DIFFERENT

“Either things will be different or there will be nothing at all.” This is, by all accounts, the firm position of the President of Ukraine on Parliament. This was also the leitmotif of Leonid Kuchma’s first major post-election press conference held in the President Hotel’s congress hall. Parliament still remains old, but it is the President who seems to have become different, just as he promised on the eve of the elections.

To look at, he has not changed in the least. He is the same Leonid Kuchma: the same face broadcast by the national television channels, the same not-quite-correct Ukrainian speech strewn with numerous pauses, the same domineering and condescending attitude toward the press in general and individual journalists in particular. But now his words are calm and confident, without hysterical overtones, The President cracks jokes, and his occasional unexpected revelations no longer shock his press service, for they do not look out of place now. A man can only afford to be frank only in one case: when he is in full control of the situation.

It might seem that the non- confirmation of his proposed candidate for Premier by Verkhovna Rada is not cause for good cheer. But Mr. Kuchma does not look depressed. He concludes that, instead of opting for constructive cooperation and forming a parliamentary majority, most deputies are again coming to a face-off. The head of state thinks this is a sufficient reason for holding a long- promised referendum in order to specify some nuances in the relationship between the branches of power. It is now a question of not only parliamentary immunity and establishment of a bicameral Parliament but also of granting the President powers to dissolve Verkhovna Rada if the latter fails to give birth to its long-discussed majority or adopt the budget. At the same time, the head of state asks not to connect the inevitable process of expressing public opinion with the situation concerning Valery Pustovoitenko. “An ambulance should be called for those claiming I will dissolve parliament if Pustovoitenko is not confirmed,” he said immediately after explaining the necessity of mid- term parliamentary elections by the inability of deputies to form a majority that could support the Pustovoitenko Cabinet, which is combating the energy crisis and conducting successful talks with the IMF about rescheduling the Ukrainian debt. “I am not interested in dissolving Parliament,” the President affirms. But one sometimes has to flout his personal interests in the name of those of the state.

Mr. Kuchma promises to put the People’s Deputies in their place strictly within the framework of the Constitution, and a referendum on a presidential-parliamentary republic is the only way to do it. In 1995 the plebiscite was a foggy but still effective threat to prompt the parliamentary leadership to sign the Constitutional Agreement which robbed Verkhovna Rada of some of its powers. In 1996 the referendum was to have finally tipped the balance of state power in favor of the President. The then Parliament, with Oleksandr Moroz at the head, a relatively united Left opposition, and the untamed Center-Righ t , proved to be stronger. Today, a referendum is not just a threat. In fact, there is no one to threaten. Very few bold politicians have stayed behind, but where are they? Nowadays, a presidential referendum is the juridical covering, the legitimization, of the political line- up formed before the election. A successfully conducted referendum will mean the final loss of influence and opportunities for self-expression by the opposition, on the one hand, and broad freedom of actions for the President in the next five years, on the other. “I will not forgo the referendum, for if we do not lay down the overall responsibility of the legislative and executive branches of power, the whole world will again be pointing an accusing finger at us,” the head of state said, adding later that the referendum is needed to install these mechanisms in the Constitution: “No majority — no Parliament, no budget before the Constitution-stipulated deadline — no Parliament.” And no Parliament means no problems.

The President’s first post-election decree-issuing activity strikes one with its radicalism.

Parliament has been running a fever for two weeks now after the somewhat belated attempt to reform property relations in the countryside. “I am not against the collective farms provided there is private ownership of land,” the President says, explaining that he does not mean the disbanding of collective farms but the restriction of the power of kolhosp management. While earlier Mr. Kuchma had to reckon with the interests of the kolhosp barons who wield a tremendous influence on the rural electorate, now he has no scruples in calling them “landlords” and “serf-owners” and spares no colors to describe their cathedral-like manors with John Deeres in the courtyard surrounded by the shabby yards of kolhosp peasants, and promises to send heads rolling. “We won’t be cringing before them, when they roll in clover and, when it comes to the economic problems of their fellow countrymen, nod at Kyiv,” is his typical reference to his recent allies. The obstruction of Verkhovna Rada sessions by the Left, outraged in their members’ best socialist sentiments, is an additional trump in his hands in the light of the probable referendum. Parliament is again showing its categorical rejection of the idea of market reforms, which were to be demonstrated to the West.

The coming administrative reform, entailing almost 40% bureaucratic staff cuts, has shocked half the Cabinet of Ministers. As long as there is no information about specific appointments in the future government, it is pointless to discuss the consequences of the landslide of mergers and cuts in the central executive bodies of power. The only exception can be the long- awaited dissolution of the State Corporate Rights Agency, for these rights have been devolved to the regions, and the performance of Oleh Taranov’s former agency stirred up a storm of criticism. If we go by the words of those who worked out the administrative reform, the latter essentially boils down to the diminution of the state’s direct intervention in the activities of economic entities and the introduction of the personal responsibility of ministers for fulfilling the decisions made by the Cabinet on an exclusively collective basis.

This, together with the idea to enshrine in the Constitution the mechanism of electing Premier by the parliamentary majority, draws a complete picture of the planned reform of the state power system.

Over the past five years, the President has been trying hard to preserve his control of the government, protecting the latter by all possible means from the influence of Parliament. As a result, the Cabinet, finding no common language with the majority of the People’s Deputies (partially for ideological and partially for corporate reasons), had to play on a legislative field put together from frazzled fragments by the lawmakers in their own interests, for which it often was paid back with resignations. The President, distancing himself from what was going on, would accuse Verkhovna Rada of a lack of a constructive attitude and the government of the inability to start a dialogue with the deputies.

The head of state wants to fundamentally change the situation in the next five years. “The main thing is an effective state resulting from the joint responsibility of Parliament and the government,” he explains his immediate objective. According to the planned amendments to the Constitution, Verkhovna Rada is obliged to form a majority which will nominate an agreed-upon Premier candidate, automatically assuming responsibility for all the Cabinet’s further actions. As a result, Parliament will have to provide the government with as favorable as possible legislative field. This is the joint responsibility. The President acquires control both over Parliament as a whole, owing to the constant threat of dissolution, and over concrete decisions passed by the deputies, by means of the upper house. He simultaneously preserves the right to dismiss the government and, hence, his real influence on the Premier.

“The first steps of the opposition are clearly unconstitutional.” “It is impossible to expect constructive cooperation from them.” “I have gained a renewed presidential mandate so as not to waste time on any fruitless struggle with them.” “All will be responsible after the referendum.” The President’s words, very similar to those he pronounced earlier, no longer sound as a mere threat. Rather, this is a statement. The head of state stands a handsome chance to get a maximum of opportunity and a minimum of responsibility for his second term in office, an ideal combination of circumstances in which to carry out radical reform, now frozen at the half-way point. Only in this case can we speak seriously about a different President and a different Ukraine. Better different than none.