Make Haste Slowly

Last Monday Oleh Rybachuk, Vice-Premier for European Integration, visited Luxembourg to attend the 9th session of the Ukraine-EU Cooperation Council, which for the first time appraised the way Ukraine had been fulfilling the Ukraine-EU Action Plan. It was expected a few months ago that the European Union would grant Ukraine market economy status at this very session. However, this prospect looks bleak now that Ukraine has failed to meet some of its key commitments: it could not resist the temptation of regulating prices during the gasoline crisis and has not yet passed the law on bankruptcy. This notwithstanding, Ukraine and the EU are continuing their dialogue. Tellingly, the vice-premier’s journey is one in the line of the Ukrainian leadership’s “European visits.” For instance, National Security and Defense Council Secretary Petro Poroshenko paid a routine visit to France last week, Prime Minister Yuliya Tymoshenko made routine visit to Paris yesterday, and President Viktor Yushchenko is also going to pay a routine visit to France on June 22. The Ukrainian leadership does not seem to be too much embarrassed over a negative vote in the French EU Constitution referendum and the resulting crisis in the European Union. On the contrary, aware of France’s negative attitude to the integration aspirations of Ukraine, this country’s topmost officials must have decided to launch a massive diplomatic “attack,” hoping to improve relations at the highest level. Has Ukraine come closer to the EU since the times of the Orange Revolution euphoria? The Day has addressed this question to some Ukrainian experts.

Hryhory NEMYRIA, director of the Center for European and International Studies:

“It is worth noting two things. First, general experience suggests that new governments tend to overestimate what they can accomplish in the short term and underestimate the potential accomplishments in the long run. The Ukrainian government is no exception. Second, speaking of Ukraine’s movement toward the EU, we should start measuring it since the end of this past February, when the final Ukraine-EU Action Plan was signed, until the present day. The very fact that we have a substantively new document outlining 177 priorities means tremendous progress. It simplifies the task of measuring the progress made on the Action Plan and identifying officials to be credited with the successes or held responsible for the failures of the program. Speaking of bringing Ukrainian laws into line with European standards, we have made some progress since last year. As for the key milestones that were prioritized at the outset of this year (securing market economy status for Ukraine, accession to the WTO, and the liberalization of visa regulations), except for the visa dialog, which has already started de facto, we are somewhat behind the time curve on the two other foreign policy goals. This time slippage is not critical, however. Our awareness of the fact that we are falling behind is a good sign, which means that the government realizes that it must get busy. It’s no use discussing whether the cause of this delay should be blamed on the Ukrainian side or some other side. In this case we should focus only on the Ukrainian context, which has three critical factors for eliminating this lag. The first is the factor of competence. The second is the factor of coordination. The third is the factor of cooperation between the government and parliament on passing priority laws relating to Ukraine’s European integration and WTO accession. If all these factors are at work, I have no doubt that by year’s end Ukraine will secure market economy status and join the WTO.

“Politically, the relationship between Ukraine and the EU has become much closer because of a changed context. The EU trusts Ukraine to honor its commitments, whilst there was no such trust before, and distrust prevailed. In this sense it is not worth it to exaggerate the Ukrainian leadership’s statements about the Single Economic Space or speak about a return of mistrust on the EU’s part. Again, this is a question of coordination. There are no differences on the level of strategies: Ukraine’s clear priority is integration into the EU. Moreover, Ukraine has drawn a red line for its involvement in the SES, which doesn’t go beyond a free trade zone. All other statements are secondary rhetoric. This applies to statements on supranational governing bodies of the SES. Meanwhile, there are no conflicts in the practical measures undertaken by the government, which is not moving away from the priority of integration into the EU. All other steps in the spheres of foreign policy and foreign trade are subordinated to this priority.

“Most importantly, the progress on the Ukraine-EU Action Plan will be evaluated already in the first quarter of 2006 as per one of the ten proposals made by Javier Solana. It will be the moment of truth that will show how many of the 177 goals undertaken by the government have been accomplished. It will provide an answer to the question whether there is more or less trust in Ukraine. Thus far we have worked for only four months, which means that there are no reasons for either rosy-eyed optimism or black pessimism. So far the process in underway.”

Oleh ZARUBINSKY, first deputy chairman, Verkhovna Rada Committee for European Integration:

“Ukraine’s movement towards the EU is not the question of what we do or do not wish. There are some concrete indications, the most important of them being the way Ukraine is fulfilling the Ukraine-EU Action Plan. It is now the key document and, at the same time, the litmus test of the progress Ukraine has made. Despite some positive points, mostly of a virtual nature, many of the tasks planned for April and May have not yet been fulfilled. Take, for example, the so-called “road map” about the fulfillment of the Ukraine-EU Action Plan in 2005. This document required drawing up a series of legislative and standard-setting acts in May. In particular, the State Committee for Atomic Energy Regulation, the Ministry of Defense, and the State Committee for Export Control were to have drafted and submitted to the Verkhovna Rada in May the law on ratification of the additional protocol to the Ukraine-IAEA agreement on safeguards under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. As of today, not only has it not been submitted to the Verkhovna Rada, but I do not know if anybody at all began to draw it up. The ministries of nature conservation and the economy and the National Academy of Sciences were to have drafted in May the law on the strategy of Ukraine’s sustained development, but the Cabinet of Ministers has submitted nothing to parliament. There are many other examples of this kind. I think one must talk less and work more. In all the prospective EU member states, the cabinet, as a subject of legislative initiative, played a key role in laying the legislative groundwork for the entry. The same should be the case in Ukraine. But today, as you see, the way this process is unfolding leaves much to be desired. To set the ball rolling, all executive branch agencies should stop eschewing hard work and refrain from empty declarations and spin-control exercises. Advancing to and joining the EU is today the question of daily routine work.

“In spite of these problems, I can say there are some improvements — mostly of a psychological nature — in the tonality of our relationship with the EU and in its reactions to our problems. The European Union is showing far greater interest in Ukraine-this is the question of a virtual and symbolic nature. But interest is a variable that can be easily lost. The EU must see that we are doing our best to comply with the Ukraine-EU Action Plan’s “road map.” The EU has been more critical lately over what we are doing. This is not a positive tendency for Ukraine, so we must work more. In this context, the Ukrainian leadership’s statements on the Single Economic Space have a very adverse effect on Ukraine-EU relations. It just impossible for Ukraine to be simultaneously present in the two economic spaces — the EU and the SES. When officials are saying today that we must go further than the free trade area within the SES, do they realize that “further” means nothing but a customs union? Moreover, it is practically impossible to bring the Ukrainian law simultaneously into line with the norms that exist in the post-Soviet space and the ones that reign in Europe. For example, the Russian economic law and commercial basis are in many respect opposite to the European legislation. So we must make a clear choice. It still seems to me that the de-facto, not de-jure, revival of a multivectored approach has first of all been caused by pre-election considerations.”