Russian choice

When the president of Ukraine was signing the Declaration of Unity together with the Verkhovna Rada chairman, acting prime minister, and leaders of parliamentary factions, his new state secretary was in Moscow to meet his Russian counterpart. Of course, Viktor Yushchenko had also visited Moscow after taking office, but then it was a matter of unwritten protocol. Besides, the new Ukrainian head of state brought a surprise to his Russian counterpart — the appointment of Yulia Tymoshenko as prime minister — the same Yulia whose criminal case remains on the books in Russia’s General Prosecutor’s Office. Of course, Putin had nothing to talk about with this kind of Yushchenko, fresh from the Maidan, with his decree on the appointment of Tymoshenko in his briefcase.

Today it is a different matter altogether when the new Ukrainian state secretary comes to Moscow in the wake of Yulia Tymoshenko’s dismissal. Business matters can be discussed with him. But what kind, exactly? To arrive at an answer it is necessary to be certain of what the Kremlin is actually after.

From a purely pragmatic point of view, Putin should support Yushchenko. After breaking with the Tymoshenko camp, and against the backdrop of the corruption scandal in government, the Ukrainian president’s positions have weakened. He needs new support groups, and he can find them in the so-called “old” government, among those who have had traditionally friendly relations with Russian politicians and oligarchs. The Kuchma system did not change during the months of Yushchenko’s presidency, so the only thing the president can do to retain his post until the end of his term is not to change anything in the system and stop taking away businesses from serious people and reshuffling the nomenklatura. Preserving this system may not be to the West’s liking, but this promises lower Russian energy supply costs and the prospect of keeping people warm this winter. And warmth in winter is also not a bad result for the parliamentary elections, including Yekhanurov as prime minister for several years. To this end, Russian business may gain a strong foothold where its positions are not conclusive. Of course, under the circumstances the Ukrainian president will be hard put to continue speaking about the Maidan’s ideals, but on the Maidan no one spoke about the need to regard Russia as an enemy either They simply didn’t like Putin’s dislike of Yushchenko. Now he appears to be fond of him — and all of us in Ukraine will fall in love with Putin because he loves Yushchenko, who doesn’t love Tymoshenko, and because Putin doesn’t love Tymoshenko.

This pattern, however, is too pragmatic, in that it requires Russia not only to recognize but also support the results of the Orange Revolution — i.e., the third round and the election of Yushchenko as president of Ukraine. This is precisely what the Kremlin doesn’t want to do because it creates a dangerous precedent, meaning that a revolution could break out, followed by several months of chaos, then stabilization and normal life. Then why doesn’t Russia carry out a revolution of its own, considering that there seems little risk involved?

But the main task of the Kremlin administration after the events in Ukraine was to convince the Russian population that there were risks involved. This is exactly why today the Kremlin is faced with a difficult choice: restoring its influence in Ukraine or solving the problem of 2008. Perhaps the answer to this choice will be the substitution of tactics for strategy, meaning that Moscow will communicate with Yushchenko’s people and with him, forcing Kyiv to make concessions, while taking no serious steps that could help improve the situation with the Ukrainian government. Meanwhile, it will be closely watching the forces on the Ukrainian political scene, which could replace not just Tymoshenko but Yushchenko himself.