Defense Minister Yevhen MARCHUK: the truth about the army is one of the military reform’s main goals

“I KNOW THAT VERY FEW WILL BE GLAD”

“When you were Secretary of the National Security and Defense Council (NSDC), there were so many rumors of you being sent as ambassador to Canada or Germany that your subsequent appointment as Minister of Defense appeard unexpected. Taking into account the condition our army is in, it is rather risky for a politician to assume this office. Did you agree at once?”

“Not at once. I managed to do quite a lot in the office of NSDC secretary. Suffice it to recall a new strategy toward NATO, the Prague summit, the decision to take part in the Iraq peacekeeping operation... Add to this such domestic policy items as radical decisions on railways, Ukrtelekom and Enerhoatom which turned from money-losing into cost-effective businesses in just one year. NSDC decisions on the State Reserve Committee, on the exploitation of mineral reserves, on foreign-invested enterprises, on energy, and on alcoholic and tobacco products helped legalize billions of hryvnias that previously had lined the pockets of some high-placed scoundrels. Of course, they would like to see me packed far away from Ukraine, even to beautiful Canada. Hence the rumors you are talking about and mud-slinging campaigns in some media. And then suddenly a ‘narrow’ office with a wide range of problems... I had to think it over. The president discussed this subject several times with me.

“The president’s main argument was the necessity of serious reform. He said: you have experience in establishing the Security Service, preparing some NSDC sessions on Armed Services problems, in investigating the Sknyliv tragedy and the Russian Tu-154 shoot-down. Then came my personal judgments, when I began comparing the pros and cons. At first, there were more contras than pros, but then their number equalized. Then, frankly speaking, I realized that somebody had to seriously look into and begin fixing the army mechanism. I knew the army was brimming with problems. But, let me say this honestly, only later did I realize why the president had insisted that I agree. I could not imagine the extent of the danger that the Armed Forces’ problems posed for the army itself and society. In time I saw that Mr. Kuchma might have known more than I about the army-related problems.”

MYTHS ABOUT THE ARMY

“To what extent do you think society and the state are aware of the condition the army is in?”

“That about 47,000 commissioned and noncommissioned officers have today no housing of their own is a vicious insult, which society and the state throw at the military. For the question is not about very young people who have served for five to seven years and somehow get through it — everybody has to put up with the hardships. The question is about colonels who have a service record of 20-25 years, have two or three grownup children, but have no place to live. This is a traumatic experience for the families of servicemen. Another detail: many do not believe and think it unbelievable when I say that today’s officers and warrant officers — from the level of a detached battalion to that of a division — have only one set of fatigues. And servicewomen? This is a real tragedy, for they have just one uniform, fatigues, for all occasions. If the state is unable to furnish a uniform to a person conscripted into its Armed Forces, it must under law pay compensation. So the state’s failure to pay the current servicemen 614 million hryvnias as compensation for the military uniforms not supplied is another slap in the face of the army. I think knowing the truth about the Armed Forces is one of the reform’s goals. And, naturally, society should know about the dangers the Armed Forces pose to the people. Perhaps this will sound strange and shocking to some... The dangers are as follows. Today, the Armed Forces store about a million tons of ammunition to be disposed of. The Ukrainian army can deal with fewer than a million tons — even for twenty years ahead. There are about 200 various storage depots and arsenals in this country, which have amassed a colossal amount of ammunition. Most of these depots were established in the late 1980s, when former Soviet troops pulled out of Eastern Europe. Now, ten years or so later, these storehouses present a colossal danger. The Artemyevsk tragedy was a graphic illustration of this. But Artemyevsk is just a tiny fraction of all army arsenals. There are storage depots ten or twenty times larger than the one in Artemyevsk. A lot of ammunition has been grassed over and can only be handled by combat engineers, some storage depots have in fact mined themselves. The first order I signed on July 3 after being appointed minister was to renovate these depots. Yet, the Armed Forces themselves will never solve this problem.”

“One of the last National Security Council sessions, when you were still secretary, was devoted to this problem.”

“Yes, it was. As of today, we’ve managed to do about 30% of the most urgent and top priority work to renovate ammunition depots at least to some extent. The problem cannot be solved without major funding. We must build strong revetments for ammunitions, for some of them are in a very dangerous condition, lying piled on the ground like beet roots or crammed into rotten boxes. The manuals require that these ammunitions be protected with five-to-seven-meter-thick earth embankments. Naturally, they must first be dressed in strong wooden shirts. About 150 kilometers of embankments should be built. This means heavy funds, fuel, equipment, manpower, and land. This requires various sophisticated warning and fire-fighting systems, fire engines, special-purpose water reservoirs, building materials and so on, which will cost hundreds and hundreds of millions hryvnias. Containers are not just herring boxes — they are quite sophisticated items for keeping multi-meter torpedoes, missiles, large-caliber projectiles, heavy bombs, etc. Why this was not given attention in the past is a different question.”

“Some online publications have supposed that the Artemyevsk blasts resulted from the intention to cover the tracks after the Security Council decided and you ordered that military storage depots carry out stocktaking.”

“No, Artemyevsk is a clear case. Three uniformed adventurists who guarded the depot invited a civilian gas-welder. That was their sixth ‘visit’ inside the depot. Knowing that the 52nd Brigade was to be disbanded and the depots will be relocated, they began cutting the access railway tracks and selling them as scrap metal. ‘Welding work’ inside a depot ignited the gunpowder, and the rest is common knowledge... Incidentally, one in Artemyevsk is not the largest or the worst depot. 3600 tons blew up there. The Armed Forces have about a dozen depots with tens of times more ammunition stored than in Artemyevsk.”

“You mentioned the myths that shroud the Armed Forces. Who created these myths and why?”

“It’s a long story. On the one hand, there are positive myths about the Armed Forces, but they were created by our ancestors — our fathers, grandfathers, and even great-grandfathers. For quite a long time, the military was a showpiece of high probity, organization, and self-denial, which eventually created a good myth which still contributes to high public trust in the army. Conversely, another negative myth was created in the years of independence: in spite of some obvious drawbacks caused by insufficient funding, all is OK in general, the military have all kinds of resources and are bound to survive. This is also the question of undying window-dressing, eyewash, and, I would say, misinformation about the actual state of affairs.”

MONEY

“Housing for the military has been so much talked about that it raises the question: what happens to the money earmarked for housing? For the army has long possessed considerable resources. Can the housing problem be solved at the expense of these resources?”

“It can, but only partially. Under presidential decrees, the state has allowed the Ministry of Defense to make use of not only budgetary but also invested funds for housing construction. The ministry was allowed to share out land plots and to grant such privileges as exempting the businesses that build housing for the military from the profit tax. The State Tax Administration and the Auditing Chamber mentioned UAH 835 million. The national budget was short of this amount for several years because businesses were exempt from the aforesaid taxes. Instead of going to the budget, this money was channeled into housing construction for the military. This was accompanied, however, by a string of irregularities. We are now looking into this.

“Meanwhile, the article on expenditures for military-related housing construction is protected under the law on the state budget this and, let us hope, next year. We must give the cabinet and parliament their due: funding is being effected on a regular basis. The budget allocates a little more than UAH 300 million next year to this end.

“Besides, the Ministry of Defense has considerable land resources. I have now stopped, with the president’s permission, the practice of transferring land resources to anybody just in exchange for some services, although there have been requests from some very high-placed visitors... Everything has been stopped, a technique has been worked out, there are estimates. All resources except budget funds will be channeled into housing construction. In other words, this problem has two aspects: past and future. We will deal with the past. We have initiated several court actions and I’m sure we’ll win every case. We won’t allow the Defense Ministry to be gypped like that. What resources the army has will be sold only at market prices. This is no problem, we can transfer surplus equipment or land to the government, parliament, or local authorities. There is only one condition. We’ll do so at market prices. A plot of land occupied by utilities has one price and an arable field has another price. So it is sold in return for an equivalent of housing accommodations for servicemen in that same area. By the way, that’s how the military housing problem is being solved in Russia, particularly in Moscow, and it includes not only “homeless” servicemen, as most officers live in adverse housing conditions, although they aren’t formally referred to the homeless category. Imagine a general officer with 22 years on record and two adult sons living in a single room, yet he is not regarded as homeless. Service apartments are a different matter. As minister, I have no service apartments in reserve and have a hard time maneuvering cadre without causing officers’ families problems. But there will be comfortable service apartments in reserve, including with proceeds of sales of army property; we’ll buy apartments also on the secondary market where the prices are lower. An end must be put forever to such an outrageous thing as homeless officers.”

“When it comes to government funds vanishing, one ought to expect more hired campaigning.”

“It’s already underway with more being planned, from what I know. Not so long ago, several journalists were hired in Chernihiv oblast and paid to write a book about the Gongadze case; they were promised access to classified information, but on one condition: hit Marchuk and two other individuals. Likewise, new so-called biographers are hired, meant to offer fresh interpretations of my life story. I have been through all this; it just never works. Lies are lies. True, there is a new aspect to this technique; hot story architects are enlisting adventuresome politicians.”

“Could you have in mind Communist Leader Petro Symonenko and his allegations about certain secrets involved in the Gongadze case? But he knows that you know...”

“I have responded to his statements. He was trapped by his own lies. I wonder where the number one oppositionist receives such texts. So you know a secret about the Gongadze case? Why not bring it to the court, the prosecutor’s office, why not send it to Ms. Severinsen? So you have read another sensational story about Marchuk, composed and sent by the same people who did it before, except now intended for those in office? Why not give it to the prosecutor?”

NO MONEY — NO REFORM

“The budget process is going full swing. Would you comment on the defense spending item?”

“Of course. It’s a long budget story, but it comes down to this. In early July, the Defense Ministry submitted its budget enquiry, based on computations done as instructed by the president in his directive on a new stage in the army reform. Copies of that directive were forwarded to all army units. The Armed Forces were to have 200,000 officers and men by 2006. Having this strength requires two things. First, this must not be done to the detriment of preparedness and military effectiveness. Second, all social guarantees with regard to the servicemen must be honored in the course of the military reform.”

“What about those guarantees?”

“First, severance pay: this means that if an officer being discharged has a service record of 25 years, he is entitled to a 12-month lump sum allowance. Second, compensation for clothing. I have mentioned UAH 614 million. Third, top priority housing accommodation. In other words, all officers thus dismissed are placed at the top of the housing waiting lists or receive guaranteed accommodations at specific housing construction projects. Fourth, compensation for the individual income tax payments. Fifth, expenses to help such officers adjust to the civilian environment. These are significant social guarantees. The sum total amounted to UAH 614 million, including the expenses involved in redeployment and reductions.”

“6.4 billion hryvnias is a minimum. How much do you really need?”

“Considering all the normative documents, from the Constitution to presidential edicts, and proceeding from the kind of structure the Armed Forces have today, keeping it running and developing it would require more than 10 billion hryvnias. That’s unrealistic. With this and the mentioned priorities in mind, we reduced the sum to 6.4 million. This is not 100% but 32% medical spending and about 30% costs of fuel supplies.”

“How will the army economize, by lowering combat training and reducing purchases of modern weapons?”

“The army can’t economize in any way. You see, this 6.4 million includes some 800 million hryvnias worth of a special fund raised by utilizing all proceeds of army property sales, scrap, materiel, and so on. We’ll economize on flying hours, shots of tank guns unfortunately, there is no alternative.”

“In other words, given this kind of financing, it is in practice impossible to prevent a slack in combat efficiency, let alone try to increase it?”

“A mere 25% of the proposed 6.4 million would be spent on development, the rest would be on maintaining the army and personnel reductions. We have to do this, because if we don’t step up manpower reductions in the next couple of years, 2006 and subsequent years will again see unjustifiably high and irrational budget spending on army maintenance. It is true that reducing a regiment’s strength now costs three times its maintenance. But suppose there is no regiment next year. It means no money has to be spent on it. Everybody should understand that army manpower reductions produce the desired effect in two or three years.”

PENNY WISE...

“A number of experts and journalists note this paradox: Ukraine’s foreign policy in terms of national security is Western oriented, particularly with regard to NATO. At the same time, there are no large military-technological projects with any Western countries. Any more or less sizable such projects are done jointly with Russia.”

“Unfortunately, nothing worthwhile is being done jointly with Russia. Let me explain. NATO doesn’t impose all its weapon system standards on us. Their partnership requirements mostly comes down to compatibility in terms of mentality, use of a single parlance, compatibility of control systems, planning principles, and communications. Which country has what tanks or submachine guns doesn’t really matter, so long as these weapons are effective and handled by an adequately trained personnel. I would say that military-technological cooperation between the Armed Forces of Ukraine and those of other countries is proceeding normally at this stage. As for the development of weapon systems and research in this field, our biggest problem is financing, of course. Here, too, we are faced with traditional army ailments. The Accounting Chamber of Ukraine checked the purposeful usage of military research and development budget appropriations. Their findings show that about one percent of several hundred million hryvnias thus allocated has been channeled into the output of finished products. In other words, vast sums have been spent on hopeless projects or for other purposes.

“Our military experts are struggling to perceive the new essence of military conflicts. I would say that it is a painful process. For example, we now have about 4,000 tanks, most of which nobody needs.”

NATO: IF PARLIAMENT DOES ITS JOB

“Getting back to the NATO-Ukraine subject. How would you comment on People’s Deputy Oleh Zarubynsky’s recent statement? He headed the Ukrainian parliamentary delegation at the NATO interparliamentary assembly and said that the Ukraine- NATO Action Plan, adopted in Prague, could fail. We have passed 7 of 29 required bills. Was he right and are there any prospects? Could the Action Plan actually fail?”

“The Action Plan envisages five cooperation sectors. Apart from two “forceful” ones, three address political, economic, and humanitarian problems, including the freedom of speech, human rights, media, and so on. As for the military sector, everything is according to plan concerning the Action Plan. Not so long ago, Oleksandr Zatynaiko, Chief of the General Staff, took part in a meeting of the NATO Military Committee. I will take part in the committee’s meeting of defense ministers on December 2. We have no problems whose nature or scope could prevent our carrying out the Action Plan. There are certain difficulties relating to defense oversight, but they can’t create obstacles to our progress toward NATO. This means that other sectors — economic, political, and humanitarian — are at issue.”

“How realistic is Ukraine’s transfer to a new, higher level of relations with NATO? Namely the Membership Action Plan at the Istanbul summit next June?”

“We cherish this possibility. Mr. Zarubynsky is right, however, saying that there is foreboding. It is also true that it’s much more important to demonstrate positive trends. There is one dangerous aspect about the Action Plan, precisely how effective our parliament proves to be. Most problems are rooted in passing or rejecting bills in Verkhovna Rada. And there is the nonetheless important issue of their implementation.”

“Indeed, there is an increasing number of issues causing sieges of the parliamentary podium, as during the Donetsk scandal. In any case, it’s safe to assume that someone will try to provide causes to block parliamentary work.”

“One has to be realistic. We are faced with this threat. Unless the parliament does its job well, we’ll have no prospects. There is another aspect. NATO is known to have demonstrated a double-standard toward certain countries that sought membership.”

“The Balkan states and Romania are often cited as examples. Yet their democratic institutions and defense standards can hardly be described as more advanced than what we have in Ukraine.”

“I will neither agree nor disagree. We know that unless NATO chooses to politicize the problem by supporting one candidate or another in the next elections, I think that with what we have now we could raise the matter of transferring to the Membership Action Plan. There is little time left until the Istanbul summit in June 2004. I am sure that the opposition — or a certain part of it — will not block the pertinent bills.”

“You have mentioned NATO’s political motives. The emphasis in the recent statements by the ambassadors from the leading Western countries remains the same: the coming elections. Naturally, the diplomats insist that they are interested in the process, not the outcome.”

“Yes, the election campaign has political hazards. We have part of it in Ukraine as well. The other part is on the other side. Regrettably, the factor of the presidential elections in Ukraine may play a radical role and have a negative effect on Ukraine-NATO rapprochement. This would be a very great loss for Ukraine. Unless we can attend the Istanbul summit with approaches to the Membership Action Plan duly coordinated with NATO, we’ll probably lose a couple of years. NATO meanwhile will have adopted new membership standards and requirements. MAP means higher technology, another quality of Ukraine-NATO relations.”

“How would you describe the Ukrainian army’s attitude toward NATO, among the generals, commanding officers, and men? National polls indicate 30-35% support of Ukraine’s NATO membership. With effort on the part of the authorities and politicians, this percentage inspires enough hope for success, for example, if we held a referendum now. Countries following a similar path showed 30% public support. Is this percentage higher or lower in the army?”

“I have no special cause to worry about the Armed Forces in terms of their attitude toward NATO membership. What’s most important for the military? Clear prospects, good logistics, modern equipment, adequate housing arrangements, and so on. Our officers and men know that all this is kept at the highest level in most NATO countries. Another point is that most officers and men in the Armed Forces of Ukraine are not afflicted with the syndrome of Soviet nostalgia.”

TUZLA THERAPY

“About the Tuzla crisis. Of course, it’s primarily a matter to be dealt with by the Foreign Ministry. The Defense Ministry officially has no role there, yet we recently heard your Russian counterpart Igor Ivanov. You have long maintained political contact with him since you were both Secretaries of the Ukrainian and Russian Security Councils. Mr. Ivanov said that the placement of Ukrainian boundary posts at Tuzla was unlawful. Even more interestingly, he added that from now on the talks would gain momentum. “It seems to me that they will, for some reason,” was what he said. Why do you think he said that, considering that Igor Ivanov is one of those rubbing elbows with President Putin?”

“In his own way Igor Ivanov confirmed the stand taken by Russia in the Tuzla conflict. I think it’s important to understand that Tuzla demonstrated the unpredictability of the Russian policy toward Ukraine. I also think that it’s even more important than the very fact of building that dam. It was a turn of events none of the European and Ukrainian analysts and politicians could have anticipated.

“I am not sure what Ivanov meant, saying that the talks would gain momentum. Whether or not they will depends on how flexible Russia proves in handling the situation. The Ukrainian side made its stand clear. Our president said where the border is and even his opponents agreed. Russia could somehow meet Ukraine halfway.

“But the Tuzla case could be for the best; it could teach us to treat Russia not only as a strategic partner, but also as a serious rival. Such is the logic of the modern world, leaving no room for illusions.”

IRAQ: WE HAVE NO IMAGE AS AN OCCUPIER

“Ukraine dispatched contingents to Kuwait and Iraq several months ago. Do you still think that it was the right decision to make?”

“Yes, I do. I haven’t changed my mind. There are a number of reasons and I have stated many, so I won’t repeat myself. There are also new reasons and circumstances. Iraq is already building a new political structure, and it’s a slow and painful process. We are taking part in it. Our lawyers are helping establish their judicial system, we secure the currency exchange, make security arrangements for local authorities, a number of enterprises, and most important elements of the infrastructure.”

“There is mounting coalition resistance in Iraq; US manpower losses already surpass those during the war.”

“Yes, the Iraqi situation remains complex and the general atmosphere in the country is tense. Our men have confiscated thousands of firearms and hundreds of thousands of munitions, meaning that these weapons can no longer be used to kill people. It’s also an element of stability. It’s true that the Americans are regarded as occupiers in Iraq. The Ukrainian contingent isn’t treated that way by the people. When our patrols were attacked it was done by mercenaries. Our presence is actually a very serious element of stabilization and stability in Iraq. We are training a territorial defense battalion there. More than 600 Iraqis have undergone training and passed; some of them are on active duty, patrolling and guarding important facilities. We are also training a border guard detachment to secure the Iran-Iraq frontier on our side. And, of course, local residents often ask our servicemen to help them in various matters, sometimes very serious, ranging from medical aid to confiscation of weapons, and so on. It’s very important for an Iraqi in the street to know that there is a certain force acting as an arbitrator, as a factor of stability. I remember the chief of a police force in Iraq telling me that if we left they would be afraid to think of what would happen next. And the last argument. Iraq is a good school for our military. Our boys returning in January (after the second brigade will on its way as relief) will be a new kind of servicemen, real professionals, the core, however small, of the future professional army of Ukraine. I think that while in Iraq, they have already realized that they not only match, but also in many respects are better than their colleagues from other countries. They will have patriotic movies.”

“Washington has started discussing political adjustments, saying that power will be transferred to civilian authorities somewhat earlier than planned. Without doubt, the Iraqi theme is among the most important ones in the US election campaign. Does this mean that Ukraine will likewise readjust its policy, that the term and strength of the Ukrainian contingent will be shortened now that the election is getting closer? How will all this effect the deployment of the Ukrainian contingent in Iraq?”

“I don’t think that Ukraine will adopt a single stand in every respect, regardless of the situation. Anything can happen as the Iraqi situation remains complex. I can’t say that yes, we’ll stay there for two years. This is something to be decided by the political leadership of Ukraine. There could be a turn of events such that our contingent would be withdrawn earlier — if, for example, the situation aggravates so as to threaten the lives of our servicemen. So far nothing points to such a grim scenario. I must say that every incident involving our men in Iraq (except the administrative and criminal cases currently being investigated by two Ukrainian judge advocates) is a lesson we are carefully learning from. What is happening there is not a military exercise on home turf... That’s why I say that these servicemen represent a new quality — quality achieved on the battlefield. Well, that’s part of their profession.”

CIVIL CONTROL LEVELS

“You spoke at the last extended board meeting of the Defense Ministry, saying that the delimitation of responsibilities between the General Headquarters and the Ministry had been practically completed. What about this delimitation? Also, do you think that the Ukrainian Armed Forces are prepared to be placed under civil control? By the way, experts often refer to this kind of control as a key NATO requirement.”

“This delimitation is quite simple. The military must not be involved in or with politics — and this applies to every officer and man, as well as to the whole military structure. Our servicemen must be prepared to carry out military and political decisions. This makes a very tangible difference, but this does not mean the isolation of the military. For example, Colonel General Oleksandr Zatynaiko, Chief of the General Staff, is not a deputy to the Minister of Defense, although previously he was First Deputy Minister of Defense. He is, however, a member of the Defense Ministry Board and of the [National] Security [and Defense] Council.

“In other words, given this kind of financing, it is in practice impossible to prevent a slack in combat efficiency, let alone try to increase it?”

“A mere 25% of the proposed 6.4 million would be spent on development, the rest would be on maintaining the army and personnel reductions. We have to do this, because if we don’t step up manpower reductions in the next couple of years, 2006 and subsequent years will again see unjustifiably high and irrational budget spending on army maintenance. It is true that reducing a regiment’s strength now costs three times its maintenance. But suppose there is no regiment next year. It means no money has to be spent on it. Everybody should understand that army manpower reductions produce the desired effect in two or three years.

“In other words, his highly professional opinion will be heard. Further, concerning delimitation, it should be noted that the military must be separated from ownership, from the economy, trade, and sale of property. That’s not its business. The military should be kept away from temptations that will eventually bring it so much harm. Besides, civilians can do business much better, mainly because they are not burdened with the commanding officer’s sense of what must be done. The third aspect of public control is teaching army officers that they are not at the top, that they must take orders from those actually at the top. This is easier said than done, after so many years when the Defense Minister, the Chief of the General Staff, and the Deputy Minister were all military men; they had become convinced that they were in command of everything. Society must be in command of the military. It is a purely psychological-administrative aspect, but it is very important. Also, we must remove all barriers and make the Armed Forces transparent. Army men, by their very nature, are hard put to act in the open. They shouldn’t be blamed, for such is the nature of the army. Indeed, the military structure should not look like a public thoroughfare, but nor should it look like a sealed fortress. And so a civilian-staffed ministry will open the doors for society to see what the Armed Forces are all about. Only civilians can provide conditions for democratic public control over the Armed Forces. They must protect the military from political intrusions. It is easier for me and my colleagues to deny a favor to the leader of a party or faction, or a people’s deputy when doing this favor is impossible. Army men must do combat training, keeping the army prepared, and rationally use the resources provided them. In order to do so, the Defense Ministry retains all controlling functions, even though the responsibilities are delimited.”

“Are the generals prepared to surrender their financial and economic powers?”

“Not all of them. Many have grown accustomed to their status and some find it difficult to realize that everything the Armed Forces have — property, land, and so on — they do not own, but are allowed to use. Overcoming this mentality will take time.”