UKRAINE-EUROPE: furiously treading water

Ukraine’s relations and prospects of joining the EU and NATO were the subject of recent brainstorming sessions at several international conferences and roundtable discussions: the international forum “Europe-Ukraine” in Wroclaw (Poland) and a series of high-profile events, in particular the conference “New Ukraine in New Europe” and a presentation by the Razumkov Center on public monitoring of the Ukraine-EU action plan. The Institute of Foreign Policy at the Diplomatic Academy and the Friedrich Ebert Foundation organized an international roundtable discussion for experts entitled “European Neighborhood Policy and Ukraine during Germany’s Presidency of the EU.”

The high intellectual level of the discussion was ensured thanks to the participants. Among them were representatives from the Presidential Secretariat and Ukrainian government, three ex-foreign ministers, MPs from the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc, the Party of Regions, and Our Ukraine, leading Ukrainian experts and political scientists, well-known artists, foreign diplomats, politicians, and businessmen from Poland, the US, the Czech Republic, Romania, Russia, Germany, France, and other countries. The forum’s first meeting in Wroclaw was chaired by Poland’s ex-prime minister Jerzy Buzek and attended by Euro MPs and parliamentarians from the Polish Sejm.

The sessions were marked by the plurality of opinions and suggestions, often contradictory. They ranged from the optimistic visions of some Euroromantics to the gloomy prophesies of skeptics, who believe that “the Ukrainian democracy train is heading for Belarus or even Vladivostok rather than Europe.”

This article does not recapitulate the proceedings of these forums. Instead, it offers the author’s reflections, in particular on the ideas expressed by the Ukrainian and foreign participants concerning Ukraine’s relations with the EU and NATO.

1. THE UKRAINIAN DREAM AND THE PHENOMENON OF VARIABLE-SPEED HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT

The beginning of the 21st century, unlike the previous one, is marked by the dramatic acceleration of processes that are leading to the establishment of a new world order. The harsh escalating battle for resources (energy, potable water, etc.) may reach an explosive finale around 2020-25, when the major players will collide. In the checkered 15-year history of Ukraine’s relations with the EU and NATO, our country’s prospects for accession were clearly formulated in the foreign policy doctrine; and corresponding treaties and other legal documents were signed. Since 1992 Ukrainian diplomats have persistently stormed Fortress Europe, at times with some success, trying to convince its masters that Ukraine is about to overcome the hardships of the transitional period. All that is needed is to sign several new documents with the EU and NATO and pass a few new laws.

Fifteen years is an extremely long time in today’s fast-paced history. During this period dynamic changes have taken place in Ukraine, Europe, and the world. The US world leadership was challenged, and America’s failure in Iraq showed that even the only global superpower has limited economic and military might. Seven countries neighboring Ukraine, including the three post-Soviet Baltic states, successfully integrated into the EU and NATO. Yeltsin’s Russia, chaotic and generally well disposed to Ukraine, sank into oblivion, giving place to Putin’s Gazprom-controlled state, which is brimming over with geopolitical energy, ambitions to restore its status as a superpower, and the desire to subdue Ukraine, Georgia, and other neighbors, as well as to shake the stability of the West by playing on the contradictions between the EU and US. China is becoming the greatest world problem because of its capacity to conduct space warfare and call the shots in the world economic arena.

Against this background, 15 years of Ukraine’s EU and NATO aspirations, despite some limited success, give the impression that our country is furiously treading water. Despite the selfless efforts of the first generation of Ukrainian diplomats and representatives of the political elite — people like Volodymyr Horbulin, Yevhen Marchuk, Anatolii Zlenko, Hennadii Udovenko, Borys Tarasiuk, Oleksandr Chaly, Kostiantyn Hryshchenko, Kostiantyn Morozov, Oleksandr Kuzmuk, Volodymyr Shkidchenko, and many others — we failed to maintain the initial consensus on the positive need for Ukraine to enter the European security, political, and economic space. Now we can see the people mentioned above, who used to work as one team, on both sides of the political barricades that rose up between the Presidential Secretariat and the government or, more exactly, between European and post-Soviet Ukraine.

While Ukrainian Eurodreamers, beaming with enthusiasm and naivete, were competing to fix the date for Ukraine’s earliest possible entry into the EU and NATO, a non-national oligarch-controlled political force was emerging on the periphery of the country. Cemented by Praetorian discipline, it placed all its financial, organizational, and propaganda resources at the service of Russia’s geopolitical interests. After coming to power in Ukraine, this force is now ignoring our fundamental national interests and pushing the country into the gray buffer zone of security, thus causing it to fall by the wayside of European integration processes. What is worse, this political force is aiming to drag Ukraine into the Eurasian empire and restore its status of a provincial and ill-fated land. It is keeping this goal carefully hidden-for the time being.

In 2004 Ukraine entered a phase of a cold civil war, revolutions, and counter-revolutions. What did his period bring Ukraine?

Even the Maidan, a bright episode that changed our society for the better, did not have an impact on the behavior of the political elites, which were overcome with the vindictive craving for a comeback and a desire to plunder the country by taking power into their hands. This only confirmed Ronald Reagan’s words that the people are always better than their government.

Ukraine drifted out of historical time and found itself on the verge of losing its geopolitical prospects. The post-communist countries that joined the EU and NATO radically improved their socioeconomic figures. According to The Economist (The World in 2007), Ukraine contented itself with a miserable GDP of $102 billion ($2,200 per capita) whereas Poland increased its GDP to $375 billion ($9,800 per capita), Lithuania’s per capita figure was $10,250, Latvia’s $10,000, and Estonia’s $14,120. Even Romania, with a population of 21,600,000, churned out a GDP of $137 billion ($6,340 per capita).

These post-communist countries began playing according to European democratic rules, whereas Ukraine is at the bottom of the ratings for competitiveness and economic freedom. It remains one of the most corrupt countries in Europe. We have become (or we always were) a backward country that is always trying to catch up, unable to resolve the key problems of its existence, such as security, political system, development strategy, private ownership of land, etc. Today, in the conditions of dual or tripartite rule, which is a feature of a chaotic, uncontrollable country, there is a danger that Ukraine will disappear from the European geopolitical context and settle at the level of some lowly Balkan or African country.

What was supposed to become the Ukrainian dream and mobilize the efforts of the people is being consistently and systematically destroyed by the united anti-Ukrainian forces, which are acting inside the country without due punishment (remember the “people’s protests” in Feodosiia in 2006). Our country’s case confirms the existence of the law of variable-speed historical development: whereas some societies are capable of rapid, flexible changes and modernization, others get stuck in the 19th or 20th century without either the will or the vigor to overcome chronocollapse (time stop).

The entire burden of guilt rests on the ruling elites and the country’s government, which has demonstrated a complete lack of political will for carrying out much-needed changes.

2. NECESSARY EVIDENCE

The Razumkov Center (Valerii Chaly and a group of independent experts) presented a unique document illustrating the results of public monitoring of the Ukraine-EU action plan, which was supplemented by the results of sociological surveys of Ukrainian citizens. This document attests to the formation of a civic society in Ukraine, in particular the institute of independent experts, which may become a serious auxiliary force in decision-making at the state level.

The document begins with statements from such high-ranking state officials as Mykola Azarov and Yurii Boiko, both known for their resistance to the idea of EU membership. Azarov, First Deputy Prime Minister of Ukraine, calls for intensifying work “but not to enter the EU sooner-the EU is likely to be closed to us for a decade, and our priorities have already changed from membership to more extensive and intensive cooperation.”

Boiko, Ukraine’s fuel and energy minister, offers his view of the achievements and problems with the tasks set before the Ukrainian government by the Ukraine-EU action plan: “I believe that what Europe is expecting from Kyiv today is, above all, predictability in our relations with Russia because our main achievement [in European integration!- Author] is the harmonization of our relations with Russia.”

However, rather than these confessions from patently pro-Russian government officials, lying at the heart of the document is a multitude of figures and facts that demonstrate the real state of affairs with Ukraine’s efforts at European integration in recent years. Three-quarters of experts believe that Ukraine’s entry into the EU corresponds to the national interests of our country; 62.5 percent agree that this may become the national idea that would unite all regions of Ukraine; 71.2 percent say Ukraine’s integration rate is slow and 5.8 percent believe it is at the zero level; 64.4 percent think that the main obstacle to the Ukraine-EU action plan is the conflicts inside the power structures, and 48.1 percent also mention lack of funding; 22.1 percent suspect the government is reluctant to carry out the action plan.

Our achievements are freedom of press and speech: 54.8 percent of experts believe that “considerable progress” has been achieved and another 29.8 percent describe the progress as “moderate.” On the other hand, there are no advances in the struggle against corruption (according to 66.3 percent of experts) and establishing judicial independence (56.7 percent). The poverty level and the gap between the more developed and less advanced regions of Ukraine have not been reduced. The critical ratio between the income of the richest and the poorest citizens remains the same-30:1, while the ratio in EU countries is 5.7:1.

According to 66.3 percent of polled experts, Ukraine is not effectively using or not using at all (24 percent) the experience of European integration that the new EU members possess. Such countries as Poland, Romania, the Slovak Republic, and the Baltic states have offered to share with Ukraine their experience in joining the EU without requesting any compensation in return.

The opinions of Ukrainian citizens are even more radical. Whereas European officials and the Ukrainian government use such evasive formulas as “certain progress has been made” or “the reforms require further implementation,” popular opinion on health care, epidemiological safety, effective market economy, and environmental protection is unambiguous: no progress has been achieved. Polls show that 31.8 percent of citizens believe that the policy of Yanukovych’s government is a mere declaration of intentions that are not supported by concrete actions, and 29.5 percent think this policy is not aimed at Ukraine’s integration into the EU.

This is how the government team is integrating Ukraine into Europe- irrespective of the flags under which it came to power.

3. UKRAINE-EUROPE: A CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS?

At the conference “New Ukraine in New Europe” the famous rock singer Sviatoslav Vakarchuk said that the difficulties of our integration into Europe are due to the differences in our civilizations. It is hard to disagree with him. Samuel Huntington defined European borders this way: “Europe ends where Western Christianity ends and Islam and Orthodoxy begin.” However, this rigid scheme has not stood the test of EU integration: three Orthodox countries (Greece, Romania, and Bulgaria) are already in the Union, whereas 20 million Muslims live in Western Europe. Their radical representatives are promoting the idea of creating ‘Eurabia’-a new religion-based state-like entity (caliphate) in the heart of Old Europe.

Today the most popular boy’s name in Rotterdam, Amsterdam, and Malmo is Mohammed. While 17 European countries, including Ukraine, are experiencing a severe demographic crisis (the birth rate index is 1.3 children per woman), the quantitative and qualitative surge of the Islamic factor in the EU is only a matter of time. And when France, in a fit of post-Napoleonic belated grandeur, refuses to acknowledge Ukraine as an EU candidate, it should remember its own 10-percent Muslim population, 30 to 45 percent of which is comprised of young people under 20, who reside in large metropolitan areas and are prone to disturbances and riots (Mark Steyn, America Alone, 2006).

Speaking in Wroclaw, Oleh Rybachuk, advisor to the president of Ukraine, posed several important questions to those who are taking on the responsibility of deciding Ukraine’s European future:

Who is the subject authorized to express the joint will of the European nations? Is it the EU, NATO, or the Council of Europe? In what way are the principles of European solidarity supposed to extend to Ukraine if it is placed in the same row of civilizations as the countries of North Africa and the Middle East? How is Ukraine, as a non-member of the EU, supposed to implement the principle of European solidarity when the EU itself shows substantial discrepancies concerning a number of important political issues, such as energy security, EU and NATO expansion, and its policy toward the Russian Federation or the US? With whom should Ukraine side?

Rybachuk cited interesting data on Ukraine’s support for EU declarations and resolutions on regional and international issues: in 2005-06, without being an EU member or candidate, Ukraine joined the EU in over 800 declarations, thus giving its support to Brussels’ foreign policy.

Meanwhile, despite the insincere smiles with which Ms. Ferraro- Waldner greets Ukrainian diplomats at the threshold of the European house, inside the EU new walls are being built, a French and German one, by means of which Europe is additionally cordoning itself off from Ukraine.

The predominating opinion among Ukrainian politicians and experts is that the European Neighborhood Policy that the EU is imposing on Ukraine is discriminatory, as it places us among African rather than European countries.

We should not be naive simpletons and continue our lame attempts at convincing European bureaucrats with such arguments as: “We are true Europeans because Princess Anna Yaroslavna was once the Queen of France.” This is not only humiliating but also counterproductive because in fact no one has ever denied our right to call ourselves Europeans. Even New Zealanders have this right. We are only denied the right to become a member of the European regional organization.

There is only one formal (and just) reason for our non-acceptance in the EU: Ukraine is not ready for membership because it is failing to meet a number of clearly defined criteria. Objective figures show how poorly prepared we are: indices demonstrate the horrible quality of drinking water (even in large cities), air pollution levels (try to breathe on Khreshchatyk, where luxury four-by-fours constantly idle), the number of AIDS and tuberculosis victims, and other social, environmental, and legal problems.

However, there are a number of hidden reasons for not wanting to have Ukraine in the EU, and these pertain to the differences in the civilizational type. First, there is a difference between Catholic and Protestant Europe and Byzantine-Muscovite Orthodoxy, a hostile expanse to which Ukraine belonged and still belongs. Second, there is a catastrophic discrepancy between, on the one hand, the values embraced by today’s post- Soviet Ukraine and the Soviet-type, authoritarian, and corrupt mentality of its ruling class and, on the other, law-abiding Europeans with their desire to live in a secure space protected by law and tradition.

There is one more, most painstakingly concealed, reason for confining Ukraine to the post-Soviet domain-the panicky fear of Germany and other pillars of the EU that Ukraine’s entry will worsen their relations with Russia.

Some EU members want, at Ukraine’s expense, to make the historical prospect that is unacceptable to Moscow even more remote: the final breakup of the imperial and Russian post-communist floe on which the enslaving and enslaved nations drifted together for centuries. For many European democracies regular deliveries of Russian gas in sufficient quantities outweigh the accession of poor, semi- reformed Ukraine into the EU.

4. WHAT CAN STOP THE PENDULUM OF HISTORY?

One of the Ukrainian participants at the Wroclaw forum made a bitter- ironic comment: “How consistent is the Ukrainian government, which is avoiding NATO’s open door yet is stubbornly continuing to knock on the European community’s tightly shut door?” Owing to this kind of “consistency” demonstrated by the government and the prime minister himself, Ukraine, to Moscow’s delight, removes NATO membership from its agenda, which is one of the painful failures of Ukraine’s security policy at the beginning of the 21st century. The patent servility and obsequiousness of Ukraine’s ruling elite concerning Russia’s demands and wishes keeps raising the eyebrows even of seasoned observers of Ukraine’s geopolitical floundering.

Quite naturally, Russia has its own state security interests, which it has firmly and loudly declared without a shred of hesitation, often putting pressure on its neighbors. But Ukraine also has its national interests. For some reason, however, our high officials are ashamed to declare them. The national interests of the Russian Federation and Ukraine differ drastically because of their geographical location, unequal size, military and industrial potential, different models of political systems, the immeasurably higher level of political freedom in Ukraine, and other factors.

Official Ukraine should be concerned by Moscow’s distinct and unilateral shift toward the Arab world, Iran, and China, as this may lead to further tensions with the West. Is it in the national interests of Ukraine to support Putin’s confrontational declaration in Munich, which reminded us of the days of the Cold War? On the eve of the Duma and presidential elections in 2007-08, Moscow may allow itself a brief remake of the Cold War in order to rally people to support the current policies of the Russian leadership.

But do Ukrainians need this? What about Russia’s readiness to withdraw from the corresponding treaty and again open medium-range missile bases close to NATO borders? Does Ukraine have to support this suicidal policy, which in the recent past led to the demise of the USSR? And what about the encroachments of high-ranking Russian officials on the Crimea and Sevastopil? What about the protectionist claims by Russian politicians that Russia’s Black Sea Fleet will “defend” Ukraine’s interests-as if we have a common enemy with Russia in this region. (And what country would this be-Turkey, Georgia, or Israel?) Do Ukraine’s energy interests coincide with Russia’s aspirations of monopolizing European gas pipeline systems?

Only an open and frank discussion of these and other issues from the standpoint of Ukraine’s national interests (to be sure, Russia will take care of its own interests) will help to improve the very atmosphere of Ukrainian-Russian relations and clarify our prospects for integration into the EU and NATO. Not a day passes without a reminder from our government about strategic cooperation with Moscow, but we should not forget about Ukraine’s strategic cooperation with Poland and the US — this remains an important element in the geostrategic balance.

We should not reduce the issue of Ukraine’s entry into NATO to information policy. It is not the number of positive TV programs about NATO barracks and the absence of hazing in the military that will convince Ukrainians but the unity of the state and political elite, its conscious consensus, political will, and responsibility for the people’s future. This kind of consensus will be possible after the current post-Soviet elites have given place to a new European-oriented generation of Ukrainians. It may also appear in the following cases:

1. A mega-event will convince Ukrainians of the most urgent need to join the global security system, which NATO is going to become soon, after it has incorporated Japan, South Korea, Australia, Israel, New Zealand, possibly Argentina, and other countries.

2. A window of opportunity, which we cannot see today, will open up; i.e., a concurrence of unique historical circumstances will occur, enabling people or countries to change their future.

This may happen quite soon, within two or three years.

We should not forget that in 2007-08 the leaders of the major powers of Europe and the entire world will be replaced. These include Tony Blair, Jacques Chirac, Vladimir Putin, and George Bush. Changes may occur in the leadership of China, Argentina, Turkey, and other countries; what will take place is the so-called “death of political leadership.” The world will become more complicated and less predictable, fundamentalism, xenophobia, and populism will be on the rise. Ukraine needs more up-to-date, mobile, and educated leaders, who, instead of fanning the suicidal fire of social and ethnic hostility in their own home, will be capable of releasing the economic brakes and uniting people with the Ukrainian dream of becoming a prosperous, free, and democratic European country.

The pendulum of history is always in motion; it never stands still. Despite civilizational and other differences, Ukraine is gradually becoming European: from the millions of our emigrant workers who were forced to seek jobs in Europe (today Ivano-Frankivsk oblast alone receives $700 million annually in money transfers from abroad) to influential business groups that are developing cooperation with EU countries. The move of the Ukrainian pendulum in the European direction is evidenced by the fact that trade with the EU comprises over 31 percent of our total foreign trade volume, as well as by our exports, which have tripled, and imports from the EU, which have increased by 4.5 times. As one participant at the forum said, “Ukrainian business is voting in favor of European integration.” Although this was said a little boastfully, it is an optimistic declaration.

In spite of a number of internal and external factors, “soft” sabotage on the part of the government, the “belatedness” of our country, and inhibitory forces in the EU, Ukraine has produced a new generation of Europe-oriented politicians (Mykola Katerynchuk has a chance to become their model representative), who are bent on bringing our country into the common EU and NATO home.

Despite momentary losses and deplorable stops and setbacks, reasonable optimism prevails. Imposing and illiterate bigwigs of the nomenklatura, who are caricatured copies of the political bosses in the industrial Ukrainian SSR of the 1950s, will yield their places in the post-industrial Ukraine of 2015-20 to promising leaders with European education and values.

The fact that Ukraine is furiously treading water now may have good consequences: its heart and muscles will be strong enough for the next dash toward Europe.