Dmytro VYDRIN: “The political reform looks like a hot potato

Some may consider political pundit Dmytro Vydrin’s judgments too abrupt and viewpoints too ironic. However, The Day’s interview partner is also quite self-critical, and he has for many years watched closely the developments both on and off the political stage. In addition, he has a wealth of experience of dealing with many Ukrainian politicians. Although he raised this journalist’s eyebrows by saying he considers himself a political astrologer and political sex therapist rather than an image-maker, he still “enjoys camaraderie” with political science. What is this seasoned image-maker’s view of the current political situation?

POLITICAL SEMI-BOHEMIA

“The opposition was successful in pushing a political hangout called the Order of St. Stanislaus to the limelight of the press on the eve of Verkhovna Rada’s third session. What do you think caused this order-mania among several hundred representatives of the Ukrainian political and business elite?”

“Most of our politicians (including democrats) still live by the hackneyed and trivial but, unfortunately, very popular Leninist maxim that politics is the art of the possible. Accordingly, they behave like semi-bohemian representatives of a certain art of the possible and the accidental people rather than those work in a serious field governed by specific laws. From this flows our politicians’ liberal attitude toward all kinds of semi-political schemes. As to the much talked about Order of St. Stanislaus, I fail to see any crime. Incidentally, I am myself one of the knights of an order.”

“Which one?”

“The Austro-Hungarian (and absolutely authentic) Ordo Vini Venatorum which consists of people enthusiastic about hunting, viniculture, and wine-tasting. Before being knighted, I had to undergo quite serious tests for six months. This order like any other has a code of honor which prescribes taking a solemn oath to defend hunting grounds as well as the honor and dignity of the Order’s trademark wine Tokaji Szamorodni.

“But let’s get back to our politicians. Maybe their mass entry into the Order of St. Stanislaus was the attempt to simulate the bohemian lifestyle with its extravagance in clothes, behavior, etc. Secondly, since Ukrainian political life is dreadfully dull, drab, and mundane, our politicians have an intuitive yearning to dress it up if not with gold then at least gilt. So they are drawn not to genuine knightly orders (that require going through their physical and moral paces) but something easy to buy. And, thirdly, most of our politicians come from the nomenklatura and matured as personalities, so to speak, in the conditions of draconian restrictions. Apparently, this mania for orders is a spontaneous protest against their past life, when everything was banned or regimented.

“Yet, there is nothing Masonic in this. Frankly speaking, nobody in (and not only in) Ukraine knows what Masonry is. Whoever has tried to trace its roots for the past 200 years has failed to prove the existence of a mysterious world-shaping organization. In all probability, gone are the times of backstage knights, court puppeteers, Beaumarchais, gray eminences, and the like. Unfortunately, the world is duller and more monotonous than we sometimes picture it in our romantic dreams. Thus we get all these games for grownups, not always adequate and not always appropriate to the office held. In a word, these are toys for which some politicians had the time and money but not enough brains and imagination.”

“As I recall, you ventured to forecast in your Notes of a Political Naturalist on the eve of the last year’s parliamentary elections that lack of principles, sycophancy, and fear would be the psychological backdrop for decision-making in the new legislature. Have you changed in any way this view?”

“No. Power was taken by a certain (to be more exact, the same) elite for which these are inherent, not accidental, features. This elite was seasoned on proverbial checks and balances which in reality are hooks and traps. As a result, almost every Ukrainian has been hooked: every above-average person has enough mud to have slung at him to quickly ruin his business and tarnish his reputation... Since someone who is hooked is always afraid of something, he becomes an ideal object for manipulation. While earlier I was resentful of the deputies’ split personality, now I am rather pleased with it: look at the way they first vote and then grope for excuses in the corridors... Luckily, this does not apply to all of them — there are also adventurous ladies and gentlemen in parliament.”

“Who do you think is most interested in slowing the political reform?”

“In today’s Ukraine nobody is interested in having the political reform slowed down or speeded up. In other words, almost everybody is happy with the existing situation. Let us think over who stands to gain from this and why. For example, a segment of the opposition will benefit from a situation when nothing is being done because then it could criticize the government for doing nothing. The government would also benefit, in principle, from such suspended animation, for on the one hand it would allow the dealers who act under the guise of government to freely rummage through the budget and, on the other hand, let the government accuse the opposition undermining the reforms. So today this reform looks like a hot potato that the government throws to the opposition and vice versa. Everybody gains from the status quo. On the other hand, everybody is too busy with himself to carry out such a big common project. Yet, a reform of governance can only be carried out when the broadest strata of the elite has reached some kind of consensus or agreement. It might be possible to make a deal, but for some reason nobody is looking for the points of contact. I think the reform can get started only when a new elite capable of addressing nationwide problems comes to power.”

THE CLOSER THE ELECTIONS, THE BOLDER WE BECOME

“What seems to be riveting the attention of today’s elite is not the political reform but the coming 2004 race. What symptoms of political positioning are noticeable today in the context of the presidential elections?”

“Elections are usually based on certain slush funds, organizational structures to rely upon, verbal agreements between partners, certain strategies, and certain tactics. Some groups have already begun to work. Some are like hamsters filling their hole in the ground with financial resources, others are building their own organizational structures in the provinces, clearly in anticipation of the presidential elections. In the regions, they are either launching a new mass media project, waving the colors of a newly-formed party, or beginning to pay campaign workers. In other words, the groundwork is being laid, but slowly. Ukraine is a country of limited resources. In real terms, the campaign will start three months before election day. Still, basic preparations for the elections will begin sometime in October this year.”

“Do you think Russian political technologists will make money during our elections as successfully as they have before?”

“For some reason everybody seems to think that Russian or some other political technicians are invited to Ukraine to work. They are invited not to do work but for status in the literary language and for kicks in the common parlance. For example, our oligarchs, instead of wearing $300 Voronin suits, prefer Brioni suits of almost the same quality but costing $3000... It’s the same with political technicians. Today, inviting a Russian political technician is a fad, just like it was to love a girl on the catwalk, a notorious Mercedes-600 or a Patek Philippe watch. It’s considered in fashion. If you don’t have a Russian technologist around, you feel a complete dolt, pardon me, just as did a nineteenth-century nobleman without a French governor for his kids. This is why the fashion for Russian political technicians continues.”

“I wonder what might come into vogue during the future elections?”

“The trendiest oligarchs have recently been gravitating toward some Oriental or Sufi philosophies of life. Many of them took to mysticism, eagerly reading Coelho and Castaneda. Should this trend further develop, I think it’ll create a model of Sufi existence, where each man of consequence will have some sort of a guru of his own. This person will be a mentor rather than a technician. Incidentally, this tradition is now noticeable in Central Asia. When I visit, for example, Uzbekistan, local oligarchs often take me to the grave of Tamerlane’s mentor. Then they always emphasize that under their laws the sarcophagus of a mentor is a more venerable burial ground than that of a ruler himself. We will hardly reach this level of veneration, but still one can already discern the interest of our politicians in some elements of Oriental lifestyles. I think the next elections will reveal some interest in mysticism, the Orient, Sufism (a mystical and ascetic trend in Islam — Ed.) because any society in decay always gravitates precisely toward mysticism — and we have to admit that our present-day elite is in decline.”

“The premier’s chair is considered a good steppingstone for a presidential candidate. Is the ‘Russian option’ or putting forward a dark horse possible in Ukraine?”

“I think one must take into account several factors here. First there is a time limitation. There is an objectively minimum time it takes to hype a certain candidate for a country’s top office. It is believed that nobody can be built up in less than a year’s time. So the hypothetical dark horse should emerge not later than a year before the presidential elections. Otherwise, it makes no sense at all to make him public. Secondly, one must also take into account the objective constraints with respect to the contender himself. As you know, you can’t make chocolate out of just anything. In addition to those on everybody’s lips (Yanukovych, Medvedchuk, Lytvyn, Tyhypko, Tymoshenko, Yushchenko, and Symonenko), there are perhaps three or four individuals who could be theoretically hyped to the level of a real presidential candidate. This is at least one governor, one chairman of the oblast council, one minister, one law-enforcement officer, and one businessman, who could possibly contend for this country’s top post by force of their will, psycho-physical, and intellectual properties. It all depends on whether they are chosen to run.”

“You mentioned Volodymyr Lytvyn among the prospective candidates, but the speaker himself has said more than once that he won’t run in the 2004 race...”

“Like any person with the village mentality, Lytvyn adheres to the principle that a bird in hand is better than two in the bush. In all probability, he understands that if he gate-crashes on the presidency, he could lose the second most important office without getting the first one. Yet, previous experience shows that almost all prospective candidates, who deny any suggestion of their possibly taking part in the presidential marathon, finally declare their candidacy. Our politicians keep saying that they burn their bridges, although bridges do not burn in Ukraine. Therefore, whatever somebody says, he always has a bridge to retreat from his promises: the people want...”

“To what extent realistic do you think is the possibility of nominating at least three opposition candidates?”

“Tymoshenko and Yushchenko, as individuals with a contemporary Western mentality, are actively working with pollsters and know very well that there is not only hired but also normal academic sociology. So they can, in principle, agree to fairly gauge the chances of each other at a certain time span. Knowing the tendencies, constituency, and potential of each, they can easily find out which of them has better chance. I think they will have enough common sense to concede the obvious. For example, Yushchenko has better chances now, but his oft-cited popularity is waning. Conversely, Tymoshenko has shown a steady growth in the past few months. Should this trend continue, their chances could in theory equalize by fall. So I think the choice will be far from easy. As to the Communists, it is still more difficult. Back in the glorious epoch, when I myself was a sociologist and worked with the Communists, I failed to persuade the Communist nomenklatura to believe public opinion polls. They always considered sociologists to be shamans and thus preferred their ‘party conscience’ to academic sociology.”

“For a long time the Our Ukraine leader has been waffling in his attitude to the KPU-SPU-BYuT opposition troika. But immediately after visiting the US, he radicalized himself and announced his participation in the March stage of the Rise Up, Ukraine! campaign. At the same time he managed to see the president about pressure supposedly put on his bloc’s members. How do you explain such maneuvering?”

“When Yushchenko says he will participate in the campaign, this does not yet mean he will side with the troika. His radicalization may have been caused by an attempt to minimize risks. For there is an unwritten political law that the closer the elections, the less risk of confrontation with the current government. This is relationship in direct proportion. In other words, as the elections approach, law-enforcement bodies, such as police and the tax inspection, take a more cautious attitude. The closer the elections, the more radicalized everybody will become, including those in power today. With three months to go, you will not recognize even those who are supposedly siding with the government today. It is they who will level the harshest and most scathing criticism of the president.”

THE SYNDROME OF PROVINCIALITY

“Do you think Ukraine is marching eastward, westward, or backward?”

“However banal it may sound, you must run very fast if you want to keep your position in today’s world. And since Ukraine is standing still, political time is inevitably drawing it into the past. I am afraid this could even be a feudal, not pseudo-communist, past. Incidentally, Ukraine demonstrates today some elements of a feudal society: real feudal lords (we call them oligarchs) are on the rise, powerful clans and ‘families’ are having a greater effect on this country’s destiny than the so-called elements of a civil society still in the process of formation. We have lost much of what we had even in 1992. At that time, we could travel freely in East Central Europe. Today, we need a visa to Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovenia... Back in ‘92, we could be condescending toward Poland, considering ourselves a more promising and powerful country in the European geopolitical structure. Today, the Poles tell us condescendingly, ‘We can be your guide to Europe and we will perhaps help you to join the EU in 15 years.’ Again in ‘92, our top officials were invited with pleasure to all the Western countries, where they received a red-carpet treatment with kisses and hugs (although this might no longer be in fashion). Now virtually nobody kisses our politicians...”

“What do you think has the most negative impact on Ukraine’s image abroad?”

“Unfortunately, Ukraine has not yet formed an elite capable of challenging the European leaders. Reputation in the world does not come from geographical position or even a positive attitude of the neighboring states — it results from very tough competition. Europe is not a flophouse where they give you a bunk, a free blanket, and all the rest, but a place where you must, to put it roughly, wrest everything by force. Yet, our elite has failed to show high competitiveness. Moreover, it has not even tried to secure a place in the European club. Our elite forgets that the European club is quite a closed society that can invite you only once, and then you have to do everything on your own. Once there, you must be able to charm your new partners, make potential friends fall in love with you, intimidate your adversaries, maintain relations even with your enemies, and intrigue against both. In other words, this is a very sophisticated psychological structure. But the Ukrainian elite has never tackled this problem and is thus being kept clear of the best European assemblies. Why did this happen? First, the national elite is not striving for Europe because it is provincially self-sufficient and unable to drop many of its provincial habits. For example, it cannot get used to the idea that walking around with bodyguards is not European practice. It cannot get used to the idea that flashing around a too luxurious lifestyle is not the thing done in Europe. Nor can it resign itself to the fact that in Europe nobody lionizes and grabs the sleeve of middle-echelon politicians or asks them for a favor. By contrast, our elite is used to being the focus of attention; it can’t accept the fact that, at a certain stage of entering elitist clubs, it has to content itself with a bit part... I often found with surprise that this country’s top leaders don’t even like to travel to Europe, are unsociable, and standoffish. They seek no new knowledge in Europe, considering themselves the most clever of all. Besides, they don’t know foreign languages. Incidentally, some supposedly pro-American opposition leaders speak no English. But this is not the main thing. The European club only admits people with an impeccable personal and business reputation. If you, for example, can’t show how you made your money, you have no chance to enter the European business and political elite.”

“And how is our elite received in the CIS countries?”

“In various ways. Some are liked for the ability to down two bottles of vodka and at the right moment tell a nostalgic story from the glorious Soviet past, others for their ability to crack off-color jokes, readiness to give up, for singing Soviet youth songs, for wearing no neckties... In other words, the CIS uses different yardsticks.”

“Recently, when the parliamentary commission investigating the Gongadze case was in session, Ivan Drach (Our Ukraine) confirmed that one of his conversations with the president was recorded by ex-Major Melnychenko. Before that, a similar statement had been made by Borys Oliynyk. As is known, the book published by Melnychenko also contains your conversation with the head of state. Can you confirm the fact of this conversation?”

“Yes, I can. Incidentally, I read with pleasure everything written there. Ukraine has, so to speak, a club of people recorded by Melnychenko. It is quite human to feel ill at ease if you, say, are missing from the book which all the best known people got into. I think Melnychenko will soon be paid for adding those who had never sat on the ill-fated sofa... So I was pleased to learn that I also got into it. Besides, these recordings have nothing to be ashamed of.”

“Some analysts do not rule out a new wave of the tapegate on the eve of the 2004 elections. Do you think this may trigger new intrigues and mudslinging?”

“I don’t think so. For there is the addict’s law: you no longer get off on a small fix after you’ve tasted a big one. And Ukraine was fed such a huge dose of compromising materials...”