START OF POLITICAL AIKIDO
The following article will hopefully give the reader some idea how the referendum results have been evolving into a political football. (—Ed.)
Leonid Kuchma has addressed letters to Verkhovna Rada Speaker Ivan Pliushch and Prime Minister Viktor Yushchenko about the implementation of referendum decisions on the formation of a bicameral parliament and reduction of the number of People’s Deputies. The letters point out that these decisions can only be fulfilled by making basic amendments to the Constitution and the election law. To draw up the respective legal acts, a drafting commission is being set up, comprising representatives of the President, Verkhovna Rada, the Cabinet of Ministers, local executive bodies, political parties, and non-governmental organizations.
Simultaneously, as First Vice Speaker Viktor Medvedchuk reported, Parliament received on April 25 the presidential bill on constitutional amendments. Mr. Kuchma suggests that the following changes be approved on the basis of referendum results. It is proposed that in Part 1, Article 76, the words “four hundred and fifty” be changed for “three hundred,” thus determining the reduction of the deputies’ corps; Part 3, Article 80, which lays down that “People’s Deputies may not be prosecuted, detained or arrested” without consent of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, be deleted. It is suggested that Article 90 be complemented with new part 3 empowering the head of state to dissolve Parliament ahead of schedule if it fails to form an effective parliamentary majority within one month or fails to approve the budget drafted by Cabinet within three months. It is proposed that item 8, Article 106, be complemented with the words “and in other cases stipulated by the Constitution of Ukraine.”
Interfax-Ukraine quotes Mr. Medvedchuk as saying that President Kuchma asks the lawmakers in his address to approve amendments to the Constitution, as stipulated in the bill, at the fifth session and finally pass the law in the sixth session of the third convocation in September 2000. If Parliament fails to pass this bill by the scheduled deadline, the President, as guarantor of the Constitution and the rights of citizens, “will be forced to take the appropriate measures to ensure the fulfillment of the decisions made in the all-Ukrainian referendum.”
Of course, Verkhovna Rada cannot avoid accepting the referendum results. The only point is HOW it is going to accept them. Former Deputy Yuri Orobets has suggested a very good term, political aikido, to identify the process of implementation. Aikido employs a purely defensive behavior and is based on taking advantage of the energy of the attacker to neutralize him. The opposition (and somebody else?) seems to be going to employ a similar tactic.
According to former Justice Minister Vasyl Onopenko, the implementation of the referendum results requires radical revision of the existing legislative norms, amending hundreds of statutes, and changing one- third of the Constitution.
The consideration of amendments to and changes in the Constitution not only threatens to become a lengthy political marathon. Political scientist Mykhailo Pohribynsky says this country has launched a process of constitutional reform which, according to his cautious forecasts, should proceed as slowly as society will allow. And our society cannot be suspected of being able to adapt rapidly to new things.
To start with, any People’s Deputy, in addition to the President, can introduce amendments to the Constitution. According to Roman Bezsmertny, the President’s representative in Verkhovna Rada, Mr. Kuchma admits that the legislators can propose other bills. To do so, one must enlist the support of 150 Deputies. this is quite easy to do even if we only take into account the number of opposition Deputies in Parliament. It is still easier if we believe that by no means all groups, comprising the parliamentary majority, welcome some consequences of the referendum.
The process is already in motion. For example, Mr. Onopenko, never distinguished as a revolutionary in his political behavior, worked out his own project of constitutional changes in record time — within three days after the referendum was held. This is a graphic example of how one can employ the techniques of breathtaking political aikido and call it “striking a balance between the powers of office.” For instance, the new part of Article 90 of the Constitution, proposed in compliance with popular wishes, grants the President the right to dissolve Verkhovna Rada ahead of schedule if the latter fails to approve the budget within three months. But the proposed version of the following Article 96 adds that, in case the Cabinet’s budget has not been approved, Parliament will approve an alternative budget drawn up by its own budget committee. How simple and in good taste: Parliament should be given the right and the chance to hit back!
It is not difficult to guess which of the budgets, government or alternative, would be approved in this situation by Verkhovna Rada, where there are so many past masters of budgetary tricks.
But the original idea was to give the President the real levers of influence.
The abolition of legislative immunity can also be implemented in different ways. In his bill, the President simply suggested withdrawing Part 3 of Article 80 which protects lawmakers from being prosecuted, detained, or arrested. But the problem can also be solved more radically, under the European scenario of Serhiy Holovaty. This means enacting Article 29 of the Constitution which says no citizen at all can be arrested without a court ruling. And to neutralize the mechanisms of possible political repression to which Parliament itself can resort with respect to politically “unreliable” Deputies, Verkhovna Rada should be deprived of the right to authorize arrest. This right should go to the courts, that is, the Supreme Court, with due account of the status of People’s Deputies. Meanwhile, Mr. Onopenko suggests abolishing immunity only in case a Solon has been caught red-handed. Thus, the Deputies have a wide choice of how to make themselves more “violable.”
Or, for example, how would the legislators react if asked to approve, in addition to the referendum results, amendments that grant them the long- desired right to give consent not only to the appointment but also to the dismissal of the Prime Minister and Prosecutor General?
Mr. Holovaty has also drawn up the concept of a constitutional reform whereby all referendum decisions, as our politically-minded people wished, are to be implemented. But what this results in is not the enhancement of presidential power but just the opposite. For example, this project envisions an absolutely European model of a bicameral parliament: one chamber of 300 deputies elected on a party ticket, and the other one of 150 members elected in first-past-the-post constituencies. In addition, the latter cannot include leaders of the existing administrative bodies. In other words, this puts up a barrier to governors regarded at the same time as motors of centrifugal tendencies and apologists of presidential ideas, for they were appointed by the head of state.
It is only at first glance that these amendments look fantastic and impossible to pass, but who can be certain he knows the true purpose of the constitutional reform? According to Mr. Onopenko, “Many factions have asked for my draft and are already working on it.” Which symbolizes readiness for political aikido. It is only the opposition that speaks of it out loud today. But this does not mean others are not getting ready for it.
First Vice Speaker Medvedchuk admitted on the eve of the submission of the presidential amendments that, while legislative changes are being drawn up, “Problems could emerge connected with the necessity of forming a government of Ukraine by the parliamentary majority.” An innocent phrase, but simultaneously Mr. Holovaty suddenly had an idea from the other short: of course, it is necessary that Parliament have a majority, for if this majority appoints the government and then fails to approve the budget submitted by the latter, this Parliament should be dissolved.
But the appointment of the government by a parliamentary majority is the classic sign of a parliamentary republic, as is the political status of ministers to which some ministries are getting ready even today, carrying out reforms envisioning that professional Deputies of a politician minister will be “protecting” their chief in specific matters. For example, Minister of Internal Affairs Yuri Kravchenko described this strategy in reforming his ministry at a press conference on April 25. Incidentally, we see now the consequences of the government having only been blessed by the legislative majority. Will the majority strive to take revenge for their “thwarted hopes and lost opportunities?” Will it take advantage of the fact that it depends only on Parliament to draw up and propose amendments to the Constitution? Will the majority opt for a bargain with the executive, and what will be at stake — the much-discussed composition of the government or a broader intrigue leading to changes in the political order?
The real interests of the financial and political pressure groups in Parliament might consist either in forming a presidential republic or, on the contrary, in strengthening the power of Parliament. If the choice has not yet been made, it is perhaps being made now. No one knows what the majority will do and whether they are preparing an aikido technique in response to the most recent events, which they have every reason to interpret as an attack on them.
