New Successes or Old Mistakes?
The government’s latest foreign policy statements, particularly those relating to Ukraine’s membership in the Single Economic Space, have left the political community in Ukraine and overseas somewhat confused. Could the new leadership be repeating its predecessors’ mistakes? Are the recent declarations by the nation’s leaders a continuation of the infamous multi-vector approach to foreign policy? Where will this lead? The Day questions a group of experts.
Anna HURSKA, Oriental Studies Center, Poland:
“It appears that now, at least on the level of declarations, the new leadership has stumbled onto the same paths as their predecessors. Regardless of how difficult the situation is or what is behind these recent statements, it is hard to understand when state officials, much like those before them, speak about Ukraine’s EU integration when they are in Brussels, about NATO integration when they are in Washington, and about SES integration when they are in Moscow or Astana. This is a very dangerous game, because political judgments are based not only on declared aspirations but also on official statements. It is very difficult to justify the present situation. The new leadership was expected to be specific: yes means yes and no means no.
“Understandably, the current Ukrainian leadership is forced to take certain steps because of the ones that were made by the previous one: Ukraine depends on the Russian market and past agreements that the new government must now honor. But it would make matters much simpler for the West if Ukraine clarified the situation and specified its capabilities and intentions. Kyiv’s actions are not transparent enough for the West: are they part of a specific plan or merely responses to forced situations or unfavorable conditions?
“We all know where the old multi-vector approach led us. But this doesn’t mean that Ukraine must necessarily move in one direction or another. The choice is entirely up to Ukraine. It’s clear to everyone that Ukraine has a strategic relationship with Russia, which is only natural. Therefore, the choice is not about one vector or another, but about a clear strategy. Otherwise, Ukraine may face the old danger when it lost the trust of both Moscow and the West. It’s not the negative consequences of a multi-vector approach that we must discuss but the inconsistency of the Ukrainian leadership’s declarations.
“Even though Leonid Kuchma may not have repudiated national interests, he created so much confusion that today, owing to Kuchma, we must start by revising commitments that Ukraine has undertaken and do this at least in the relationship with Russia. While these agreements do not provide for any major concessions, they are complicating the current situation. Consider, for example, the situation surrounding the state border. Under the agreement on the joint use of the Kerch Strait and the Sea of Azov, the Russian side can now dictate its own conditions, refusing to establish a naval border. Was this a concession at the time the agreement was signed? Not specifically, but because of this step it is now very difficult to discuss further demarcation of the state border. Was it a concession to sell nearly all of Ukraine’s oil refineries to Russian investors? On the one hand, there were no other bidders who could have bought them. But this has created a situation in which the Russian business community can impose conditions on Ukraine by controlling this strategic sector of the Ukrainian economy. Every agreement can be interpreted along these lines, especially the SES agreement. Kuchma simply signed all the agreements that were shoved at him, but later he tried to conduct his policies in such a way that would allow him not to honor these agreements. The consequences of such an approach are obvious, and it is a major problem.”
Yevhen KAMINSKY, Institute of Global Economy and International Relations:
“Everything that happens in a country results from the policies of the previous leadership. Yet expectations that the West would help us, which were born out of the Orange Revolution, were completely unfounded. Thus, we are predictably forced to pursue a dual-vector policy. The question is how to put into practice these two vectors: the western and northeastern. This can be accomplished only if we proceed from the objective realities of life. Tremendous hopes have been placed in the new leadership, but it will take billions to fulfill these hopes. Therefore, it is from the inner foundations, from the people’s desire to live better lives that the northeastern vector, which we call the SES, has come to the forefront.
“As a result, we are doomed to a two-vector policy but not necessarily to repeating old mistakes or being caught in another vicious circle. The previous government did not entertain the notion of national interests, so it makes no sense to discuss their actions. They had clan interests. The interests of individual groups trumped all others. National interests were present only in words, not deeds. Moreover, a proposal from the experts’ circles to develop a strategy of national interests was left hanging. As a result, Ukrainian officials traveled to Brussels, Moscow, or Kherson with a different story for each visit. There were no national interests: Kuchma simply adapted to specific conditions and situations. Kuchma’s multi-vector policy was part of his adaptation, which often proved successful. Today the new leadership has failed to consider certain aspects of this adaptation, which has resulted in individual mistakes during the Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan visits. The eastern vector must be revised altogether. Everything should start from scratch.”
Kostiantyn MOROZOV, former defense minister of Ukraine:
“A multi-vector approach is not effective for Ukraine. It is time to clearly determine which vector is a priority. In my view, this would be the officially designated directions of EU and NATO integration. There is no alternative to this.
“Will we return to the old days? We cannot speak of a return because we are still there. Like before, we are marking time despite our vocal declarations of commitment to the western vector, which are immediately followed by no less resonant declarations of commitment to the eastern direction. The West is fed up with the old multi-vector approach. They want to see determination and to offer their assistance, but they first want to see consistency in Ukraine’s policy. For example, the new level of relations with NATO, intensified dialog, is evidence of Kyiv’s decisive positions. However, it is not clear why conflicting statements are being made at the same time.
“Of course, the repercussions of foreign policy errors that were made by the previous leadership are being felt to this day. These problems cannot be resolved overnight. The new president took over the country, inheriting the legacy of the previous leadership. Therefore, reverberations of this duplicity and multi-vector approach are being felt today. All the difficulties that the new leadership is being forced to tackle were imposed on Ukraine: the presence of the Russian Black Sea fleet, the gas transport consortium, the reversed oil flow in the Odesa- Brody pipeline, and the SES. From the very outset Ukraine did not try to secure its interests in these projects. Ukraine did not initiate these formats of cooperation. Now, while making excuses, we must seek our national interests. This is unclear to me. I cannot support the form in which these projects are unfolding.
“On his first visit to Moscow President Victor Yushchenko made correct statements about a foreign policy aimed at the realization of national interests. Moscow has started to take this into consideration. But, of course, many residual factors from the previous policy are slowing down these processes. The most effective way to secure national interests would be to uphold the position that Yushchenko declared immediately after his inauguration. Meanwhile, the factors that are hindering this process, temporary efforts to camouflage the Western direction, must be identified and eliminated. Russia will undoubtedly be interested in maintaining a relationship with a strong Ukraine, a member of extremely effective organizations: the WTO, EU, and NATO. Ukraine must also be interested in developing friendly relations with Moscow and, instead of currying favor with it, clearly adhere to its integration priorities. In moving in the western direction, Ukraine needs the wind at its back from the east, i.e., no disagreements with its neighbors, disagreements that are undesirable to the West.”
