What caused democracy to fail in Russia

Some readers must have read the article “Aren’t We Slaves? Historical Running in Place: Russia’s ‘Special Way’” [in Ukrainian] at www.day.kiev.ua last week. This feature was submitted by the Russian scholar, politician, and public figure Yuri AFANASIEV after we asked him for an interview and reflects the views of this experienced politician who is currently in opposition to the Russian government.

In fact, Afanasiev does not have too many rostra from which to voice his views, except Novaya Gazeta (www.novayagazeta.ru) and the Moscow Echo Radio Station. At one time Savik Shuster invited him to Ukraine to take part in his talk show. He came but was dissatisfied with his time here: a debate on an important topic was turned into a marketplace show and he was given just enough time to say hello, figuratively speaking.

That was why the Russian politician treated The Day’s request for an interview with cautious enthusiasm and asked the editors to acquaint the readers with his article: “I am afraid that they will not understand my stand without first reading this article.”

Afanasiev’s views on the past two decades in Russia, Ukraine, and the rest of the world are especially interesting because he took an active parts in the events that changed and are still changing the course of history. HoweverAs it was, the following interview reached far beyond the boundaries of the said period. As a deep thinker, Afanasiev is keenly aware of the cause-and-effect relations between historical events. Also, acting very unlike his fellow politicians, he acknowledges his own mistakes in addition to pointing out those of others. Agreeably, this approach is not overly popular these days.

One can agree or disagree with Afanasiev’s views but there is one thing worth remembering: this man is a scholar, one of the most knowledgeable experts on present-time political history of Russia, Ukraine, and Europe.

Mr. Afanasiev, as an historian and participant in political events, you have, no doubt, your special view on what took place in Russia and the rest of the world in the past twenty years. How can you describe these two past decades? What kind of path did Russia complete and why in the manner it did?

“The events that took place between the late 1980s and mid-1990s were stormy in terms of changes, yet the level of their comprehension and interpretation was low. I must admit that I am also to blame. The reason is not that we were too lazy. Subsequent events showed that many of us had lost the ability to think in what I would describe as unreasonable terms. This had its effect. Some efforts were made. Some of them made sense, yet there was no understanding. I can’t say that this was a totally spontaneous process but there was no strategy, not even an intellectual one.

“Perhaps what I’m trying to say will be easier to understand by drawing a parallel with Poland. A group of intellectuals established Solidarity there. They adopted a strategy. Solidarity was preceded by an intellectual effort aimed at determining the direction in which Poland had to move. Czechoslovakia’s well-known Charter was also essentially a strategy. We [in Russia] had nothing of the kind, no charter for an organized [political] force to follow.

“The trauma sustained by Soviet society proved much worse than that in Poland or Cze­choslovakia. Individuals ca­pable of independent and free thin­king were physically de­stroyed starting from 1917, so there were few left in the 1980s. The blow to the intellectual potential [of the nation] was so heavy, there were none left when the time came to make use of free-thinking individuals. Of course, there were the democratic platform and the Interregional MP Group (Mezh­regionalnaia deputastkaia gruppa) that included individuals who came up with quality analyses, proposals, and forecasts, yet there was no creative team product that could be qualified as a strategy.

“I was one of five co-chairmen of the IMPG. We strove to analyze the Soviet Union’s prospects. Our idea was to transform the USSR not into a union state but one made up of [independent] states. We were resisted by Mikhail Gorbachev and the rest of the congress delegates. They wouldn’t even listen to our proposals. In fact, the whole Novo Ogarevo process was meant to torpedo our idea. In the end, there was the notorious GKChP [also known as the August putsch], although I wouldn’t say that our idea of a union of states was backed by a program. We also tried to work out an economic platform, something like Grigori Yavlinsky’s well-known “500 Days.” We failed to convince the economists to cooperate with us because each insisted on his views and refused to listen to colleagues.

“Intellectually, we were impoverished and never succeeded in coming up with an understandable and prestigious platform that would conform to the interests of the peoples of the Soviet Union.”

In your article “Aren’t We Slaves” you write that there was no revolution in 1991. Did you have doubts even then or did you arrive at this conclusion later?

“I did have doubts, although not at once, not in 1991. Perhaps some time in 1993. In addition to the IMPG, there was also the Democratic Russia Movement in which I was a co-chairman. As soon as Boris Yeltsin was elected President [of the Russian Federation], we started noticing that nothing was being done in the social, economic, or politic sphere in terms of democratic reform. Most importantly, So­viet Russia’s main traditional institutions of power remained intact. If there were changes, they addressed certain functional aspects, having nothing to do with structural ones.

“Toward the end of 1992, we-and I in particular-spoke with Boris Yeltsin in his office, telling him that he was doing certain wrong, inexcusable things in that he ignored the necessity of urgent reforms. I made a similar statement during a meeting of Democratic Russia. Alas, no one supported me. By the way, Andrei Sakharov also started by saying that the IMPG had to be an open opposition to the CPSU. He was supported by a handful of people.”

Why was that? Were they afraid? Were they unprepared at the time?

“They were all convinced that Yeltsin and his government spelled democracy. Few if anyone had the kind of discernment Sakharov had.

“On the other hand, all that came to pass was a shocking surprise. Mind you: all this took place in 1989. At the time no one would dare utter something like ‘we are openly opposed to the CPSU and its Politburo.’ The very notion instantly reminded everyone of the first, second, and third opposition dealt with by [NKVD/KGB] firing squads. All Soviet history is packed with political trials and executions, among whose victims were people who never identified themselves with any political opposition. No one mustered the courage to say as much at the time, although it should have done, perhaps. Later, it transpired that “the mole of history” was already digging its tunnels back then, although this was mostly a spontaneous process. As a result of privatization (actually, grabitization) of public property, which lacked any legal framework, there emerged the monster — or mutant — which I describe in my article. But this has become clear only now.

“Our society was utterly immoral by the late 1980s. People had no other [official] source of income apart from their salaries and wages, and struggled to make ends meet. This forced millions to live by double standards, stealing, evading the law, and bypassing bans. When it became possible to merge public and private funds (while there were actually no private funds), mechanisms for transforming public capital into private property were developed. This process pushed the entire economy into more chaos, making it more archaic and primitive and ruled by the grab-and-keep principle. It is hard to grab things out there when act singly, so there emerged groups that evolved into Mafia clans. That was how Soviet society began to be structured in the mid-1980s.”

We keep hearing about “Russia’s special course.” Sche­matically, it looks like this: a tyrant or a dictator rules, then he is replaced by a reformer or a person who, at least, declares deep reforms. His project fails and the man is either physically des­troyed or ousted from politics. After a while someone else comes to rule with an iron hand. Alexander II, Pyotr Stolypin, Nikita Khrushchev, Gorbachev, and Yeltsin did not quite reach their goals. Why?

“They totally failed in reaching their goals. In the five centuries since the time when a united Russian state began taking shape (during the reign of Ivan III), the so-called Russian system emerged and strengthened. It is made up of such structural elements as, above all, ownership, power, the space of Mother-Russia, and [Russian] Orthodoxy. The most important elements of this system are the militarization of its entire life and a desire to annex other states, while resting on a very weak economic foundation.

“This is what has been characteristic of Russia since Ivan III-and perhaps since the establishment of Muscovy. All reforms, or rather, attempted reforms, have one thing in common — a desire to score points in the economic, financial, or administrative realm, with one mandatory reservation, namely that the foundation of the system should remain intact. This foundation is forced rule and autocracy. These are the indestructible pillars. That was why our at­te­mp­ted reforms were doomed.

“An authoritarian system, implying the presence of a single man as the ruler, automatically rules out the existence of any other individual wielding power. Above all, this system does not provide for the existence of a free individual, whereas this kind of individual is the main element that makes the difference between the Western and Russian civilizations. Whereas human rights, liberties, and free enterprise are the propelling engine in the West, here [in Russia] this function belongs to the state and its authoritarian, autocratic nature. This is the main reason that explains why no reforms ever succeeded [in Russia].”

In your article you mention a number of post-Soviet countries, but never speak directly about Ukraine. Is this accidental or do you think that we share social hardships?

“There are lots of hardships, but I wouldn’t say they are the same. There are substantial differences. Ukraine occupies a borderline position in the relation “individual — the state” in that it gravitates to both civilizations. Taken as a whole, Ukraine leans toward the East, although there is the Western element.

“If you analyze this situation starting with Kyivan Rus’ and Novgorod Principality and bear in mind the fact that this is where Ukraine and Russia went different ways in terms of civilization, then Ukraine gravitates to Kyivan Rus’ more than Muscovy does, which seems to have more in common with the [Golden] Horde, Asia, and autocracy. Ukraine did not start out as a democracy — as some believe-but as a country with a greater degree of pluralism. There was the viche [popular assembly], the prince, his druzhyna troops, and the church. If there are four forces, they must seek accord. More often than not, they achieved it only when a certain force prevailed, but the need to coexist taught them to balance their relationships.

“Also, Ukraine is split by denominational differences and languages. I won’t speak on the issue of language, considering that even experts in the field are divided on this issue and can’t come up with a more or less satisfactory solution.

“There is also the problem of the empire and its outskirts-otherwise designated as the metropolis and its colonies. Moscow and Kyiv are likely to hold polarized views on the issue. This affects intellectual elites in different ways. When Russia looked at Ukraine, it did not give much thought to who lived there. In the late 18th century, [Russia] thought that [Ukraine] was largely inhabited by Polish landlords who were not to be allowed to have the upper hand. As for Ukrainians, Russia simply did not notice them. Here you have another metropolis-colony di­vide.

“Of course, the biggest divide was the war which Ukraine and Russia survived in absolutely different ways. In fact, there were two wars, the Second World War and the Great Patriotic War. The OUN-UPA problem-what is it all about? It is about fellow citizens who fought in totally different wars. The Second World War began in September 1939 and the Soviet Union was Nazi Germany’s ally. This lasted until June 22, 1941, with the USSR aiding the Third Reich in every way, all the while. What was the populace to do? Fight in the ranks of the Red Army, being essentially on the side of Nazi Germany? Ukraine’s entire intellectual elite must take a well-considered approach to resolving this problem.”

The issue of the Holodomor-Ukrainians, not some abstract people, were purposefully annihilated, millions of them. This is evidenced by numerous facts when militarized units were used to protect grain collection places, and so on. Russians, Tatars, and Jews were resettled to areas where the Ukrainian populace had been starved to death. How is one to prove to a person who survived this horror that the Holodomor was not an act of genocide?

“While studying the Holocaust and the Holodomor, we — I mean [a group of] European intellectuals — were very much focused on these phenomena themselves. We had made quite some progress because there are publications, research papers, documented facts, video films, countless memorial items. But in pursuing this approach, we inadvertently pushed far into the background the main problem: what made these things possible?

“The deep underlying cause for the Holocaust was the Nazi regime’s misanthropic essence. Nazism and Stalinism are typologically comparable phenomena. It is important to understand why Hitler hated the Jews so much, what was behind his “final solution” to the Jewish problem? When asked whether he wanted all Jews annihilated, he said, ‘No, of course not. If all Jews were destroyed, we would have to invent them.” The enemy had to appear as a concrete entity rather than an abstract image, but this was preceded by hatred.

“Both the Nazi and the Stalinist regimes were marked by the dominance of the person-mass-the faceless, average person who has no personality and wants to dissolve in the crowd. This person is torn between his desires and reality: he wants to be great but sees his own worthlessness; he wants to be happy but is constantly unhappy; he wants to be successful but fails. However, there are successful people, and this person does not identify with them and aims his animosity at them. Hitler and Stalin were mediocrities incarnate, the personified person-mass. People must realize what such regimes rest upon. Only then can they discuss the Holocaust and the Holodomor.

“Another problem has to do with victims. Jews have succeeded in having their victims recognized on an international scale. Germans have repented of having allowed Nazi war crimes. I think that the recognition of the Holocaust marked the rebirth of the German nation. Where there are victims there are their hangmen. In the case of the Jews, it is the Nazi regime. In the case of the victims of the Holodomor, it is the Stalinist regime. However, this is an abstract approach, considering that there were specific culprits.

“Here the problem becomes even more complicated. The Soviet Union was a meat grinder in which millions were destroyed in the course of the so-called construction of socialism. It is even more difficult to identify those who acted as hangmen and victims — they changed places several times. One and the same person could be a hangman or a victim more than one time. What kind of population is this? If the victims and the hangmen were named, the result would be half and half [of the population]. Add here the secret NKVD/KGB reporters, the people who passed resolutions and manned the GULAG camp crews — these were all Soviet citizens, too.”

Certain Russian scholarly sources and textbooks exhibit an attempt to rehabilitate Stalin. The Day has repeatedly written on this subject. Here the frequently repeated thesis is this: yes, there were victims but there was a great result. And, of course, there is the well-known statement that Stalin was an outstanding manager. This is an extremely alarming process. What consequences can it bring, do you think?

“Its consequences can be most disastrous. Talking of Stalin, he did have successes — if they can properly be called that. Russia was well — armed and its industries were advanced. All this was achieved in the shortest period ever but at the cost of destroying society and the individual all over the Soviet Union.”

In the literary sources I mentioned above the issue of the price is not raised implying that it had to be done at all costs.

“Well, if achievements come at all costs, we will keep reaping the same things we have now-total immorality and soaring crime rate that are embracing the whole social vertical.”

You said that Russia has already made its historical choice. This is a pessimistic forecast. Is there a solution?

“The thing is that this choice wasn’t made by Russia but by its leadership. Russia was simply faced with the fact, but I don’t think that this is the final choice. There can be cataclysms, outbursts of popular wrath, revolutions, you name it. Personally, I view such prospects with trepidation. It’s like finding your way in the woods — there is no telling whether Russia will come out of this as Russia or something else altogether or will fail to find a way out. Only a fool or an adventurer can wish to have such collisions. Russia is on a well — trodden path, but it’s hard to tell if and when it decides to leave it. Frankly, I don’t know.”

In your article you list the names of your fellow countrymen who share your ideas, among them Dmitry Kholodov, Galina Starovoytova, Anna Politkovskaya — these people’s lives are tragic. Are you afraid to follow in their footsteps?

“In my age it does not befit a man to be afraid. Of course, I think about my children and grandchildren. I have hopes that they will not be affected. As for me — maybe I will be spared.”

What will you tell your opponents whose numbers will greatly increase after the publication of your article?

“I am Russian not only by birth — I am also one hundred percent Russian in my self — perception. Russia is a special kind of civilization, so all these Western standards will never fit in here. We have to view the West through the prism of Russia. When I say the West, I mean a small territory on our planet that has eventually succeeded in placing the individual personality at the head of the evolutionary process. Let me emphasize that this is something few countries in the West have achieved. Russia has a very long way to go in that direction and I’m not sure my country will get there. Right now we’re moving in the opposite direction.”