Infected by lack of freedom
The similar symptoms in Ukraine, Russia and Belarus do not imply that there is a single cureOur authorities have had to swallow yet another bitter pill. For the first time since 2004, Ukraine dropped in the Freedom House index from the list of “Free” countries down to the “Partly Free” ones. This is the result of the strengthening of the so-called power vertical, the abuse of administrative resources in the recent elections, the persecution of former government officials for political reasons and the general attack on the freedom of speech. All this is accompanied by oaths to strengthen democracy and “Europeanization.” When receiving high-level European officials we tell them one thing and do another. I wonder if our leaders understand that they will be outed in the end. Europe is aware of the hypocrisy, so it will tone down relations with Ukraine. After all, you cannot endlessly cheat everybody. It looks like our authorities caught an infectious and widespread disease called “lack of freedom,” albeit in a benign form for now.
From the very beginning it was clear that all pre-election promises of freedom and democracy, made by the presidential contender Viktor Yanukovych, were nothing but populist slogans. At that time they started to talk of strengthening of the “vertical of power.” It was also suspicious that the term itself was not homemade, but thoughtlessly borrowed from neighboring Russia. How our authorities like all that neighbors do! MPs from the Party of Regions tirelessly call to follow the Russian example. Now they develop an even greater liking for Aleksandr “the Father” Lukashenko [the moniker comes from the Belarusian Batka, Lukashenko’s nickname – Ed.], who threw away all illusions of honest elections and clearly demonstrated in the squares of Minsk how he was going to rule the country. The vertical of power he already has is such as to be envied by Medvedev and Putin. The secret dream of our leaders is to have a similar one. And for Europe they would like to appoint cunning tellers of long tales about democratization. But it is difficult to persuade rational people that black is white. They won’t believe it. As a result, Hanna Herman got confused while explaining the reasons behind Ukraine’s fall in the Freedom House index.
But the Party of Regions’ member’s proclivity for a firm hand is too simple an idea to explain Ukraine’s present trajectory toward authoritarianism. This factor is present, but it is an accessory. A systemic crisis of the general idea of power as such is obvious. A primitive idea inherited from the Soviet times, that a clear-cut vertical ensures quick and unambiguous passage of governing pulses from Kyiv down to the smallest village now domi-nates. It is strange, but virtually all our leaders have either engineering of management diplomas and do not understand the well-known systems theory. In a multilevel system, like the state, governing signals do not reach below the third level, counting from the top. And even if they do, they arrive with such distortions that their sense is absolutely lost, and often acquires an opposite meaning. This is not due to ill will or the low qualifications of executives, although this can make things worse — it is just the way it works. Of course, you can try to refute a theorem like that the sum of all internal angles of a triangle equals 180 degrees. Many people were engaged in such a Sisyphean toils, to no avail. To change a theorem, you must change geometry.
Another problem of the authorities (also of systemic nature), lies in the blind faith in the efficiency of simple and straightforward methods of management: order-execution-control. In a compound system they are not only ineffective, but they also lead to extremely unfavorable, often even dangerous and unpredictable effects. Furthermore, these effects are quite durable and difficult to get rid of. By the way, this disease affects the authorities in both Russia and Belarus, and now the list is supplemented by Ukraine.
The infection of authoritarianism, which still persists from the times of Leonid Kuchma, is poisoning the minds again. For the umpteenth time it is coming from Russia, where the disease has affected the whole country and is now spreading beyond its borders. And our authorities take pleasure in breathing this air poisoned with miasmas of oppression. Where do the so-called reformists start being lame in the authoritarian leg? They start from reprisals against the opposition who allegedly impedes them. Those who are as reckless as “the Father” in Minsk are smiting it hip and thigh without being fastidious about using any means, even the dirtiest ones. In Moscow they try to look respectable for external appearance and keep a reptilian opposition in the State Duma, which is basically a front for the United Russia party, though it is nominally communist. In Ukraine, they have chosen the middle way. The opposition, which is not loved at all and even considered dangerous for some reason, will face Minsk-style reprisals, and the rest will be allowed, for the time being, to speak their mind, but within an established frame. I wonder whether the president and his circle really believe that, having politically killed the likes of Yulia Tymoshenko or Yurii Lutsenko, they will clear the way onto the thoroughfare of progress. Or is it a paranoiac of a Maidan recurrence after the approaching parliamentary elections? From the systemic point of view it absolutely does not matter why the authorities are behaving in this particular way. A fundamental mistake is made; the belief that without a legitimate opposition the country will have no opposition at all is absolutely wrong. The Tunisian president, Zin al-Abidin Ben Ali, ruled the country for more than 20 years with no opposition: how did he end up? He barely managed to escape and found asylum in Saudi Arabia. He probably felt omnipotent and invincible.
Diseases often produce a high fever, but this is not enough for a diagnosis. Additional examinations are needed. Likewise with the despotic intentions of the Ukrainian authorities. Similar symptoms do not mean a single disease. Russia, Belarus and Ukraine must be treated differently, and in different wards.
“After the end of the war and liberation from the Germans there will be, I fear, a great number of the most severe, merciless public prosecutors who were trained especially for Ukraine! And how they will judge cruelly and interrogate our people: what did you do in the times of occupation, did you serve the fascists, why were you in the occupied territories after all? And those public prosecutors and judges will be absolutely merciless! So that’s what the Ukrainian people will have to go through as well...”
“A man — right down to the bottom, such as he really is, with no mask or disguise on — reveals himself in “boundary” situations, when the abstract choice between the good and the evil suddenly becomes an awfully concrete choice between the real death (his own or somebody else’s) and life (his own or somebody else’s). This was the choice that our Belarusian people faced and, moreover, not in 1941, but much earlier, in the 1920s-1930s.”
“All of us, all our genes, bones, blood, and even our shit were imbued by the time and by the air that Stalin created. Up to now we are his children in many aspects, although we are ashamed of confessing it even to ourselves.”
A specific feature of Russian authoritarianism is that part of the ruling elite leeches off the country’s immense natural resources. Due to conditions that have developed in the world, the most marketable goods that have a virtually guaranteed sale market are energy resources — first of all, oil and gas. State monopolies were inherited from Soviet times and constitute the economic basis of the government’s power. This both the case with foreign sales and domestic ones, but particularly the latter. The possibility of unfettered use of energy resources for their own enrichment and as a tool of expansion preserves the status quo, while feeding the people with crumbs from the baron’s table. Any attempt to contest the monopoly of one part of the elite by the other part, who is dissatisfied with the state of affairs, is ruthlessly stopped, as in the Khodorkovsky case. Such a situation can last for a long time, until the next scientific and technical revolution substantially changes both the general demand for energy resources and their types. For instance, new technologies may enable gas extraction from fields whose development was previously infeasible or unprofitable. In Moscow they cursed shale gas and tried to prove that its large-scale production is loss-making, but with a gnashing of teeth they had to agree that the US has mastered this technology and is already satisfying over one quarter of its total demand with shale gas. Then comes liquefied gas, which is not in Gazprom’s favor either.
Russian authoritarianism is also characterized by a lack of response to a changing environment. New technologies are not being mastered, because a hope is cherished that there will be a rescue in the long run. Moreover, all power of the state machinery is aimed at complicating as much as possible the use of everything new. Society is in a state of permanent stagnation, and nobody is looking for a way out. The total lack of prospects for self-development makes more mobile and trained citizens leave for far-away countries. Stagnation is therefore enhanced as the number of people, who are willing and at least potentially able to change that situation, is reduced. There is no way out from this vicious circle, you can only jump out of it. But such jumps often turn into revolutionary chaos. And you can never know where you will land.
These objective factors should be appended with a number of subjective ones. In the first place, absolute centralization of power is a tradition, and there are no hints of local self-government whatsoever. Russia has never seen the Magdeburg Law [medieval German town and village rights that spread throughout much of Central and Eastern Europe and became a basis for local government tradition. – Ed.]. And even with all the autocracy of Polish magnates in Ukraine, they recognized and observed the special rights of cities. Nobody allowed them, and they did not aspire either, to interfere into the internal affairs of such cities as Lviv or Kyiv. Centralization is not only a way of organizing the state, but also a psychology of both the ruling elite and average citizens. Although Russia is nominally a federation, it cannot be compared with the federal arrangements of Austria, Germany or even India. And since nobody can challenge Moscow, it will take a very long time until conditions are ripe to change this order. Furthermore, the Kremlin eliminates every potential threat to its autocracy. Under the pretext of strengthening the vertical of power, governors are not elected but appointed, and mayors will be next. During the last local elections citizens offered their Metropolis a number of unpleasant surprises, and the authorities are getting ready to prevent such unexpected presents.
Belarussian authoritarianism is more or less of the same nature. The main difference is that the whole country has been turned into “the Father’s” estate. His circle is allegedly run like a bunch of puppets. Moreover, as the real owner of the whole country, he can either give or withdraw instructions anytime, without justification. Considering the lack of the Russian abundance of natural resources in Belarus, it is difficult to do without external support. Until recently, Russia has been a donor. Now it is getting more complicated, and this is the weak point of the regime.
Ukraine is in a somewhat different situation. Firstly, authoritarian claims have only just begun. And it cannot be said that here they will agree to tolerate any whims of the authorities. The recent Maidan is proof of this. Ukrainian authorities underestimate the protesting potential of society. Moreover, there is a proven organizational form of its expression, i.e. the Maidan. Last time it engulfed not only the capital, but the provinces as well. Such meetings can be banned; however, it does not change the situation, but rather aggravates it. And it needs to be taken into account. This also provides a remedy for a disease contracted from outside. In the first place, there should be political self-organization. The authorities are perfectly able to fight against unorganized protests. They make every effort to shatter and intimidate the protesters. The only counteraction to this is unity. No dam can stand against a powerful concentrated stream.
Secondly, the Ukrainian authorities are very vulnerable. They do not have the immense financial capabilities of the Russian elite. There is nothing special to share; crumbs on the table from manipulations of the gas pipeline are not enough for everybody. Further, the Ukrainian elite is more deeply stratified than the Russian one. Even among the Donetsk clan members there are different interests. This was clearly demonstrated again during the recent protests in Kyiv. There were much more protesters from the eastern regions than from the western ones. It is an evidence of narrowness of the social basis of the authorities, and all those, who until recently regarded each other with a certain distrust, can unite in the struggle against authoritarian tendencies.
Thirdly, Russia can afford to ignore the attitude of the surrounding world, which, in its turn, does not aspire to exert much pressure on Moscow either, due to mutual dependence. Ukraine does not have such possibilities. Therefore it has to refrain itself, no matter if somebody likes it or not, from being too fast in following Moscow’s footsteps. The EU only threatens Russian officials with sanctions — it never applies them. But with regard to Kyiv such sanctions may as well be applied. This technology was tested on Belarus, and even Lukashenko had to take it into account. Furthermore, it is much easier and safer for the EU to introduce sanctions against top-level Ukrainian officials than against Russian ones. It is also quite convenient for them to take tough pro-democracy stands on the Ukrainian example. And the introduction of visa restrictions, as followed by financial sanctions, is a mortal danger for a great many serious people, not only in Kyiv, but in Donetsk, Kharkiv and Dnipropetrovsk. The mere threat of their application will surely make lots of people shrivel up. Accordingly, the authorities will feel internal pressure to prevent such a course of events.
Despite similar symptoms of the authoritarian disease, remedies for each country are different. What cure will Russia and Belarus take against this infection — it is up to them to choose. This is their business, and nobody should interfere in this process. In want regards our problems, the danger of development and aggravation of the disease should not be underestimated. We are already at that stage, when a simple subduing of fever will not be enough. Desperate times call for desperate measures. But will our authorities have enough insight to understand that authoritarianism will provide no solution to their problems? There are doubts about it, for the time being. And time is pressing...