that voters sent this kind of message. Unfortunately, the leaders of the BYuT and the Party of Regions failed to adopt a constructive approach. I am sure that Our Ukraine could have helped them. But, unfortunately, the game was different from the very outset. The aim was to polarize the situation in parliament and bring about what worked well under Leonid Kuchma: if you create a hostile atmosphere in parliament, the government will change everything even if it has no majority. It is bad that the 30-day negotiations were concentrated on trivia. They showed no large-scale governmental care about what can unite us and bring about a constructive majority/minority relationship. We don’t have this. There will be attacks and perhaps very sizable bribes. A three-man advantage is a very high risk: they can get sick, leave on a business trip, or simply stray.

Did the early elections achieve their goal or is it too early to assess them?

They can be assessed right now. The factions will never form a coalition on the same principles as eight months ago.

Do you mean that nobody will be buying anybody?

You know, this scheme no longer works. It is not important for the formation of a coalition whether someone has bought someone or not. As you remember, Article 81 of the Constitution stipulates who can and who cannot be a member of a faction. In other words, when we speak about the coalition, the strength of this model is that it is already obsolete, and nobody is going to set the clock back. It is the good will of one, two, three, four, or five factions to unite and form a majority. And the attitude of any MP is of no importance in this context. This is the joint decision of a party. He or she cannot enter or withdraw. A coalition is formed through a symbiosis of factional relations. That’s it. This is the positive aspect of the current situation. God bestowed on us the election results that prompt each side to launch a dialogue. If you don’t make a deal, you will be in a very shaky position, no matter where you are. This has something to do with the imperative mandate and the political attitude of the MPs. I would like to say this even now: in my view, the Constitution of Ukraine explains the imperative mandate in very simple and clear-cut terms. It says that it is impossible to change factions and, hence, the coalition format through the actions of any deputy. This is the first answer, and that is why we are talking about a democratic coalition.

The next question is about another process — voting. Does the dogma of delegated democracy lie in a free and independent mandate? Is it to be voted on in a synchronized and unified way; is it a person with a free and independent mandate? It seems to me the answer is clear to the first and the second question. The Constitution provides for two norms according to which a deputy may be stripped of his mandate. If he did not enter the faction on behalf of the party from which was elected or if he withdrew from this party, he is no longer a parliamentarian. In all other matters, it is the question of dialogue: who will vote for what. This confirms again the fact that the leaders of the political forces that were elected to the current parliament should radically change the basic principles of their relations — I mean at the factional level. I am calling for this not because I want to take a prejudicial attitude but because, after the last elections, any model envisions the mandatory component of a new strategy of relations between those who are going to make a majority and those who are going to form the opposition. If this is not achieved in terms of the parliamentary election results, we can clearly say that we will not get a parliament that can ensure political stability at the Verkhovna Rada.

Then new decisions and new elections...

You know about the new decisions: the president’s mission is described very clearly. I will not go outside the constitutional limits, and a new election or something else will not give any other answer to this. I think that the circumstances will ensure that those dialogues and minimal respect should become the norm because no progress is possible without this movement.