James SHERR: “The West should not lessen its attention to Ukraine”

James SHERR, Senior Fellow at the Conflict Studies Research Center, Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, comments on the impact of the “anti-crisis coalition” agreements on Ukraine’s foreign policy positions.

“Were you shocked by the news that the ‘Orange’ coalition had fallen apart?”

I am not shocked or even surprised. The Orange parties have faced cohesive opponents organized on Leninist principles. Who ever supposed they would sit still? Forming a new coalition after the March elections was a matter of urgency. But when did the president last act with a spirit of urgency? Since the March elections, the Orange parties have been a soft, stationary, divisible target, and their opponents have been offered many lines of attack. The issue of Poroshenko’s nomination gave them the tactical opportunity that led to their strategic success.

We should not forget that if free and fair elections had been held in 1999, Oleksandr Moroz might well have become president of Ukraine. I doubt if Moroz has forgotten this. His party’s poor showing in March 2006 was the verdict of the country. But the rejection of his bid to become speaker was Yushchenko’s decision. In the algorithm of coalition politics and in the perilous conditions confronting the country, his ambition was a reasonable one. Perhaps his desertion began from the moment he was forced to withdraw his candidacy. Perhaps it only began when Our Ukraine — The People’s Union nominated Poroshenko in his place. The point about Poroshenko’s nomination is this: it gave Moroz an opportunity for principled desertion. If Yekhanurov or Kinakh had been designated speaker, it would have been seen as betrayal, pure and simple. Yet even on this “principled” basis, his desertion is fragmenting and destroying his party.

“How can the creation of a ‘red-pink-blue’ coalition affect relations between Ukraine, the EU, and the US? Will the Western states change their attitude to Ukraine?”

No one will be prepared to answer such a question now, and for two good reasons: first, because the answer is largely in Ukraine’s hands; second, because the future is now open. Perhaps one chapter is over, but what is the next chapter: a country “without victors and vanquished”? Probably, we will see pink elephants on the street first. The real questions are: what will the new majority do with its power? How will they do it? How will the country react? Will there be a real parliamentary opposition capable of opposing and capable of retuning to power?

So for practical as well as principled reasons, the most important tasks for the West are these: not to lessen its attentiveness, engagement or presence. We need to seek opportunities for influence and to use them. If we lose influence, so be it. But we should never fail to use the influence we have.

We also need to remind Ukrainians that, whatever happens, the door to NATO membership will remain open when Ukraine is willing and able to walk through it. And while EU membership will not be on the short-to-mid-term horizon, the possibility of membership remains open to Ukraine under the Treaty of Rome, and the European Neighbourhood Policy explicitly reiterates this principle and right.

“Does the coming to power of the anti-crisis coalition mean that Ukrainian-Russian relations will automatically improve?”

It makes Russia stronger. Is that an improvement? Even Yanukovych knows this is a very questionable improvement, and presuming that he returns to power and keeps it, he will be seeking to resurrect the multi-vector policy as quickly as he can.