Armed Humanitarian Intervention

It is expensive, dangerous, and controversial. It is at the edge of what the international community finds acceptable. It is what the United States is currently doing to Yugoslavia or to what remains of the former Yugoslav state, namely, Serbia,
Montenegro, and the sometimes autonomous region of Kosovo. What, if anything, can justify the United States or the other NATO powers in using force against a government which is conducting police and security operations on its own territory?

The short answer to this question is: massive violations of fundamental human rights which indicate that genocide is imminent and which create an emergency situation in which the ordinary means for settling disputes have broken down. In situations of this type (Kosovo, Bosnia, Rwanda, Somalia, Uganda, Liberia, and East Pakistan), there is a partial or complete breakdown of order within a society. The rule of law and the protections which it offers cease to be available for a substantial part of the population of a state, perhaps even for all. Often enough this breakdown is engineered or controlled by one faction or by the rulers of the state itself. What is at stake in such a situation is the survival of large numbers of people, and the continued existence of a culture and a community seeking political expression and legal protection.

Sometimes the attacks on persons and communities are indirect, as in Kosovo, where, in the process of ethnic cleansing many more people are driven from their homes and exposed to the elements than are massacred. But the attacks are nonetheless real.

Such an emergency situation is created by the violence of the oppressors and evokes violence from those who are threatened. It also creates the likelihood of uncontrolled population movements and regional instability, which makes it a matter of international concern. One of the fundamental reasons for acknowledging the sovereignty of a state, namely, its ability to maintain order within its territory, ceases to hold. Sometimes the collapse of order is the result of the activity of revolutionary or secessionist movements, which can often act brutally and be guilty of human rights violations themselves. But when the primary responsibility for the collapse of order rests with a state which is attacking its own citizens, and which is unwilling to give them the protections that one would give to prisoners of war or to citizens of an occupied country, then it is clear that internal action will not be enough to restore order and stability. This is also true when the state has collapsed and has lost the ability to enforce its decisions, as in Somalia. Other states then, especially in today's world of rapid communications and increasing interdependence, are likely to feel strong moral and political pressures to intervene in order to avoid or to end a disaster.

But those who favor intervention, especially when it is a question of preventing rather than terminating massive violations of human rights, have to recognize that they are making a judgment about what is likely to happen; such judgments may not always be correct, and even when they are correct, they may not be universally persuasive. The recent actions of the Milosevic regime in expelling large numbers of ethnic Albanians from Kosovo have persuaded most observers that judgments that large-scale violations of human rights were imminent were indeed correct.

Armed interventions for humanitarian purposes are justifiable in such circumstances; they can be a matter of moral obligation as well as of moral right. But interventions are carried out by states or coalitions of states which are militarily powerful and which also have other interests and responsibilities. This point has several consequences.

First, there is a continuing need to monitor and assess interventions so that intervening states do not abuse their power. This should be done officially within the forums provided by the United Nations and other international organizations; but it should also be carried out informally by human rights organizations and by the communications media.

Second, since intervention is an exercise of military force, it should not violate the moral norms governing the use of such force as these have been formulated in the tradition of the just war. That is, it should be limited in its scope and its means, it should respect the immunity of civilians, it should be undertaken only as a last resort, it must have a just cause, it should not be driven by inappropriate or unjust motives such as the desire for vengeance.

Third, it should be seen as a temporary response to an emergency situation and thus as a stage in the reshaping of the local situation so that the various parties can live together in an orderly, if not harmonious, future. It is not an opportunity for intervening powers to advance their own interests, but to serve the common good by promoting justice and reconciliation in the region. This is an idealistic goal, but its attainment may require considerable canniness and occasional threats as well as patience and self-restraint on the part of the intervening powers.

Fourth, intervening states have the right and the duty to consider the impact of intervention on their other concerns and on the international system as a whole. Normally, this will mean that intervention is not justifiable if it is to take place on the territory of a major power or one possessing nuclear weapons, or if intervention is likely to lead to war or to increased levels of violence in the region and the international system. In a conflict-ridden world, it is not possible to rescue all victims.

To put the matter as concisely as possible, intervention is a grave and risky matter, but can be justified as a necessary response to grave evils. It should be infrequent and limited; but it can be an opportunity to promote justice and reconciliation in the future.