The Ripening of the Orange Revolution

In the fall of 1997 political parties started to announce their election rosters. Formed in January 1995, the Social-Democratic Party of Ukraine (United) announced a roster headed by Leonid Kravchuk and Yevhen Marchuk. This move augured well for the success of a party that at the time only had several thousand members.

The Communist Party of Ukraine scored a predicted victory in the multi-mandate nationwide constituency, garnering 24.7% of the popular vote. The election roster of Prime Minister Valeriy Pustovoitenko’s Popular Democratic Party (NDP) got a mere 4.99% of the vote. A pro-government party, the NDP even trailed behind the Green Party of Ukraine (5.46%), whose leaders were new to the political arena, and barely outstripped the hastily formed regional bloc “Hromada” (4.68%), headed by the president’s inveterate opponent Pavlo Lazarenko.

Even though the various parties had their parliamentary nominees in almost every majority constituency, most voters threw their support behind independent nominees. After some of these candidates made it into parliament, they wanted to join one of the factions. A total of 87 out of 136 lawmakers who were unaligned or whose parties failed to clear the hurdle for representation in parliament chose one of several factions. As a result, the Popular Democratic Party obtained 58 new members, “Hromada” — 15, and the Social Democratic Party of Ukraine (United) — 8. Nobody joined the leftist factions.

In the presidential campaign of 1999 Leonid Kuchma chose a scenario that had proved successful in the 1996 elections in Russia: the incumbent president got himself into the runoff against a communist, which guaranteed him victory. But most importantly, the president needed to win enough votes to make it to the runoff — no simple task given Kuchma’s modest ratings compared to other nominees from the right spectrum of political forces.

At the outset of the campaign, the most influential of the right- leaning candidates was Yevhen Marchuk. In the struggle for the top spot he attempted to use the resources of the Social Democratic Party. This party, however, chaired by Viktor Medvedchuk since 1998, sided with Leonid Kuchma. Marchuk was forced to leave the SDPU(o) and ran without the backing of any party, which seriously undermined his chances of being elected.

In November 1999 Pavlo Lazarenko fell prey to election strategists. After he was publicly accused in parliament of having embezzled large amounts of public funds, which had accumulated in the presidential administration, Lazarenko had no choice but to abscond from the country. On February 17 the lawmakers passed a resolution allowing the arrest and prosecution of People’s Deputy Pavlo Lazarenko. His “Hromada” bloc lost its political footing and splintered. Yulia Tymoshenko and some of the former “Hromada” members formed a new faction, “Batkivshchyna” [Fatherland], which in the spring of 1999 was registered as a party with the same name.

Kuchma’s team also played a hand in splitting the Rukh Popular Movement, which proved an easy task. The mysterious car accident that killed Rukh leader Vyacheslav Chornovil accomplished this. The warring leaders of the two parties that formed out of the fragments of Rukh ran in the elections, but each got a little over 3% of the votes.

After the first round of the October 31, 1999, presidential elections, Kuchma had a commanding lead with 36.5%, followed by Petro Symonenko with 22.4%. Oleksandr Moroz finished third with 11.3%, Natalia Vitrenko fourth with 11%, and Marchuk fifth with 8.1% of the popular vote. In the November 14 runoff Kuchma scored a convincing victory over the Communist Party leader. He won a majority in 14 oblasts, garnering 16 million votes, or 56.2%. Symonenko won in 9 oblasts and the Autonomous Crimean Republic with 10.7 million votes, or 37.8%.

The first round of the presidential elections and the 1998 parliamentary elections showed that the Communist Party leader drew his support from one-fifth of the population. The additional votes that he received came from people who did not want to vote for Kuchma. On the contrary, voters in western oblasts overwhelmingly supported Kuchma, despite the fact that Popular Democratic Party centers in the country’s west were embryonic. These voters were ready to support anybody in order to prevent the Communist Party chief from winning the presidential seat.

The Orange Revolution brought the accuracy of election results into question. This problem has two absolutely different aspects, i.e., manipulation of the popular will as opposed to election fraud. In the first case, citizens consciously vote for the candidate they do not support, because their candidate of choice is not present on the ballot. In the second case, carrot-and-stick methods are used to force citizens to vote for the “right” candidate, or election results are skewed with the use of technologies developed to this end.

In a stable society, candidates’ political platforms and personal profiles play a decisive role in elections. In a society that has preserved the material and spiritual vestiges of a communist civilization, election results are primarily affected by the dynamics and vectors of sociopolitical processes.

Ukrainian society of the 1990s was sharply polarized. While some people feared the return of “developed socialism,” others were nostalgic for the past. The number of those who feared the past was much larger. A decade of independence was enough for the majority of the population to appreciate the political and economic advantages of a democratic society. Meanwhile, the number of people who supported leftist parties was insufficient to bring them to power, but it was large enough to make society concerned about the threat of a Red backlash. This concern was instrumental in the success of the technology that was previously used in Russia, which guaranteed the incumbent president a runoff victory over the Communist Party chief.

The November 14, 1999, runoff left few Ukrainians indifferent. The presidential campaign was transformed from a competition among politicians into a referendum on the fateful question: “Do we move toward Europe or return to the past?”

For this very reason electoral districts drew an additional 2 million voters, mostly young people who had refrained from voting on previous occasions. The turnout in the first round was 70.2% compared to 74.9% in the runoff. Voters were much more active this time than during the 1994 presidential elections in which Kuchma was pitted against Leonid Kravchuk.

For this very reason Ukraine’s west overwhelmingly voted for the incumbent president, even though he was less popular in the west than in the country’s south and east. In Ivano-Frankivsk and Ternopil oblasts Kuchma won 92% of the votes, 91% in Lviv, 84% in Zakarpattia, 77% in Rivne, and 73% in Chernivtsi oblasts.

Kuchma thus became the rallying point for politicians who disagreed with his administrative methods. In particular, between the first and second election rounds Yevhen Marchuk accepted the president’s proposal to chair the National Security and Defense Council.

The Russian election scenario was not a winning solution because it was intended for the runoff only. Leonid Kuchma had to score high in the first round to make it to the runoff. How did he make this happen?

According to international observers, violations of the electoral legislation during the presidential elections were insignificant. In the February 22, 2005, interview with The Day, however, Yevhen Marchuk said that the elections were falsified “to a very significant degree.”

It would not be a mistake to reconcile these two statements with a third one: falsifications that took place exactly on election days could not affect the outcome because the incumbent president had a formidable reserve of votes as compared to his closest rivals.

This conclusion does not contradict the assumption that the “party of power” was controlling the electoral process. First, powerful rivals of the incumbent president were either weakened or eliminated altogether. Second, voters were brainwashed by the state-controlled mass media. Third, voter bribing was rampant. Kuchma’s official election fund was UAH 1.7 million, while his semi-shadow “Social Protection” fund, controlled by Oleksandr Volkov, was rumored to have spent over $ 1.5 billion. Fourth, the infamous “administrative resource” was used on a grand scale. In the short period between the first and second rounds Kuchma fired several oblast administration chairmen who had allowed his opponents to garner too many votes. On February 12, 2001, the Internet publication Ukrayinska Pravda published the transcripts of Major Melnychenko’s recordings, which proved that Kuchma was exerting tremendous pressure on officials in the provinces. Kuchma had incriminating documents on many of them, and threatened to prosecute those who didn’t work hard enough to secure his victory.

A VELVET REVOLUTION IN PARLIAMENT

Immediately after the presidential elections the mass media stopped their crusade against a Red backlash. In the meantime, the oligarchic clans stepped up the pressure on the president in an effort to secure the most favorable terms for the privatization of major state enterprises. The struggle among the various clans escalated with the privatization campaign that began on a grand scale in 1998. The clans were like- minded only in their striving to pay the smallest price for enterprises on which they had set their sights. Since he was relying on the support of the clans and clan parties in parliament, the president did nothing to stop them from snatching world famous enterprises that had been built over five or six generations.

After the defeat of the clan parties in the 1998 parliamentary elections, representatives of leftist parties occupied leading posts in parliament. The reelection of Leonid Kuchma set off a “Brownian movement” in parliament. Majority lawmakers and clan parties started to rally around the president. Even Lazarenko’s “Hromada” turned pro-presidential. As a rule, lawmakers with business interests did not wish to remain in the opposition. As practice showed, being in the opposition in a “blackmail state” led to many repercussions.

The presidential administration turned its sights on the leftist factions in parliament, plucking members one by one. When the membership of the Peasant Party of Ukraine (SelPU) dropped to a critical minimum, the Communist Party propped it up with several of its members. But this did not save the faction, and its remnants joined the majority to create a pro- presidential faction “Solidarity” headed by the thriving businessman Petro Poroshenko.

The Constitution required the newly elected president to propose his candidate of choice for prime minister. Kuchma proposed Pustovoitenko, who headed the government since July 1997. But Kuchma did not try hard enough to have him endorsed in parliament. That’s when the president proposed Viktor Yushchenko for the post of prime minister.

Yushchenko was twice approved by the lawmakers for the chairmanship of the National Bank’s board. The 45-year-old “father of the Ukrainian hryvnia” was renowned as a successful financier. In December 1999 parliament supported Yushchenko’s candidacy with a nearly constitutional majority of 296 votes. Oleksandr Moroz abstained from voting, but spoke approvingly of Yushchenko as a proponent of a liberal, un-clannish, direction in the country’s development.

After the 1998 parliamentary elections, Leonid Kuchma went to great lengths to prevent his undying enemy Oleksandr Moroz from being reelected as parliamentary speaker. The so-called “speaker saga” lasted for over two months and ended with the election of Oleksandr Tkachenko. All the remaining key posts in parliament were redistributed as a result of the new speaker’s influence. Communist Adam Martyniuk was appointed first deputy speaker, and businessman Viktor Medvedchuk deputy speaker. The Communists chaired six parliamentary committees and the Socialists, two.

The predominance of leftist parties in parliment not so much stalled market reforms as distorted them, pushing the country toward oligarchic communo-feudalism. Oligarchs needed only a limited version of market reforms. They were satisfied with nomenklatura-style capitalism and the monopolistic use of the country’s economic resources without competition from domestic or foreign businessmen. Much like the leftists, they also sought a return to the past, albeit a Western past, not a Soviet one. The concept of a post-capitalist, socially-oriented state was alien to them.

However, the protracted economic crisis ended in 2000, lessening the destructive influence of the leftist parties. Under the pact that formed the parliamentary majority, factions were duty- bound to secure the dismissal of all leftist lawmakers from leading posts in parliament.

In this situation, Speaker Tkachenko launched a new “speaker saga” in order to prevent a vote of no-confidence in the parliamentary speaker. According to the regulations, a quorum of two-thirds of the MPs was required to replace the parliament leadership. Every time this issue was raised, the leftists did not register to vote, which meant there was no quorum in parliament. At the same time, the speaker blatantly violated regulations, preventing lawmakers from proposing a change of the parliament leadership when there was a quorum, or refusing to put such a proposal to the vote. Days passed, but the newly-formed majority was unable to use its advantages.

In this situation parliament split into a majority and minority. The majority left the parliament building on Hrushevsky Street and relocated to the Ukrainian House on European Square. The minority remained in the parliament building, but could not work because there was no quorum.

On January 21, 2000, the 239 lawmakers who had gathered at the Ukrainian House voted to dismiss the speaker and his first deputy. Immediately afterwards, deputy speaker Medvedchuk and majority coordinator Leonid Kravchuk began talks with factions to replace all leftist minority lawmakers in leadership posts.

On February 1 the majority, which by then had grown to 255 members, met for another plenary session at the Ukrainian House and endorsed several new appointments. Ivan Pliushch of the Popular Democratic Party (NDP) was appointed parliamentary speaker, Viktor Medvedchuk of the SDPU(o) first deputy speaker, and Stepan Havrysh of the “Vidrodzhennia Rehioniv” faction [Rebirth of the Regions] deputy speaker. The majority elected new chairmen for the eight committees that were previously headed by leftist lawmakers.

The February 1, 2000, session of parliament passed one more significant decision: it endorsed a new system of numbering the legislature’s convocations. The new numbering began with the Verkhovna Rada that was formed during the first free elections in 1990. This was the convocation of lawmakers who had adopted the Declaration on State Sovereignty and the Ukrainian Independence Act. The lawmakers rejected the historical tradition of numbering convocations beginning with the USSR Constitution of 1936 and the Ukrainian SSR Constitution of 1937. As a result, the Verkhovna Rada of the 14th convocation became the Verkhovna Rada of the 3rd convocation.

An equally important decision concerned amendments to the Labor Code. The lawmakers canceled the red-letter days of November 7 and 8, marking the Great October Socialist Revolution.

Both resolutions were passed when Ukraine entered its tenth year of independence. They were a logical continuation of the anti- communist revolution of 1989- 1991. But did this mean that Ukraine had finally broken free of its totalitarian past?

The passage of these resolutions was made possible by the absence of leftist parties. However, they were passed by a de-ideologized element of the former Communist Party and Soviet nomenklatura, which was diluted over the past nine years by new people of different social origins. The rate of dilution was obviously insufficient to give the Ukrainian “party of power” a qualitatively new look. At the same time, it became clear that new forces were growing stronger in society and parliament, which was a mirror of society. They proved able to resisting the vestiges of the Soviet past not only at the superficial level of state symbols.

The leftist minority did not recognize the resolutions passed at the Ukrainian House, which the journalists were quick to dub a “velvet revolution in parliament.” According to the regulations, any resolutions may become effective only if they are endorsed in the presence of two-thirds of the lawmakers. There was in fact no such quorum at the Ukrainian House. However, the leftists did not seem to take notice of the fact that Tkachenko himself was violating the regulations. The Justice Ministry examined the situation and recognized the legitimacy of the majority’s resolutions, thereby ending this legal conflict.

The fifth session of the 3rd convocation Verkhovna Rada began on February 29, 2000. All the legislators were equally interested in resuming their work in parliament. Had they failed to begin a session with a quorum within a month, this would present the head of state with the only constitutional opportunity to disband the Verkhovna Rada. Therefore, the leftist factions were forced to accept the new parliamentary leadership and register in the session hall.

“UKRAINE WITHOUT KUCHMA!”

Leonid Kuchma did not doubt that he would win the 1999 elections. He conducted his campaign under the motto of making amendments to the 1996 Constitution, which would facilitate the formation of a parliamentary majority and be conducive to its constructive cooperation with the Verkhovna Rada. He didn’t hide his dissatisfaction with parliament and threatened to call a nationwide referendum to have the public evaluate its performance.

Almost immediately after his reelection the president ordered a nationwide referendum slated for April 16, 2000. The focus of the referendum was to be proposals, which, if approved, would establish a “permanent bond” between the government and parliament, according to Kuchma. The people had to answer “yes” or “no” to six proposals:

— To declare a vote of no- confidence in the Verkhovna Rada of the 14th convocation (the 3rd convocation since February 3, 2000);

— To grant the president the right to disband the Verkhovna Rada if it fails to form a parliamentary majority within one month, or within three months to endorse the state budget proposed by the government;

— To strip the legislators of their immunity;

— To reduce parliament from 450 to 300 members;

— To form an upper chamber in parliament as a representative of the regions’ interests;

— To adopt a new constitution by referendum.

If approved, these proposals would have fundamentally changed the triangle formed by the head of state, parliament, and political parties. Let us imagine the situation that would have ensued if this constitutional reform had been implemented.

On the face of it, the reform seemed attractive and logical. The gist of it was that parliament would form a majority, which would in turn form the government. This simple formula was used to describe political life in European countries. The gap between the legislative and executive powers was rightfully considered Ukraine’s biggest problem. In the absence of a parliamentary majority, the government had no stable support from the legislature and therefore could not operate effectively enough. During the December 7, 2004, talks at Mariinsky Palace attended by Yanukovych, Yushchenko, and Kuchma, the latter mentioned the 2000 referendum, again repeating the deceptive formula: “Parliament forms a coalition, which forms the government.”

At its core Kuchma’s 2000 constitutional reform, much like Gorbachev’s 1988 reform, was different from what it appeared to be on the surface. However, unlike Gorbachev, Kuchma had his personal interests in view. The reform would give him access to powers on a par with those of his Russian counterpart. By becoming ostensibly a parliamentary republic, Ukraine would in fact become a republic with the highest concentration of powers in the president’s hands. Such a paradox is possible only in countries with a totalitarian past.

Read the last installment of this article in the next issue of The Day